

BORN TO LOSE AND DOOMED TO SURVIVE
STATE DEATH AND SURVIVAL IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES

OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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July 2001

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation addresses a fundamental question in international relations: under what conditions do states die, or exit the international system? Specifically, this dissertation examines the causes of violent state death, which typically occurs in the form of conquest or long-term military occupation. I define state death as the formal loss of control over foreign policy making to another state.

The probability of state death is governed by the incentive structures of would-be conquerors. States engaged in enduring rivalries face a strategic imperative to take over states that lie between themselves and their opponents. Thus, buffer states are particularly likely to die. This insight is surprising because great powers are generally thought to promote the survival of buffer states that separate them from each other.

Just as strategy can drive states' decisions to conquer other states, so can international norms constrain these decisions. After 1945, a norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty prevents violent state death. In the face of this prohibitive norm, great powers turn to other means to pursue their ends. One form of "death" replaces another after 1945 as the boundaries of buffer states harden, but external interventions to replace buffer state regimes and leaders become increasingly common.

This argument disagrees with several major international relations theories. Neorealists suggest that states that behave as if they were rational will be more likely to survive. Occupation costs theorists argue that states that are more nationalistic will generate higher governance costs for conquerors; would-be conquerors therefore avoid taking over states likely to generate these costs. And constructivists suggest that states

accorded greater levels of international legitimacy are more likely to survive than less legitimate states.

Both quantitative analyses based on original data and historical case studies of interventions in Poland and the Dominican Republic illustrate the peril of buffer state status and the relative safety of the post-1945 world. Moreover, the data show that the variables suggested by previous scholarship are unrelated to state survival or death. Thus, buffer states are “born to lose” and states after 1945 are – at least for now – “doomed to survive.”

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It is often said that writing a dissertation is an excruciating, lonely journey. For me, it has been a true joy. I attribute this in part to my good luck in being able to do what I love doing, but mostly to the wonderful people who have helped me through this process.

First and foremost, I thank my advisers. Scott Sagan has been my teacher, my mentor, my co-author, and my shoulder to lean on for the past six years. I know that I will spend the rest of my career trying to emulate him as both professor and scholar. Steve Krasner, from the first day I met him, has been a kindred intellectual spirit for me. I thank him for his generosity, his skepticism, and for afternoons spent arguing in his office and over coffee. Jim Fearon, despite coming late to Stanford and therefore to this project, consistently offered insights that have made an indelible impact on this work. And Simon Jackman patiently suffered through many hours of confusion (mine, not his) as he steered me through the waters of quantitative analysis.

My advisers have served as my primary intellectual support, but others have been generous enough to grant me more prosaic types of assistance. I thank the National Science Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, the Lane Foundation, Stanford's Social Science History Institute, the Dean's Office for Humanities and Sciences, and the Institute for International Studies for their generous financial support during my graduate career. I also thank Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation for providing me both financial support and an unparalleled intellectual and physical home for the past two years.

If the friends and colleagues I have known at Stanford have benefited half as much from my company as I have from theirs, I will have done extraordinarily well by them. In the Political Science Department, Sean Theriault and Dave Lewis pulled me through my beginning days of learning to “do statistics,” while Svetlana Tsalik, Anu Kulkarni, Norma Alvarez, and Sybil Rhodes forced me to play when I needed to stop working. At the Center for International Security and Cooperation, I have been lucky to have Barry O’Neill, David Edelstein, and Jeremi Suri as colleagues and neighbors who pushed me to improve my arguments and accompanied me on many free food forays. I join most of my generation of international security scholars in thanking Lynn Eden for being a peerless mentor and colleague; magically, Lynn has always known when to be a cheerleader and when to tell me to stop being silly, and I am profoundly grateful for her friendship.

All my life, my family have believed unconditionally – even when I did not – in my ability to accomplish all my goals. Mom and Dad, thank you for putting up with my bad humors, my working through holidays, and random requests for money. And Dad, thank you for keeping me up arguing at night when I was a little girl. I also thank my sister, Shaena, because she really wanted to be in these acknowledgments.

Finally, Lou – thank you. More than anyone else, you have been my rock, my peace, and my home over the past six years. Thank you for listening to all my venting and brainstorming, and for learning more political science than any self-respecting lawyer ever should. I could not have done this without you.

T.M.F.

Stanford, California

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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examines the phenomenon of state death in the international system. I define state death as **the formal loss of foreign policy making power to another state**. This definition distinguishes state death from cases of extreme regime change or internal state collapse. For example, the partitioning of Germany after World War II constitutes a state death, but the Cuban revolution of 1959 does not constitute a state death. The British conquest of Punjab in 1846 led to the death of the Punjabi state, but while the internal collapse of Somalia in 1992 left the state without clear internal authority structures, Somalia continues to exist as a member of the international system. Although the argument advanced here has important implications for domestic political changes, the dependent variable is the survivability of states in the international system.¹

Since 1816, 68 of 210 states have died. Fifty-one of these cases are instances of violent state death, which constitutes the narrower focus of this dissertation.² Figure 1 shows the number of states that have died violently per year from 1816 to 1992. This graph provides a window onto my primary question: why do some states die violently and not others? This question itself raises a set of problems: why has violent state death virtually ceased in the post-1945 era? Why do some states that exit the system reenter at a

¹ For an extended discussion of the definition of state death, please refer to Chapter 3.

² Violent state death occurs when one state uses military force to deprive another of its formal control over foreign policy making. Typically, violent state death occurs in the form of conquest or occupation, although there have been cases of state dissolution or unification that were violent as well.




Figure 1

later time? Does the current decline in violent state death mean that the international system has become less competitive than before?

An obvious answer to the question underlying this project is that powerful states are more likely to survive than weak states. This hypothesis is consistent with realist theories of international relations, which tend to look to power as a principal variable in world politics. The bivariate correlation between power and state survival, however, is a very weak one.

I will show that two factors are more important than power, or any attribute or behavior of states, in determining state survival and death. States that are buffers caught between two rivals are very likely to die, and states that survive to 1945, when a norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty takes effect, are very unlikely to die.

The realist focus on power as predictive of state death and survival is similar to other explanations for state death derived from the broader international relations literature in that it looks to state attributes or behavior for explanations of state survival and death. In contrast, I argue that we must examine the incentives facing states that might take over other states – rather than the features of states that might themselves be taken over – to understand state death. In so doing, I ask two questions. First, under what conditions might states want to take over other states? And second, under what conditions might states be constrained from taking over other states?

In answer to the first question, I argue that states engaged in enduring rivalries have strong incentives to take over the states that lie between them and their opponents. In other words, buffer states are particularly likely to die. The rivals surrounding buffer states each want to avoid a situation in which their opponent takes over the buffer area at

their expense. In order to avoid this worst-case scenario, both rivals are likely to take over the entire buffer area.

In answer to the second question – under what conditions might states be constrained from taking over other states – I argue that proscriptive norms, supported by great powers, may alter the behavior of would-be conquerors. Specifically, a norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty prevents violent state death after 1945, as great powers lend support and sponsorship to the norm in the postwar period. I will show that this norm has its origins in Wilsonian idealism, and was agreed to by other powers for fear of punishment, adverse reputational consequences, and because other alternatives to achieve goals previously sought through conquest were available. I will not argue that the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty has led to a better, more peaceful world; nor will I argue that this norm is a permanent feature of the international system. Would-be conquering states have turned to other means to achieve their goals, and this norm may very well decline with American hegemony.

What are the survival prospects for buffer states in a world with a norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty? In other words, does buffer state status trump the power of the norm, or vice versa? I argue that a norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty prevents even buffer states from violent state death. The norm does not, however, protect buffer states completely from incursions of sovereignty. Faced with this norm, the rivals that would otherwise take over buffer states today intervene to replace regimes and leaders instead. While the buffer states themselves are not at risk, their leaders and regimes are in great danger – perhaps even greater danger than before.

Competing Explanations

From Cleopatra to Metternich to Gorbachev, leaders have fought for the survival of their states. Insofar as state survival is a primary goal of statesmen, international relations scholars are unable to offer sound advice to help policymakers attain this goal. State survival and state death, while clearly relevant to states at risk of dying, are also important for more stable states whose international relations are threatened by state deaths. As demonstrated in later chapters, state death is almost always violent. Frequently, state death is either a cause or a consequence of war. For example, the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait was the trigger for the Persian Gulf War. After World War II, Germany was dismembered for almost five decades. If we can predict which states are at risk of dying when, we may view the causes and consequences of war from a new angle. By identifying potential “hot spots” and understanding the patterns exhibited in such areas in the past, we may be better prepared to allocate resources efficiently and prevent war in the future.

State death is also an important issue for international relations theorists. I test my argument against three alternative hypotheses drawn from the international relations literature. State death is one of several points of contention for two main, competing IR paradigms: neorealism and constructivism. State death, or state selection, plays a fundamental, yet underappreciated role in neorealism. Perhaps contrary to popular perception, rationality of states or state actors is not a neorealist assumption. Indeed, neorealists avoid making a strict rationality assumption by making a selection argument: states that “do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to

prosper, will lay themselves open to danger, will suffer.”³ At the same time, neorealists, among others, assert that the death rate of states is low.⁴ If irrational behavior is punished by death, and the death rate of states is low, neorealists claim, then states must behave as if they were rational. Thus, state rationality is an inference of the neorealist paradigm, rather than an assumption. Even if we assume that the assumptions are empirically correct, the logic behind the deduction is shaky at best. Nonetheless, the neorealist selection argument is itself an important hypothesis that many scholars have suggested testing.⁵ Until now, none have taken up this challenge.

Unlike realists, constructivists do not conclude or assume that states behave rationally. According to constructivists, states and state actors socially construct their world such that certain actions are permissible and others are forbidden. For example, David Strang and Alexander Wendt have argued that states also confer degrees of international legitimacy upon other (aspiring) state actors.⁶ Insofar as the world is socially constructed, some actors may be designated as being in the “in-group” while others are in the “out-group.” This distinction among actors is accompanied by different rules of behavior as applied to actors in the in versus out groups. To conquer and occupy an illegitimate state is permissible, while conquest of a “legitimate” state is taboo and will be punished. Wendt goes even further to suggest that, in certain “cultures of anarchy” any state death may be prohibited. Thus, in a Hobbesian culture of anarchy, where a violent social construction reigns, all states are at risk of being taken over by any

³ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 118.

⁴ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 138; see also Wendt, p. 279.

⁵ Cf. Feaver; Waltz, “Reflections on *Theory of International Politics*”.

⁶ Strang; Wendt.

other. In Lockean or Kantian cultures, on the other hand, there are rules against conquest or occupation; state death exits the behavioral repertoire of would-be conqueror states.

The issue of state death is also relevant for a third set of arguments from international relations theory – what I will call the “occupation costs” or “governance costs” argument. Represented by scholars such as Robert Gilpin and David Lake, proponents of this argument have suggested that nationalistic societies will generate particularly high costs for states that conquer them.⁷ The resistance to conquest inspired in these particularly nationalistic states would make conquest untenable. Would-be conquerors, behaving strategically, thus avoid taking over states whose populations would generate these occupation costs.

Does the international system punish irrational behavior? Or, does an international society sometimes forbid states from acting on strict cost-benefit analyses and conquering their neighbors? I will argue that realists, constructivists, and occupation costs theorists are wrong; I will also argue that realists, constructivists, and occupation costs theorists are right.

The argument presented here has clear realist and constructivist components. A focus on buffer states is akin to a focus on position in the system; this approach is not unlike Waltz’s structuralism or Hans Morgenthau’s more traditional balance of power argument.⁸ An emphasis on the power of a norm acknowledges that at least parts of the international system are indeed socially constructed. Furthermore, the strongest reason for states to adhere to this norm is that they will be forced to pay a cost for violating it; a cost-benefit calculation therefore prevails in my analysis, but it is the costs of

⁷ See Gilpin; Kaysen; Lake, *Entangling Relations*; Rosecrance; for an excellent critique of this argument see Liberman.

opprobrium, rather than the costs of occupation, that enter into the calculus of would-be conquering states.

My goal is not to align with a particular school, or even to construct a bridge between paradigms. It is, instead, to answer the question: under what conditions do states die? While the argument presented here is composed of realist, constructivist, and materialist elements, there is an important distinction to be made between my argument and the predictions of other scholars who have made claims about the conditions under which states will die. The neorealist focus on state behavior, the constructivist claims about the import of state legitimacy, and the occupation costs argument's attention to nationalism all refer to attributes or behaviors of states; their implication is that states can take actions to increase or reduce the probability of their deaths. By contrast, I argue and will show that the situation a state is in – and in particular, the incentives facing would-be conquering states – is more determinative of state survival and death. Even when we control for these situational variables, state attributes or behavior fail to predict state death. My argument, then, cuts across reigning theories of international relations while borrowing from them.

Plan of the Dissertation

Chapter 2 includes a more complete discussion of arguments from international relations theories, laying out specific hypotheses derived from these paradigms. Additional predictions, from fields as diverse as sociological institutionalism and

⁸ Morgenthau.

industrial organization theory, are presented as well. The principal focus of the chapter, however, is on the argument outlined above. In addition to an expanded discussion of the argument, I discuss briefly conditions under which buffer states are especially likely to be taken over by a surrounding rival. I also trace the origins of the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty to the Wilsonian tradition of promoting the related rights of self-determination and territorial sovereignty. I then show why it is that even powerful states – like the US and Soviet Union – adhered to the norm.

Chapter 3 offers definitions of key terms and variables. In part because the subject of this dissertation will be new for most readers, it is important to consider and reconsider how we define the independent and dependent variables under discussion. In addition to an expanded discussion of the definition of state death, I revise the coding rules for the Correlates of War list of members of the interstate system. I offer the first (to my knowledge) coding system for international legitimacy, and also address a number of issues associated with state death, like state resurrection and succession. This chapter also includes lists of states, state deaths, buffer states, and state resurrections.

Chapter 3 lays the groundwork for Chapter 4, which contains quantitative tests of hypotheses on state death. Duration analysis is used to test the neorealist, constructivist, occupation costs, buffer state, and norms hypotheses outlined above. Hypotheses from other disciplines are also tested. When duration analysis is inappropriate or impossible, other techniques are used to test the hypotheses that states that can generate higher occupation costs are more likely to be resurrected, that external replacement of regimes and leaders is more common after 1945 than before, and that the incidence of violent

state death over the past two centuries is close to the incidence of war. In this way, I highlight the relevance of this subject, as well as test possible answers to the question.

As will be shown in Chapter 4, one of the most striking features of the history of violent state death is the virtual cessation of violent state death after 1945. I argue that great power support of a norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty accounts for both the content and timing of this change. There are, however, a number of competing explanations for this trend that require attention. Given that the post-1945 territorial sovereignty norm is coincident with bipolarity, the presence of nuclear weapons, increased market integration, and increased numbers of democracies in the international system, it is important to examine corollary hypotheses of a number of theories that predict a decline in violent state death after 1945. In the second half of Chapter 4, I examine each of these variables and their potential role in explaining the post-45 trend; I also derive and test corollary hypotheses of these arguments.

Having concluded quantitative tests that are meant to eliminate non-viable hypotheses, case studies constitute the following two chapters. Several hypotheses, particularly the claim that states able to generate higher occupation costs are more likely to survive, are difficult to test using quantitative methods. Chapters 5 and 6 therefore contain historical case studies; because the same countries are studied in each case, a number of variables are controlled. Chapter 5 examines over 200 years of the history of Poland, the state that has perhaps been killed and resurrected more than any other. I will examine the 18th-century partitions of Poland, the reasons for its resurrection in 1919, the 1939 annexation, the 1945 resurrection, and Soviet behavior toward the Polish regime during the October Spring of 1956. In particular, I will ask: why was Poland such a

frequent target for intervention? Why did the surrounding great powers attack Poland at certain times but not others? Why did the Soviet Union intervene in Hungary but not Poland in 1956? Did the Soviets consider long-term occupation or annexation of either state? Polish history illustrates that, despite the constant, vocal, and often violent presence of Polish nationalists, nationalist revolt almost always evoked the wrong response from Poland's neighbors. Rather than being deterred by the prospect of taking over an uncooperative population, Poland's conquerors were consistently angered by revolt under their rule. Ruthless repression, rather than immediate withdrawal, characterized the periods following the many revolts in occupied Poland. Poland's deaths instead correlated with the intensity of surrounding rivalries, while Poland's rebirths all occurred after the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty began to take weak hold in the international system in the aftermath of World War I.

The Polish case very clearly illustrates the dynamics of the buffer state argument. Although the events in October 1956 support the normative argument made here, additional exploration of this argument is necessary. Thus, Chapter 6 presents a case study of the Dominican Republic during its near-annexation to the United States in 1870, the prolonged occupation by the US from 1916-1924, and the limited US intervention in 1965. I will attempt to show that US policymakers were governed at least in part by a norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty in their Cold War behavior. They were not constrained principally by bipolarity or by an increased Dominican ability to generate occupation costs.

The concluding chapter explores policy implications stemming from the research and inferences underlying the dissertation. My prediction is that, in a world where a

norm protects states' territorial sovereignty, the rate of violent state death will decline dramatically. This norm, however, is not necessarily "good." Protection of states' territorial sovereignty also may lead to a higher number of internal state collapses, as neighboring states or regional hegemony are prevented from occupying imploding states. Insofar as this norm is rooted in a protection of the right to self-determination, we also may see more non-violent state deaths, or dissolutions, as multi-ethnic federations fly apart at the seams.

As stated above, this norm protects state borders, but leaves domestic political structures vulnerable to external intervention. Another policy implication stemming from this norm is that domestic leaders and members of ruling regimes should not allow complacency about the stability of their states' borders to affect evaluations of their own prospects for political survival. On the contrary, in a world where occupation is prohibited but intervention is permissible, regimes and leaders are even more vulnerable today than before.

While leaders ought to be wary of their own prospects, publics should see a clearer separation between the leader or regime and the state. Commitment to the survival of their state will likely lead to a higher payoff for citizens than commitment to a political leader. It seems clear, for example, that international aid to states like Serbia and Iraq today would rise dramatically if the current regimes were to be replaced by leaders more acceptable to the Western palette.

At the same time, statesmen and citizens in buffer states should recognize that their states' survival hinges on the continued power of the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty. Thus, buffer states should support this norm where possible.

Because US support of the norm continues to be critical to its strength in the system, buffer states also have strong incentives to support US hegemony.

Clearly, the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty generates a number of important and interesting policy implications. The most salient of these, however, ought to be that the norm may not be a permanent feature of the international landscape. If the norm is, for example, supported heavily by American might, what will happen if the US declines as a superpower? The possibility that this norm might not survive an American decline only highlights the importance of thinking about patterns of violent state death. The pattern is clear: buffer states operate in a very dangerous world. The implications are both theoretically compelling and practically troubling: they suggest a return to traditional geopolitical approaches to international politics, as well as shaky prospects for the present and future stability of buffer states.

LOCATION, LOCATION, AND TIMING

State death is a touchstone issue for a number of international relations (IR) theories. Neorealists have claimed that irrational behavior can be punished by state death, constructivists attribute state survival to greater international legitimacy, and still others argue that survival is a function of nationalism, or the level of opposition to conquest, within a state. Each of these arguments focuses almost exclusively on the attributes of particular states as determinative of their prospects for survival. I will argue, in contrast, that the situation a state finds itself in is the most consequential variable in predicting state death and survival, although in a surprising way. States that great powers have a large stake in protecting – buffer states – are in fact very likely to die. At the same time, would-be conquerors – including great powers – are restrained by a norm protecting territorial sovereignty after 1945, leading to a world with few, if any, violent state deaths.

In this chapter, I present various hypotheses that predict conditions that lead to state death, and violent state death in particular. Most of the arguments presented here focus on a state's external relations rather than domestic politics; consequently, the processes and types of state death predicted are usually violent and caused by another state. Although several of the hypotheses mentioned could be applied to cases of non-violent as well as violent state death, the focus of this dissertation is on cases of violent state death that current international relations theories are best-suited to predict. Because the principal predictions of several hypotheses are the same or similar, corollary hypotheses intended to distinguish arguments are discussed as well. Particular attention

is paid to honing my own argument, modeling conditions under which buffer states are more or less likely to die, and tracing the history of the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. I first present existing hypotheses predicting state death, most of which expect that one or a set of state attributes determine state survival and death. Among these explanations, I turn first to arguments that speak directly to the question at hand. Neorealist, constructivist, and rationalist claims about state death have been frequently asserted but virtually never tested. I examine the logics of these claims and derive specific, testable hypotheses from them. Hypotheses on state death are also derived from a related substantive topic: the evolution of the sovereign state. Less obvious arguments are examined as well. For example, arguments about the survival of organizations – singly or in groups – from sociology may bear on the question of state death. And insofar as the international system bears similarities to a market, it is interesting to examine theories of firm death from industrial organization.

In the second section of this chapter, I turn to my argument, which lies at the level of state context as opposed to state attributes. I argue that, rather than looking to features of a state to predict its survival, it is essential to examine the incentive structures facing states that might take over other states to gain leverage over the general question. In elaborating the first component of my argument, I present the logic behind the claim that buffer states, which are meant to preserve existing balances and whose survival should be protected by great or regional powers, are in fact in a very perilous situation. I also discuss conditions under which buffer states themselves are more or less likely to die.

Next, I turn to the second component of my argument. I lay out the history of a norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty, and also discuss why states have and continue to adhere to this norm. Corollary hypotheses from the norms argument particularly relevant to today's international relations are derived as well.

In the third and final section of this chapter, I synthesize and present the various hypotheses discussed. The chapter concludes with a list of hypotheses, identified by associated theories and fields, that will be tested in chapters four through six.

Existing Explanations: State Selection

In this section, I present arguments from international relations as well as other disciplines that suggest conditions under which states will die. I turn first to major IR theories' predictions about state death, and focus particularly on the neorealist selection argument, which generates the principal alternative hypotheses to my own argument. I then turn briefly to arguments about the evolution of the sovereign state and suggest how these might be adapted to explain selection *among* states (versus selection between states and other organizational forms). Next, I discuss sociological and economic theories of selection. Fundamentally, states are a type of organization. It is therefore useful to examine the broader gamut of organization theory for selection arguments. Furthermore, states, while different from firms, operate in an environment that shares many similarities with a marketplace. A brief discussion of theories of selection from the field of industrial organization is therefore also included.

State selection plays a fundamental, although underappreciated, role in major international relations theories. Given the importance of state death to major paradigms in the field, it is surprising that the logic behind claims about the conditions under which states will die has not been explored previously. While predictions about state death can be derived from IR theories as different as neorealism and constructivism, most of these predictions share a common feature. They focus on state attributes and, by extension, suggest evolutionary arguments about state survival.¹

The connection between evolutionary, or selection, arguments and state survival is very clear with respect to analyses of the emergence of the sovereign state. Charles Tilly argues that the sovereign state was the organizational form best suited to waging and financing wars; Hendrik Spruyt contends that sovereign territorial states preferred dealing with similar entities, and thus played a very active role in promoting their own relative “fitness.”

Similarly, neorealists argue that, in a world of sovereign states, irrational behavior will lead to selection out of the system. Others have argued that other attributes, including the level of international recognition a state receives and its ability to generate high occupation costs for conquerors, promote state survival.

These arguments share a basic claim with evolutionary theory: organisms – or organizations, in this case – must adapt to their environment, or die. Indeed, any theory that focuses on state attributes as the key to survival can be considered an evolutionary argument to some degree. States that possess these attributes will survive; states that do not possess and cannot develop these attributes will die. Note that, because traits tend not

¹ Miles Kahler provides a useful overview of extant and possible future applications of evolutionary theory to social science.

to be passed on among states, these arguments do not suggest a linear evolution. In other words, the constructivist claim that internationally “illegitimate” states will be selected out of the system does not necessarily mean that the system will, ultimately, only consist of “legitimate” states. New, illegitimate states could enter the system at any time.

International Relations Theory and State Selection

The Neorealist Selection Argument

Waltz avoids a strict rationality assumption by making a selection argument. “Since making foreign policy is such a complicated business, one cannot expect of political leaders the nicely calculated decisions that the word ‘rationality’ suggests. I accord [greater significance] to the process of selection that takes place in competitive systems.”² This claim is followed by another: that the death rate of states is low.³ If both claims are true, realists assert, then it is safe to assume that states do in fact behave as if they are rational actors.⁴ Subsequent to this analysis are policy recommendations about deterrence and nuclear proliferation that are contingent upon rational state behavior.⁵

The neorealist argument is that states that fail to behave rationally will be selected out of the system. In realist terms, rationality refers to balancing – internally and externally. It is clear that on issues ranging from the construction and influence of international institutions to evaluations of the shape of various trade policies, realists

² Waltz, “Reflections on *Theory of International Politics*”, p. 330.

³ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 95.

⁴ Waltz, “Reflections on *Theory of International Politics*”.

⁵ Cf. Karl; Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War”; Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict”; Waltz, “More May Be Better”.

consider power a central explanatory variable for international relations outcomes.⁶ More to the point, Waltz writes: “Power provides the means of maintaining one’s autonomy in the face of force that others wield.”⁷ Thus, one realist hypothesis should be that powerful states will be more likely to survive than weak states.

Realists also predict a central role for external balancing. The formation of alliances is considered to be in states’ interest whenever they perceive a major threat, and critical to success in deterrence and/or war whenever internal resources are insufficient to the task.⁸ Allying with other states when alliances are required for successful balancing is rational behavior in the realist lexicon. Certainly, if a state faces threats to its survival, realists would expect that it would find and form an alliance to counter those threats and, further, that states that failed to form alliances in similar situations would face a much higher risk of extinction. Thus, a second realist hypothesis is that states that form alliances are more likely to survive than states that do not form alliances.

These simple claims can easily be derived from Waltzian neorealism. In order to avoid creating a “straw man” out of the theory, however, it is important to consider potential refinements. For example, with regard to external balancing, realists often distinguish between balancing and bandwagoning. While both types of alliance offer advantages, realists might suspect that states that engage in balancing alliances are behaving more rationally than states that bandwagon.⁹ Additionally, some realists focus on the level of threat surrounding states, and might argue that it is only states in threatening situations that are at risk of death – thus, irrational behavior is punished

⁶ Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”.

⁷ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 194.

⁸ Walt.

⁹ Walt.

particularly severely for these states. This argument can be tested by using an *a priori* measure of threat, and comparing the consequences of (ir)rational behavior of states in similarly threatening situations.

The anarchy that defines the realist world means that states must be ever vigilant, since attacks can happen without warning, and since states seek survival at the least and world conquest at the most.¹⁰ In this very dangerous world, irrational behavior is severely punishable, even by death. Note that while neorealism is often taken to be a theory of great power behavior, in explicating his selection argument, Waltz specifically makes the point that, despite many differences, weak and powerful states are functionally similar. Following this point, he argues that “international politics consists of like units duplicating one another’s activities.”¹¹ Thus, neorealist claims about rational behavior and selection should apply to all states. At the same time, weak, unallied states should face dim prospects for survival.

Legitimacy

Unlike realists, constructivists do not view the environment in which states operate as a strictly, or necessarily, competitive one. Instead, the international system can be socially constructed to be more or less benign and thus, generate more or fewer threats to states. Furthermore, since the international system is socially constructed, membership in the system is not objectively determined; there may be rules that include or exclude states as “legitimate” based on religion, region, or political system.

¹⁰ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

¹¹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 94-96.

David Strang has elaborated one constructivist claim by arguing that states that are “unrecognized” have a lesser chance of retaining their sovereignty than states that are officially recognized. Strang, one of the few social scientists to have addressed the question of state death, examines “transitions of status.” He shows that transitions to “unrecognized” or “dependent” status are much less stable than transitions to “sovereign” status. In other words, unrecognized political units that become dependent (e.g., through colonization) will tend to have an unstable status; they may easily become unrecognized or sovereign. Once a political unit has become sovereign, however, transition to unrecognized or dependent status is unlikely. Strang attributes the few cases of transition from sovereign to dependent/unrecognized status he identifies to the young age of these states.¹² Essentially, Strang is arguing that states that are perceived as less legitimate are more likely to die. Following Strang, Alexander Wendt suggests that even relatively stable state systems are governed by norms that do not apply to “non-members” or less legitimate states. “Indeed, placing the fate of these unrecognized states next to that of recognized ones provides some of the strongest evidence for a structural difference between Lockean and Hobbesian anarchies.”¹³ Thus, one constructivist hypothesis regarding state selection is that less legitimate states are more likely to die than fully legitimate states.

A second constructivist claim is that state death will be more or less permissible in different “cultures of anarchy.” In other words, a norm can arise to protect states against violent deaths. This argument, proposed by scholars like Wendt, Robert Jackson,

¹² Strang.

¹³ Wendt, p. 284.

and Mark Zacher, is adapted below, where I have argued that a norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty has become particularly strong since 1945.¹⁴

Occupation costs

The notion that some states are better able to generate occupation costs for potential conquerors than others, and that these costs will forestall conquest, has been frequently asserted but rarely tested well. Richard Rosecrance, for example, argues that increasing occupation costs explain a decrease in the number of territorial wars in the twentieth century.¹⁵ At the same time, Robert Gilpin suggests that the spread of nationalism in colonial possessions generated costs for imperial powers that made empire untenable.¹⁶ Carl Kaysen argues that the relevant social change behind the so-called obsolescence of major war is precisely the development of nationalism following the centralization of the state.¹⁷ And David Lake contends that imperialism would be less cost-effective today than a century ago because even small, weak states could and would effectively resist occupation.¹⁸

The logic of the occupation costs argument is as follows. Centralization of education, the establishment of mass armies, and increased urbanization in the nineteenth century redirected citizens' loyalty away from local interests and toward the nation.¹⁹ With the advent of nationalism, publics are more easily mobilized – particularly when their nations are threatened. Thus, states that are advanced (industrialized) economically

¹⁴ Jackson; Zacher.

¹⁵ Rosecrance, pp. 32-38.

¹⁶ Gilpin, p. 140.

¹⁷ Kaysen.

¹⁸ Lake, *Entangling Relations*, p. 292.

¹⁹ See for example Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power".

have sufficiently loyal populations to generate high occupation costs for potential conquerors.

A parallel logic also predicts high occupation costs in the modern era. Liberal norms of self-determination developed in Western Europe were diffused to colonial Africa and Asia, generating occupation costs for imperial powers both abroad and at home.²⁰ Overseas, colonial revolts born of nationalism increased governance costs beyond acceptable bounds and led to decolonization. At home, protests against the injustice of colonization were also politically costly for regimes trying to justify their imperial orientation. Note that this analysis complements and perhaps even follows the argument that industrialization led to increased nationalism and therefore occupation costs.²¹ As nationalism grew at home, a commitment to the right of self-determination may (or may not) have grown alongside it. Since, however, the logic of nationalism could also easily lead to violation of the right of self-determination of others, it is useful to disaggregate these logics for the moment.

Notable among the few existing studies of the occupation costs argument is Peter Liberman's re-framing of this proposition as a cost-benefit analysis.²² Liberman challenges the conventional wisdom advanced by Gilpin, et al. (see above) by pointing out that, just as industrialization may increase nationalism and therefore the costs of occupation, it may also increase the benefits of occupation and the costs of resistance. In fact, in studies of mostly European world war cases, he finds that highly economically developed societies can be effectively repressed and their resources extracted efficiently at small cost to the conqueror. Thus, even if the relationship between industrialization

²⁰ Crawford, "Decolonization as an International Norm".

²¹ Also note that this argument is consistent with the norms argument presented below.

and nationalism holds, it does not necessarily translate into a negative net benefit for a potential invader.²³

While most of these arguments have referred to existing states' ability to fend off potential conquerors, they may also be suited to states that have already exited the system. Conquerors may not know the occupation costs they face prior to an occupation. Because occupation costs may only be operative after conquest, they may have a greater effect on the duration than on the probability of conquest. Tests of the occupation costs argument will therefore be conducted on two dependent variables: violent state death and resurrections of violent state deaths.

The contending views of the occupation costs argument lead to one general and one auxiliary hypothesis. The general hypothesis is that states that can generate high occupation costs for conquerors will be more likely to survive (and be resurrected, if they die violently) than states that are unable to generate high occupation costs. Following Liberman, the auxiliary hypothesis is that the effects of economic development will be indeterminate on the probability of violent state death.

The arguments about state death from international relations theory share a focus on the attributes of states. They suggest that the international system will select out irrationality, illegitimacy, and a lack of nationalism. In contrast, the argument I propose focuses on the incentives facing states that might take over other states, as opposed to features of states that might themselves get taken over. Although the two types of

²² Liberman.

²³ Stephen Brooks challenges Liberman's analysis with respect to the Post-World War II world by arguing that the globalization of production has reduced the benefits of conquest after 1945. Brooks' argument

argument are quite different, they can be combined. For example, neorealists might respond to my argument by suggesting that, for states in very threatening situations, the consequences of irrational behavior will be particularly drastic. To the degree that neorealists believe buffer states are threatened by virtue of their position, then balancing against power will be essential to survival for buffer states. Those buffer states that fail to balance are most likely to be selected out of the system. Tests of these hypotheses will therefore control for buffer state status; if the state attributes suggested by previous international relations scholars explain a significant amount of variation in survival among buffer states, then their positions need only be modified.

The Evolution of the Sovereign State

Substantively, the topic closest to state death is the death of alternative organizational forms to the state. Below, I discuss two important and opposing views about the evolution of the sovereign state system. I then derive hypotheses about the death of alternative forms of political organizations to the state that might be applied to the deaths of states operating within a state system.

Charles Tilly looks at the selection in of the "national state," otherwise known as the sovereign, territorial state, and the concomitant selection out of alternative institutional forms like city-states and empires. Tilly's question is: how and why has the national state come to dominate the international system? He distinguishes the "national state" from city-states and empires as "powerfully centralized, sovereign, and

leads to predictions similar to those of Rosecrance, Gilpin, and Posen and is thus a kind of "neo-traditionalist" occupation costs claim.

differentiated political organizations."²⁴ Tilly argues that states tended to follow one of three trajectories: capital-intensive, coercion-intensive, or capitalized coercion. States that followed the capitalized coercion trajectory were best able to face the financial and military demands of large-scale war, and thus came to dominate the European, and then the global, system.

The primary selection mechanism for Tilly is war. In a similar analysis of the rise of the nation-state, Richard Bean also finds that changing military technology in the late medieval era advantaged centralized states of large scale.²⁵ These states could successfully field and finance the most advanced militaries; they had access to great resources, by virtue of their size and ability to quell domestic opposition. As for Tilly, war is Bean's key selection mechanism in international politics; given the technologies of the time, large, centralized states were best equipped for war in the late medieval period. According to these analyses, state forms that can win large-scale wars survive and thrive, while those that cannot adapt or fall by the wayside. State structures and institutions that combine to increase the probability that a state of a particular form will win a war will themselves survive. If we applied this analysis of survival among state forms to survival among states, we would conclude that weak states are not likely to survive because they are ill-equipped for war.

Similarly to Tilly, Hendrik Spruyt is interested in the emergence and triumph of the sovereign state.²⁶ Like Tilly, Spruyt argues that the sovereign, territorial state was more efficient than alternative forms of political organization, in this case the city-league and the city-state. Efficiency – in war or financial management – however, was not the

²⁴ Tilly, p. 1.

²⁵ Bean.

only driver of success. Sovereign, territorial states were also mutually cooperative. They preferred to deal with each other, or at least with units that similarly delineated territorial boundaries. For this reason, the city-league, in particular, was disadvantaged and excluded from important international agreements.

In Spruyt's analysis, war is not the primary selection mechanism of institutional forms. Success in war is merely an indicator of the strength of domestic institutional arrangements and inter-unit cooperation that promote organizational survival. More central than military matters is the ability to marshal and employ economic resources. Both learning and like-unit cooperation play critical roles in Spruyt's argument about the rise of the sovereign state. Political units support others of their type; those that are excluded from lucrative agreements tend to imitate more successful units and reshape themselves along lines more acceptable to the "winners" in the system. States in Spruyt's analysis are not helpless before their environment; they can both alter themselves and alter the competitive nature of the environment by creating cooperative clusters.

Jonathan Bendor and Piotr Swistak make an argument somewhat similar to Spruyt's, but on a more abstract level.²⁷ Bendor and Swistak find that "nice" strategies, like Tit-for-Tat, are evolutionarily stable in a number of games.²⁸ Two important insights of their analysis merit special attention. First, like Spruyt, Bendor and Swistak show that cooperation among like players enhances survival chances. Second, Bendor and Swistak are not looking at the survival prospects of players per se, but of strategies; thus, Tit-for-

²⁶ Spruyt.

²⁷ Bendor and Swistak.

²⁸ Jörgen Weibull defines an evolutionarily stable strategy in the following way: "[An] incumbent strategy is said to be evolutionarily stable if, for each mutant [i.e., invading] strategy, there exists a positive invasion barrier such that if the population share of individuals playing the mutant strategy falls below this barrier, then the incumbent strategy earns a higher payoff than the mutant strategy." Weibull, p. 33.

Tat and other strategies face threats of invasion or extinction, but players themselves are assigned strategies with the option of switching later in the game.

A combination of Spruyt's and Bendor & Swistak's analyses yields interesting predictions for selection within a system of sovereign states. Generally, the argument would be that states play strategies in the game of international competition. Each state may begin playing one strategy, but has the option of switching strategies. One feature of these strategies is that some allow for mutual cooperation; for example, states playing the same strategy may seek each other out. The behavior induced by strategies serves as a signal to other states that a particular actor is or is not a potential partner for cooperation. Bringing this argument down the ladder of abstraction, strategies may be seen as regime types. Among a system of sovereign states, there is variation in regime types. Some regime types promote "nice" strategies – or at least, strategies that lead to nice behavior with actors of the same regime type – while others are "nasty." An obvious, existing application of this argument is the democratic peace proposition that democratic states will not go to war with each other. If we can specify strategies as functions of regime types, then we can test this argument with respect to state selection, with some modifications. The argument takes regime types, rather than states, as the unit upon which selection pressures are exerted. A slight modification of the argument would predict, first, that regime types encouraging nice strategies have a greater chance of spreading and, second, that states playing not-nice strategies are more likely to die and be replaced (or reborn) by states playing different strategies.

The work of these authors can be adapted to suggest at least two hypotheses as to the conditions under which states are likely to die. First, Tilly's analysis of the triumph of

the sovereign state presents war as the primary selection mechanism in international politics. Thus, states that are poorly equipped for war – in particular, weak states – are the most likely to die. And second, the work of Spruyt and Bendor & Swistak suggests that states can shape their environment in ways that enhance their chances for survival. This type of strategic selection suggests a different prediction: that members of certain regime types will cooperate with each other. Here, the critical predictor of state survival is not power, but political systems.

Sociological Theories of Selection

Sociologists, and organization theorists in particular, tend to fall into two camps in examining organizational survival and death. Organizational ecologists take organizational death as a fact of life, and attempt to uncover the processes by which individual organizations die and, more generally, by which populations of organizations rise and fall. Institutionalists, on the other hand, argue that once certain organizational forms achieve a sufficient degree of legitimacy, they are virtually guaranteed survival.

As before, organizational ecologists are interested in looking at organizations within their larger populations; they are also interested in looking at the interactions between populations of organizations. A familiar hypothesis explored and tested by Michael Hannan and John Freeman is Arthur Stinchcombe's liability of newness hypothesis. This claim predicts that new organizations are more likely to fail than older ones. The logic behind the claim is that new organizations need to develop trust among members as well as new roles and routines precisely when resources are stretched to their

limit.²⁹ Hannan and Freeman test this hypothesis by examining the failure rates of labor unions and restaurants; their tests are particularly useful because they control for size. In other words, Hannan and Freeman do not assume (as does Audretsch – see below) that age and size move in tandem. And, in fact, they find that the liability of newness hypothesis is robust across many tests, including those that control for size.³⁰ As before, it is conceptually quite easy to apply this hypothesis to a population of states; by this logic, one might predict that the newer former Soviet states have a relatively poor chance of surviving.

Hannan and Freeman's primary hypothesis is that organizational entry and exit are not monotonic over time. They argue that, as a new organizational form appears and gains legitimacy, entry rates in the population will be high and failure rates will be low. Once the population has reached a certain critical mass, though, competitive forces take over; entry rates decline and failure rates increase. Again, how might we think of this argument applied to a population of states? The logic behind this thesis is that resources are finite; to the degree that the presence of like organizations supports organizations within a population, competition is suppressed. Once an organizational form becomes legitimate, and thus virtually assured of survival, existing organizations within the population resist attempts at entry by new organizations. The application of this argument to state survival seems straightforward: as the state system develops, the rate of state entry should be high; once the system is sufficiently developed, state deaths should increase and entries should decrease. Thus, rates of state death should be initially low,

²⁹ Hannan and Freeman, p. 245.

³⁰ Hannan and Freeman, pp. 256, 259, 264-65.

but then increase over time. Note that this argument also generates a converse prediction about state birth: rates of state birth should be initially high, then decline over time.

Another school of sociologists offers an alternative view: once an organizational form is legitimated, it is not only difficult to dislodge the organizational form, it is also difficult to dislodge any organizations taking that form. Institutionalists like John Meyer, Brian Rowan, and David Strang (discussed above) would argue that the dominance of the nation-state in the world polity after World War II means that we will see very few state deaths.³¹ Note that this argument generates two subsidiary predictions. First, alternative institutional forms will be rejected by the world polity.³² Second, weak political units adopting the form of the nation-state will be protected by the world polity.³³

Meyer argues that "the rules [of the world polity] define the structural form of the nation-state as the most highly legitimated form of corporate social authority."³⁴ This proposition suggests that alternative forms of political organization, like empires or city-leagues, are unlikely to succeed in the current world polity. But Meyer also states that "efforts to break up a nation-state or to alter established boundaries are illegitimate, and many forces in the system assemble to resist them."³⁵ This claim is not disputed; state death is often preceded or followed by external or civil war. The implication of Meyer's argument, though, is that the nation-state is so firmly entrenched in the world polity that virtually no state death – violent or non-violent – should occur after the state form is institutionalized. As discussed in Chapter 4, however, while violent state death has

³¹ Meyer and Rowan; Meyer; Strang.

³² Stephen Krasner makes a similar argument in his discussion of international legal sovereignty.

³³ Jackson and Rosberg also make a similar argument in their discussion of juridical sovereignty and weak states.

³⁴ Meyer, p. 117.

³⁵ Meyer, p. 118.

declined dramatically since 1945, non-violent state death continues to occur, as exemplified by the Soviet, Yemeni, and Czechoslovak cases. To strengthen their argument about the continued dominance of the nation-state, institutionalists must develop an explanation for cases of non-violent state death that do occur after 1945.

Nonetheless, the institutionalist argument does offer an possible explanation for the survival of weak states: they survive because they exhibit the correct institutional form. Meyer and Rowan argue that, in order to increase their chances for survival, organizations will adopt a legitimate form while failing to perform the functions expected to accompany the form. Thus, very weak states may look like states, but may not behave like states. In some respects, this argument resembles Waltz's second mode of selecting out irrational behavior: socialization. "States will emulate [winners] or fall by the wayside."³⁶ The arguments are not entirely similar in that Waltz refers to behavioral socialization, while Meyer and Rowan focus on structural isomorphism. If socialization is very common in the international system, however, it may account for the continued survival of very weak states.

Several hypotheses emerge from the sociological literature on selection. First, sociologists have developed and tested Stinchcombe's liability of newness hypothesis, with positive results. Thus, we might expect that very young states have a high probability of dying. Second, Hannan and Freeman suggest that the number of members in an organizational population rises with increasing legitimacy of the organizational form, but then decreases once the form is accepted as legitimate and the members of the population begin to compete against each other. Using states as the relevant population,

³⁶Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 18. For a detailed, empirical discussions of state socialization, see the work of Martha Finnemore, David Ralston, and Joao Resende-Santos.

this logic suggests that rates of state death should increase over time. Third, and in opposition to the previous hypothesis, rates of organizational failure should decline dramatically once an organizational form has become legitimated. According to institutionalists and world systems theorists, then, rates of state death should be low, and weak states should face few threats to survival.

Economic Theories of Selection

Evolutionary theory in economics has been important for some time.³⁷ Armen Alchian's classic 1950 article "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory" presents an argument about firm selection not dissimilar from Waltz's argument about state selection.³⁸ Alchian admits that assumptions of profit and utility maximization are unrealistic, just as Waltz avoids an explicit assumption of rationality. Like Waltz, Alchian relies on the environment to winnow out irrational behavior. While firms do not have to maximize profits to survive, they must realize positive profits. The combination of chance, luck, or intentionality that leads to a positive profit margin is irrelevant, in Alchian's view. The market will simply select out behavior that leads to bankruptcy.

What behaviors, or features of firms, are most likely to cause firm exit? Might theories predicting firm exit be used to predict state death? Purely economic views of selection may indeed be adaptable to the question of state death. Clearly, the

³⁷ The most well-known evolutionary economic analyses, however, focus more on diffusion of innovations within industries than on the process of firm selection, or exit. Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter's book, *An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change* is a case in point, offering greater insight into the process of technological change and diffusion than that of firm entry and exit. Note, though, that Nelson and Winter do discuss selection on organizational routines.

³⁸ Alchian.

international system and the economic marketplace are very different arenas in many respects. Chief among these is the lack of a formal governing structure above states, as compared to the role of national governments vis-à-vis firms. Nonetheless, both states and firms are relatively discrete entities that compete for finite resources. States and firms also tend to operate in areas where they represent the principal forms of organization. They are hierarchically organized, have boundaries, and importantly, may be forced to exit the system. Competition between firms can range from rumor-mongering to hostile takeovers, just as competition between states can range from propaganda to war. While it is important to bear in mind the limits of the analogy, it is also useful to examine economic theories of selection (particularly as political theories of selection are relatively underdeveloped) that may shed light on the problem of state death.

Among economists, industrial organization theorists focus on questions of firm exit and entry. What happens, they ask, when the demand curve facing an industry contracts? Which firms are the first to exit the industry? Two primary perspectives emerge from a brief survey of the literature. Both tend to refer to ascriptive features of firms.

First, Boyan Jovanovic argues that small firms are the likeliest to exit an industry at any time.³⁹ Size, argues Jovanovic, is an indicator of efficiency. Thus, all large firms are efficient and likely to survive. Not all small firms are efficient. Those that are inefficient will exit the industry; those that are efficient will grow and become large. Efficiency, in this case, is like a genetic immunity to a childhood malady; infant mortality

³⁹ Jovanovic.

is high because this disease only strikes the very young. Those genetically immune to the malady will survive to adulthood; those without immunity will perish. The analogy to state death is fairly clear. By analogy, small states are more likely to die, at any given time, than are large states. Size could be measured in terms of territory, population, or economic resources; in other words, size could be thought of as power.

Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole look at a firm exit in a more specific context: duopoly.⁴⁰ Two features of duopolists, or of one surviving monopolist, stand out. First, to have survived until duopoly, a firm must be sufficiently large to reap duopolist and, probably, monopolist profits. Like Jovanovic, Fudenberg and Tirole see a significant advantage to firm size. Second, if only one firm is to survive, it must be not only large enough to be a monopolist, but also of the right "type." Fudenberg and Tirole set up a model where each firm knows its own cost function, but not that of its rival. If one firm exits, it is because it is not sufficiently tenacious. Again, in analogizing firms to states, we would thus predict that among great powers, the least powerful and the least resolved would be the most likely to die. Resolve, unfortunately, is difficult to measure; testing this part of the prediction would pose significant methodological problems. While also difficult to define and identify, various measures of international power are available to us. Thus, the hypothesis, presented by both Jovanovic and Fudenberg & Tirole, that small (i.e., weak) firms (states) are likely to exit (die) first, is testable.

A second set of opposing arguments requires some thought in analogizing the economic market to the international system. Pankaj Ghemawat and Barry Nalebuff, in

⁴⁰Note that Waltz makes explicit reference to analogizing state survival, particularly that of great power, to an oligopoly rather than a competitive market. To the degree that we want to extend this analogy, Fudenberg and Tirole's argument is particularly interesting. Fudenberg and Tirole; Waltz, "Reflections on *Theory of International Politics*".

two separate articles, ask which type of firm is most likely to exit a declining industry.⁴¹ Can the international system be thought of in terms of supply and demand? Firms supply goods or services to their consumers; when consumers no longer need or want the goods firms supply, firms exit the industry. Likewise, states provide goods for their citizens – sometimes in the form of social welfare programs or resolution of collective action or coordination problems – but almost always in the form of security from external invasion. Under what conditions, however, does demand for security contract? This question is beyond the scope of this dissertation. In descriptive terms, though, demand for security has contracted when structural constraints are low.

In contrast to Jovanovic, Ghemawat and Nalebuff argue that declining demand will see large firms exiting an industry first and fastest.⁴² Their logic is that, in the face of falling demand, small firms are more able to claim their share of the profits than large firms, which are unwieldy in contracting markets. In a later article, they adjust this prediction slightly. Large firms will not necessarily exit a declining market; instead, they will downsize until they are on par with their smaller competitors. At this point, all firms have an equal chance of survival and exit.⁴³

Both sets of predictions seem plausible when applied to international relations. It is somewhat intuitive that the weakest states will be the most likely to leave the international system under any conditions. On the other hand, it is also logical that, in

⁴¹ Ghemawat and Nalebuff, "Exit"; Ghemawat and Nalebuff, "The Devolution of Declining Industries".

⁴² Ghemawat and Nalebuff, "Exit".

⁴³ Ghemawat and Nalebuff, "The Devolution of Declining Industries".

periods of low structural constraint, large states fielding large armies will break apart without the glue of external threat.⁴⁴

Unfortunately, an apparent disjoint between industrial organization theorists and empiricists means that there are few direct tests of these theories. The empirical literature, however, does provide additional hypotheses about firm death; some of these may also be applied to state death. For example, a number of scholars have found that young firms are more likely to die than older firms.⁴⁵ This result supports Stinchcombe's "liability of newness" hypothesis. In fact, this result also supports Jovanovic's claims to some degree; since new firms tend to be small, firm size and firm exit are positively related.⁴⁶

A second hypothesis addressed by this empirical literature refers to the interaction between firm entry and firm exit. Specifically, Audretsch and Kleijweg & Lever propose that the processes of entry and exit can be analogous to a revolving door, where new firms enter but exit almost immediately, or to a forest, where new trees displace old ones. As stated above, the revolving door hypothesis is consistent with the liability of newness argument and Jovanovic's thesis. Audretsch finds that the two systems of firm entry and exit are prevalent in different types of industries. Where there are scale economies, entry and exit occurs consistent with the revolving door hypothesis. Where small firms are better innovators, however, new firms do replace and displace old ones in industrial "forests." To return to the question at hand, can we conceive of the international system as either advantaging scale economies or rewarding innovation by small states? The

⁴⁴ Michael Desch makes a similar argument; in the absence of threat, more states should "deform" because the warfighting capabilities of the state – those capabilities that keep the state together – are no longer predominant.

⁴⁵ Audretsch, p. 590; Kleijweg and Lever, p. 380.

literature on the evolution of the sovereign state, discussed above,⁴⁷ as well as a broader literature on military history,⁴⁸ support the notion that there are economies of scale in the international system. The notion that small firms are better innovators and thus able to replace large firms is more difficult to apply to international relations. As before, insofar as we conceive of security as the primary good afforded to citizens by states, smaller states would have to find innovative ways to provide security. While small states might generally be more innovative than large states, due perhaps to smaller and more maneuverable bureaucracies, it is difficult to imagine that many small states would be able to surmount the economy of scale problem presented by modern military exigencies. Certainly, nuclear weapons have made state size less important, but states must still be fairly powerful in order to acquire nuclear weapons. Chemical and biological weapons are perhaps better candidates for overcoming the scale problem in international security. These weapons, however, were not invented by small states, and they certainly threaten small states as well as large ones. Thus, for the moment, this hypothesis will be put aside.

Economics literature on firm exit suggests several hypotheses about the conditions under which states will die, or exit the international system. Industrial organization literature, in particular, presents two opposing views. First, small states (firms) are the most likely to die because they are the least efficient. This hypothesis is also consistent with Bean's argument that economies of scale promoted the rise of the nation-state through military competition. Second, in situations of low structural constraint (declining demand), large states will be the most likely to die. While this

⁴⁶ Audretsch, p. 590.

⁴⁷ Bean; Spruyt; Tilly.

hypothesis seems logical, it presents serious problems in terms of predicting and measuring structural constraint *ex ante*. And third, the newest states face an inherent liability: they are young. Young states will be likely to die in the international system.

An Alternative Explanation: The Context of Death

The situation in which a state finds itself is highly determinative of the state's prospects for survival. This claim suggests a focus on geography in examining the conditions under which states die violently.⁴⁹ For example, island nations might be safer from conquest than states in the midst of a continent of dueling rivals. The social context surrounding a state also bears on its probability for survival, by permitting some actions while prohibiting others.

The focus on context suggested here differs fundamentally from the approaches presented in earlier sections of this chapter. Insofar as international relations theorists have considered the question of state death, they have operated on the prior assumption that all states are equally likely to die, and that the distinction between states that die and states that survive has fundamentally to do with actions taken or attributes exhibited by these states. In contrast, I argue that it is imperative to examine the incentives facing states that might take over other states. Once we understand which states are "targeted," so to speak, by predatory states, we might also find that behaviors or attributes among targeted states makes them more or less likely to survive. At the very least, though, we should certainly expect that targeted states are more likely to die than non-targeted states.

⁴⁸ Black, *War and the World: Military Power and the Fate of Continents*; Parker.

Under what conditions might a state want to take over another state? I argue that states engaged in enduring rivalries have strong incentives to take over the buffer states that lie between themselves and their opponents. The logic behind this claim is elaborated below; the governing dynamic pertains to each rival's incentives to prevent its opponent from gaining an unacceptable advantage.

We can also imagine, however, conditions under which states are constrained from taking over other states. For example, states might alter their behavior in the face of proscriptive international norms supported by great powers. A norm against conquest had certainly emerged in the international system in the early 20th century; its codification in the Covenant of the League of Nations is clear. This norm, however, only received great power support at the close of World War II. The desire to learn lessons from the interwar period and to prevent major war in the future led the US in particular to sponsor the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty in the postwar world. Fear of punishment if they violated the norm led other states to adhere to it.

The underlying contention here, then, is that the incentives facing states that might take over other states are more consequential for state survival and death than features of states that might themselves be taken over. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to exploring the incentives structures of would-be conquerors. In addition to explaining why rivals are likely to take over the buffers between them and how great power support of the anti-conquest norm constrains behavior, I also explore conditions under which buffer states are more or less likely to die, as well as corollary hypotheses of the norms argument.

⁴⁹ I am not advocating an argument in support of geographic determinism, à la Halford Mackinder or Jared Diamond. In other words, I do not claim that the rivalries that create buffer states are inevitable.

Buffer States and the Dynamics of Rivalry

Almost by definition, buffer states should enjoy a privileged position in terms of their prospects for survival. Neighboring powers have a stake in preserving buffer states that mitigate the effects of rivalry and, potentially, reduce or delay the effects of war.⁵⁰ Contrary to this basic intuition, I will argue that buffer states are in a particularly bad position. Although great powers have a clear interest in maintaining the presence of buffer states, they are more often tempted to acquire territory that their competitors desire, even when such behavior places them right next to a rival.

States between two rivals – “buffer states” – face a high risk of death. D. Scott Bennett defines a rivalry as “a dyad in which two states disagree over the resolution of some issue(s) between them for an extended period of time, leading them to commit substantial resources (military, economic, or diplomatic) toward opposing each other, and in which relatively frequent diplomatic or military challenges to the disputed status quo are made by one or both of the states.”⁵¹ Buffer states are particularly vulnerable because they are potential battlegrounds for surrounding rivals; more importantly, they are a source of a potential advantage for one or both rivals.

Buffer states are defined by their location. It seems clear that buffer states are in a very dangerous situation, particularly when we consider that rivalry itself is typically identified by the rivals having fought against each other in a minimum number of


⁵⁰ Paul Schroeder provides an excellent discussion of the historical value – and the survival prospects – of buffer states, or intermediary bodies.

⁵¹ Bennett, p. 160.

conflicts. Other states located between two more powerful states are not at risk if a rivalry between surrounding states does not emerge.

To explain why it is that buffer states are likely to die, I propose a “rivalry” game with three actors: two mutual rivals and a buffer state that lies between them (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Rivalry Game



I incorporate two assumptions into this game. The first assumption is that it is always cheaper to rule indirectly than it is to rule directly.⁵² The second assumption is that each rival is concerned about its opponent taking over the buffer area, thus gaining an unacceptable advantage in terms of its ability to win a war or to extract concessions.

The components of this simple model generate a Prisoner’s Dilemma between the two rivals, with respect to the buffer area. Both rivals know that they would be better off if they could exercise mutual restraint with respect to the buffer area. But they both also want to avoid the worst-case outcome of being “suckered;” neither rival wants to exercise restraint while its opponent takes over the buffer area.


The outcome of this dilemma is a familiar one. In the equilibrium of this very simple model, both rivals will take over the entire buffer area. Thus, precisely because of their geography, buffer states are likely to die.⁵³

⁵² Indirect rule refers to a situation where influence is wielded by one state over another – for example, through aid disbursements – without the influential state explicitly governing the state being influenced. In situations of direct rule, by contrast, one state has absorbed, conquered, or formally taken over the decisionmaking powers of another.

⁵³ Robert Jervis provides the general intuition governing the dynamics of security dilemmas.

Why, though, are buffer states more likely to die than non-buffer states? Let us consider an expanded geography.

Figure 3: Buffer States and Non-Buffer States



Once again, we have Rivals A and C and Buffer State B. In addition, however, there is small state D, located on the other side of Rival A. I will argue that Buffer State B is more likely to die than Small State D. The reason for this difference in outcomes is primarily due to the fact that Rival A is not concerned about an opponent taking over Small State D. Furthermore, because (by assumption) it is cheaper for A to rule D indirectly rather than directly, A (and C) is more likely to take over B than to take over D. Again, precisely because of where it is located, Buffer State B is more likely to die than Non-Buffer State D. This logic can be generalized to claim that buffer states are more likely to die than non-buffer states.

The role and prospects for buffer states in the international system can be probed even further. For example, while buffer states are more likely to die than non-buffer states, not all buffer states die. Why is it that some buffer states die and not others?

If it is the threat of rivalry that leads to buffer state death, then we should expect that rivals will attempt to substitute direct for indirect control over buffer states when the likelihood of losing control over a buffer appears imminent. Such a threat could take at least two shapes. First, referring back to the model of rivalry presented above, Rival A (or C) could make advances to Buffer State B, thus upsetting the status quo that

previously supported the survival of the buffer. Second, the buffer state itself could – intentionally or not – take action to hasten its own demise, for example by pursuing a policy that the buffer sees as independent, but which is regarded by at least one rival as drawing the buffer farther into its competitor’s camp. Note that, in this situation, a state would have limited control over its survival; although buffer states are “born to lose,” they may have some control over the manner and timing of their death. Note, also, that while the specific mechanisms driving state death in these cases differ, the underlying logic is the same. A buffer state is increasingly likely to die when at least one of the rivals surrounding it fears loss of all influence with the buffer; in this situation, the rival prefers the surety of direct control over the buffer to the insecurity of influence that appears to be slipping away.

Two hypotheses have been advanced in this section. The first is that buffer states are “born to lose.” This claim is somewhat counterintuitive because buffer states are often created to assist stability in a region. One of the reasons for the resurrections of Poland in 1919 and 1945, for example, was to prevent war between Germany and Russia. Another *raison d’état* for the Polish state, however, was to literally buffer Russia from a German threat. If there was to be a war, Poland, not Russia, would be first line of defense.⁵⁴

The second hypothesis advanced in this section is an extension of the claim that buffer states are more likely to die violently than non-buffer states. I do not claim that buffer state status is perfectly predictive of violent state death. It is important to understand, then, when and why buffer states are more likely to die violently. The more

⁵⁴ Trachtenberg, p. 4.

general argument about the likelihood of buffer state versus non-buffer state death is helpful in predicting which buffer states will die when. If buffer states are more likely to die than non-buffer states because rivals surrounding buffers fear their competitors will take over the buffers at their expense, it stands to reason that the likelihood of buffer state death increases as these fears become acute. When the threat of a buffer being captured by a rival seems imminent, that buffer is particularly likely to die.

The Norm Protecting States' Territorial Sovereignty

Buffer states are particularly likely to die because the states surrounding them have strong, if varying, incentives to take them over. But we can also conceive of situations in which states are *constrained* from taking over other states. For example, a proscriptive norm supported by great powers may cause states to find alternatives to prohibited behaviors. I argue that such a norm works to prevent violent state death after 1945, as it promotes the protection of states' territorial sovereignty and enjoys the support of great powers in the postwar world.

The argument that a norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty prevents violent state death after 1945 is compatible with, yet very different from, the argument that buffer states are more likely to die than non-buffers. The buffer states component of my argument is general across time and space; the norms argument is historical – I expect that this norm will impact state behavior differently in different eras. The two lines of reasoning are also distinct in the nature of the independent variables. Though neither

buffer states nor norms are easily identified, buffer states are probably easier to recognize than evolving international norms.

The following explication of the claim that a territorial sovereignty norm prevents violent state death after World War II reflects these differences. First, I discuss theoretical arguments about norm definition, emergence, and robustness. Second, I trace the history of this particular norm from Woodrow Wilson to Harry Truman and through the Cold War. I then apply the hypotheses advanced in the theoretical literature on norms to develop specific claims about the ways in which this norm should influence state behavior. I conclude this section by discussing incentives for states to adhere to the territorial sovereignty norm.

How do you know it when you see it? A norms literature review

Arguments based on the impact of norms run the risk of tautology. For example, one could argue that “we know a prohibitive norm exists because the behavior prohibited by the norm does not occur, or occurs only rarely.” Or, “we know a norm is declining in strength because violations of the norm are becoming more frequent.” The problem with both of these claims, of course, is that they lack any *ex ante* foundations regarding the emergence and robustness of norms.

The definition of norms is as contested as norms themselves can be. Robert Axelrod asserts that “a norm exists in a given social setting to the extent that individuals usually act in a certain way and are often punished when seen not to be acting in this way.”⁵⁵ Ann Florini takes objection to this definition because it omits any sense of

⁵⁵ Axelrod, p. 1097.

“oughtness,” and argues that a salient feature of norms is their reference to “legitimate” and “illegitimate” behavior.⁵⁶ In a somewhat similar vein, Jeffrey Legro defines norms as “collective understandings of the proper behavior of actors,” focusing more on actors’ understandings of how they ought to behave than on the consequences of deviating from proper behavior.⁵⁷ Similarly, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink define a norm as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.”⁵⁸ Because Axelrod’s definition refers to the potential impact of a norm, rather than the features of a norm itself, I will accept the latter definitions of norms, but seriously consider the import of punishment in the development and support of a norm.

Indeed, Axelrod’s analysis is helpful in conceptualizing how norms emerge and become accepted. Axelrod points to two factors that may lead to the emergence of a norm: dominance and reputation. “Dominance” refers to a situation where a powerful actor imposes its preferences on others to support a norm. This route of norm emergence is similar to the “normative entrepreneurship” discussed by Florini (although she makes the point that normative entrepreneurs need not be powerful actors); it is also similar to Keohane’s analysis of the emergence and sustenance of cooperation in a hegemonic world.⁵⁹ One means, then, for norm emergence is for a powerful actor to endorse and support a norm, thereby granting it prominence in the system.

Another method of norm emergence is reputational. As Axelrod suggests, if, for example, an actor has a reputation of keeping promises, other actors may be more willing

⁵⁶ Florini.

⁵⁷ Legro, “Which Norms Matter?”, p. 33.

⁵⁸ Finnemore and Sikkink, p. 891.

⁵⁹ Keohane; Florini.

to engage in transactions with him or her. In other words, individual self-interest can lead to the emergence of a collective norm.

The presence of a norm in a system, however, must be differentiated from the strength of a norm. In other words, under what conditions are actors likely to adhere to various norms – which “standards of proper behavior” are followed and which are violated? Jeffrey Legro suggests three criteria for evaluating the robustness of a norm: specificity, durability, and concordance. Specificity refers to how clearly the norm is stated and understood. Durability refers to the tenure of the norm – for how long has it been in the system? And concordance refers to the breadth of acceptance of the norm – how many (critical) actors agree on the content and value of the norm?⁶⁰

While Legro’s analysis is helpful in providing a set of *ex ante* criteria for norm robustness, it is not difficult to imagine a norm that is clear, long-lasting, and apparently widely agreed-upon, yet frequently violated. What is missing (or is perhaps simply not explicit) from Legro’s framework for norm robustness is actors’ incentives for norm adherence. In their excellent review of this literature, Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that “which norms matter when” will be determined by the legitimacy, prominence, or intrinsic characteristics of the norm that are consistent with some notion of historical efficiency.⁶¹

It is possible that actors’ reasons for adhering (or not) to a norm are related to the nature of the norm’s emergence. If, for example, the norm emerges because individual actors have reputational reasons to behave according to the norm, these same incentives may operate to encourage adherence to the norm. If, on the other hand, the norm

⁶⁰ Legro, “Which Norms Matter?”.

⁶¹ Finnemore and Sikkink.

emerges because a powerful actor imposes it on the system, other actors may observe the norm because they fear punishment if they violate it. Despite subtle differences, both patterns of norm emergence in turn generate adherence based on the probability of punishment: both loss of reputation and sanction by a powerful actor can constitute punishment of norm violation. At the same time, punishment can become unnecessary to norm adherence. Often, scholars of norms have argued that norms are deeply held rules that govern policy makers' actions almost without thought.⁶² Alexander Wendt labels this level of norm adherence "internalization to the third degree."⁶³

This brief review of theoretical literature on norms suggests a set of questions to ask with respect to the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty. The first question is, of course, does such a norm exist? How might we be assured of its existence? If the norm is present in the international system, where did it come from? Was it introduced by a great power, or was it seen as an efficient solution to a collective problem of international relations? What incentives do states face in deciding whether to violate or adhere to this norm? How deeply is this norm internalized? And, most importantly, what are the consequences of the role of this norm for international relations today?

Origins of the Territorial Sovereignty Norm

The norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty emerged along a path more akin to dominance and normative entrepreneurship than to reputation or efficiency. Specifically, the norm was espoused by two US wartime presidents – Woodrow Wilson

⁶² Finnemore and Sikkink; Mueller; Price; Wendt.

⁶³ Wendt.

and Franklin D. Roosevelt – in different forms and to different degrees. In this section, I discuss the evolution of this norm from Wilson’s to FDR’s time, and beyond.

The norm protecting states’ territorial sovereignty is at once closely related to and contradicted by a prior norm supporting the self-determination of peoples. The self-determination norm can be traced back as far as the French Revolution, and reared its head intermittently during much of the 19th century.⁶⁴ This norm appeared to be supported in cases when, for example, plebiscites were used to determine transfers of territory, even though the validity of these plebiscites was frequently questionable. Adherence to this norm by great powers in particular was shallow if not opposed. The response of Austria, Russia, and France to the revolutions of 1848 indicated clearly that preservation of the existing order was more highly valued than the right of self-determination.

The onset and duration of World War I were characterized by more successful efforts on the part of adherents of self-determination. The Balkan Wars themselves can be viewed as attempts at self-determination, and Woodrow Wilson in particular promoted the ideal of self-determination as a governing principle of international order both as an observer of and a participant in the war.⁶⁵ In 1916, in a speech to the League to Enforce Peace, Wilson stated: “We believe these fundamental things. First, that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live.”⁶⁶ Two years later, Wilson’s Fourteen Points also contained a number of explicit and implicit references to

⁶⁴ Cobban.

⁶⁵ Cobban; Heater; Knock.

⁶⁶ “An Address in Washington to the League to Enforce Peace.” May 27, 1916. Wilson, et al., vol. 37, p. 115.

this norm.⁶⁷ Yet Wilson's commitment to self-determination outstripped that of his negotiating partners. Prior to the US entrance into the war, Allied postwar aims contained plans for annexing a number of states.⁶⁸ And later, while both Lloyd George and Lenin verbally supported this right, neither Britain nor the Soviet Union renounced their imperial possessions.⁶⁹

At the same time, respect for states' territorial sovereignty was also at the top of Wilson's international agenda. Wilson saw the outlawing of territorial aggression as a means to prevent future wars, and convinced the US voting public that his plan for peace, which was based on this principle, was a workable one. War-wariness certainly contributed to widespread US popular support for the League of Nations during and immediately after World War I.⁷⁰ Combined with the relative destructive magnitude of the World Wars, pre-existing desires to prevent war in the future generated increasing support for a norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty at the beginning and middle of the 20th century. Because most wars had been fought over territory, removing territory – in the form of states – as a legitimate source of conflict was seen as a way to prevent war.⁷¹

⁶⁷ Examples include point 5, which states that "A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined"; point 9, "A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality"; point 10, "The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development"; and point 12, "The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development."

⁶⁸ Korman, p. 136.

⁶⁹ See Cobban, Ch. 4; Heater, Ch. 3.

⁷⁰ Knock.

⁷¹ Knock.

Wilson's extremely public and clear devotion to the right of self-determination, however, led to unintended consequences, particularly with respect to the preservation of borders. The exposition of this principle was meant to apply to such peoples as the Poles, who had clearly constituted an independent state in the past, and who had managed to preserve their national unity in the face of multiple territorial partitions. But the publicity afforded Wilson's pronouncements led to demands for sovereignty from much smaller nationalities. As Wilson later ruefully noted, "When I gave utterance to those words ('that all nations had a right to self-determination') I said them without the knowledge that nationalities existed which are coming to us day after day."⁷²

Thus, a paradox of Wilson's vision of postwar order was exposed. Two of the foundational principles of this order – the right to self-determination and the preservation of territorial integrity – were, unexpectedly, in tension. Wilson's original conception of these ideas was as complementary, rather than competing, principles. Territorial aggression could hardly be consistent with self-determination. But states' territorial sovereignty could be threatened from within as well as from without.

One method to contain the dual threat of general instability and constant questioning of state borders was to reaffirm the commitment to the right of self-determination while, concomitantly, drawing a "bright line" with respect to the territorial sovereignty principle. Wilson wanted some flexibility built into the territorial integrity norm, but not so much that all claims to nationhood, no matter how small the nation and how destabilizing the claim, would be honored.⁷³ In Wilson's own words, he desired:

That all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or

⁷² Quoted in Temperley, et al., vol. 4, p. 429.

⁷³ Cobban, pp. 75-84.

perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break up the peace of Europe and consequently of the world.⁷⁴

In the Wilsonian era, then, the principle of self-determination preceded and, in some respects led to the emergence of the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty. The examples of territorial aggression witnessed during the Great War were, at the same time, violations of the right to self-determination. One way to prevent such aggression in the future – and, by extension, to prevent war – was to enshrine the principle of territorial sovereignty. This process was led by a normative entrepreneur with great power, in the form of Woodrow Wilson. Wilson insisted that both self-determination and territorial sovereignty were necessary to a future peace but, when he saw the two principles in conflict, he opted to support the principle of order over the principle of justice.

All of Wilson's efforts notwithstanding, the US retreat into isolationism following World War I meant that, while the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty had emerged in the international system, adherence would be low in the absence of a powerful sponsor and enforcer of this norm. Nor did individual states have independent incentives to adhere to the norm; more could be gained from violating than from following it.

The return of the US to the world stage was in large part engineered, and certainly shaped, by the next wartime president. FDR inherited many of Wilson's ideological commitments, although his behavior was governed more by pragmatism than by idealism. Nonetheless, ample evidence suggests that Roosevelt's commitment to the territorial sovereignty norm predated concerns about growing Soviet power. For example, Roosevelt was outraged by the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, publicly opposed a

⁷⁴ "An Address to a Joint Session of Congress." February 11, 1918. Wilson, et al., vol. 46, p. 323.

US right to intervene in Latin America, and refused to intervene in the Spanish Civil War on the grounds of US nonintervention policy.⁷⁵ Indeed, Roosevelt was willing to hold up an alliance with the Soviet Union by refusing to honor Stalin's request to recognize Soviet annexation of the Baltics.⁷⁶ While Roosevelt shared Wilson's conviction that violations of the territorial sovereignty norm would and could lead to war, his conviction was not absolute. For example, he refrained from publicly denouncing the German annexation of Austria during the Munich conference, in the slim hope that British and French appeasement of Germany might work.⁷⁷

Perhaps more than Wilson, Roosevelt was clearly beholden to public opinion while trying to manipulate it.⁷⁸ It is clear that, in Roosevelt's view, publicly sanctioned violations of self-determination by Allies would not be acceptable to his voters. Repeatedly, Roosevelt protested his allies' postwar plans on the grounds that Americans would not accept a settlement that contained blatant violations of the right to self-determination. For instance, FDR explained to Stalin that it would be difficult for the US to officially recognize the Soviet annexation of the Baltics, as well as Soviet domination of Poland without a true referendum.⁷⁹ And repeatedly, Roosevelt's allies retreated in the face of these objections. Like Wilson, then, FDR sought to gratify two potentially contradictory principles at once: the right to self-determination and the sanctity of territorial sovereignty.

When a much less experienced Harry Truman took over the presidency upon FDR's death, he inherited many of Roosevelt's chief foreign policy advisors. At the

⁷⁵ Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy*, pp. 106, 110, 116, 123, 131, 156.

⁷⁶ Feis, pp. 58-64.

⁷⁷ Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy*, p. 158.

⁷⁸ Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy*; Divine.

close of World War II, US fears of growing Soviet power were on the rise. Truman's advisors – and Truman himself – while perhaps sharing the Wilsonian ideals previously espoused by Roosevelt, also saw an opportunity in those ideals to restrict Soviet expansion.⁸⁰ The territorial sovereignty norm thus continued to be a clearly articulated principle of US foreign policy through the end of World War II.

Thus far, I have traced the history of the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty. I have shown that, for Wilson, this norm was intimately attached to the right to self-determination; when the two principles came into conflict, however, Wilson sought to limit claims to self-determination by making territorial sovereignty inviolate. In addition to his commitment to the ideals of self-determination and sovereignty, Wilson saw these ideas as means to the end of preventing future war. During World War II, FDR, although less idealistic than Wilson, also believed that preventing future territorial aggressions would prevent war. Roosevelt also felt constrained by US public opinion, which he suspected would oppose any US foreign policy (and, by extension, any US president) that permitted violations of the right to self-determination or of the right to territorial sovereignty. While Truman's commitment to these ideals may have been shallower than Wilson's or FDR's, he certainly continued to state his support of the rights to territorial sovereignty and self-determination, using the rhetoric of idealism to justify policies meant to counter Soviet expansion.

⁷⁹ Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy*, pp. 436, 513.

⁸⁰ Leffler, pp. 17, 21, 45, 52.

Expected Effects of the Territorial Sovereignty Norm

The history of the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty is interesting in itself, but it raises the question of what the norm explicitly prohibits and allows. In Legro's terms, how "specific" is this norm?

The norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty is quite specific in its prohibition of conquest and annexation; these behaviors are clearly criminalized. Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations states: "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League." Similarly, Article 2.4 of the United Nations Charter states: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." But the norm is more ambiguous with respect to less blatantly observable violations of the rights to territorial sovereignty and self-determination. According to Legro's framework, then, we should expect adherence to different parts of this "normative package" to vary depending on how clearly different parts of the norm are specified. In other words, to the degree that the norm is supported by a meta-norm of punishment, we should see changes in various state behaviors that might violate this norm, but even these changes will vary in degree according the specificity of the normative prohibition.

What are the various behaviors that might be prohibited or encouraged by this norm? The clearest behavior, once again, is the takeover of other states by coercive means. Another behavior might be limited territorial incursions: the conquest or annexation of parts, but not the entirety, of states. This second behavior, though, is not as

clearly sanctioned as the first; therefore, we should expect the decrease in the conquest or annexation of states to be greater than the decrease in forcible territorial change.

Another set of behaviors related to this norm is closely connected with the origins of the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty in the right to self-determination. Insofar as the territorial sovereignty norm implicitly supports the principle of self-determination, we also should see an increase in voluntary dissolutions and unifications of states, particularly along ethnic or national lines. At the same time, because the right to self-determination is less clearly specified than the prohibition of conquest and annexation, the increase in state dissolutions and unifications should be smaller than the decrease in state conquest and annexation. In other words, non-violent state deaths should increase, but they will increase by less than violent state deaths decline.

Two additional sets of behavioral implications can be derived from the origins of this norm. The first refers specifically to the history of the norm. As discussed above, the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty has strong roots in Wilson's presidency during World War I. The well-documented lack of support for this norm until after World War II – due in large part to US isolationism during the interwar period – greatly limited levels of adherence to the norm, as discussed in greater detail below. Nonetheless, the presence of the norm in the system as well as the re-emergence of support for this norm on the part of the WWII Allies suggests that we should see limited adherence to this norm even prior to the emergence of a strong meta-norm to punish violations of this norm. For example, while support for the norm might not have been strong enough to prevent state conquest and annexation in the interwar period, it might have been sufficiently strong to prevent these state deaths from being permanent.

Another prediction of the argument, then, is that states that die violently after World War I should be more likely to be “resurrected” than states that die violently before World War I. A similar prediction is that all states suffering violent deaths will be more likely to be resurrected after World War I than before.

A final set of behavioral implications of the norm discussed here refers to alternative means that states might seek to achieve the same ends. Faced with strong normative constraints against conquest and annexation, would-be conquering states should seek other methods to satisfy the goals previously achieved through conquest and annexation. One such alternative is the replacement of regimes or leaders of would-be conquests. Thus, as the bright line prohibiting conquest and annexation hardens, predatory states should alter their behavior; as conquest and annexation decrease, external replacement of regimes and leaders should increase. Wilson himself implicitly suggested this course of action by distinguishing limited intervention from territorial conquest:

I understand that article [Article 10 of the League Covenant] to mean that no nation is at liberty to invade the territorial integrity of another. Its territorial integrity is not destroyed by armed intervention; it is destroyed by the retention of territory, by taking territory away from it.⁸¹

I have traced the norm protecting states’ territorial sovereignty to clear roots in the principle of self-determination and US foreign policy. An important assumption underlying this discussion has been that the principles of US foreign policy have been consequential for the behaviors of other states and, further, that adherence to this norm strengthens sufficiently to generate implications beyond the cessation of conquest and annexation. I next unpack this assumption by exploring more thoroughly the variation in state incentives to adhere to this norm.

Reasons for Adherence to the Norm

Under what conditions should we expect that states would adhere to the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty? I will argue that, in the context of 20th century international relations, adherence to this norm has varied as the expectation of major power enforcement of the norm has changed. The principal motivation governing adherence is thus fear of punishment, rather than a confluence of individual self-interest.

That the territorial sovereignty norm was a principal tenet of the Wilson administration is clear; that Wilson and his successors in the interwar period were unable to pursue a foreign policy based on this principle is equally clear. The US retreat into isolationism during this period meant that the territorial sovereignty norm lacked an effective normative entrepreneur. As before, it is not at all clear that this norm represented a solution to a collective problem in such a way that individual actors would have independent incentives to adhere to the norm. Nor was it clear that there were strong reputational incentives to adhere to the norm; conquest and annexation had been a part of the behavioral repertoire of states since the beginning of international relations, and practitioners had not faced reputational disincentives for acting in this way. Drawing upon Axelrod's framework for norm adherence, the only remaining route to robustness for the territorial sovereignty norm was that of dominance, or normative entrepreneurship. The US withdrawal from the world stage closed this route as well; none of the other great powers had subscribed to this norm as fervently as the US under Woodrow Wilson.

⁸¹ "A Conversation with Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee." August 19, 1919. Wilson, et al., vol. 62, p. 392.

The US retreat into isolation after World War I limited the power of the territorial sovereignty norm immensely. Nonetheless, reaction to the severity of the Second World War created an ideational shift in US public opinion that led to stepped-up support for the protection of states' territorial sovereignty after the war. Jeffrey Legro argues that, at the conclusion of World War II, isolationism was seen as a failed policy; learning from this perceived failure dramatically increased support for "internationalism" in the US.⁸² Similarly, Cecelia Lynch finds that policymakers were increasingly receptive to peace movements as the Second World War drew to a close.⁸³ This is not to say that all US policymakers whole-heartedly embraced this principle. Rather, after World War II, American interests in the world both strengthened and narrowed the scope of the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty. The conviction that such a war must never be repeated supported the norm; the acceptance of US superpower status undermined it.

The US thus reemerged as a normative entrepreneur during FDR's presidency. While it is unclear how he might have further shaped US foreign policy if he had lived longer, FDR's commitment to these norms (which was already tempered with more pragmatism than Wilson's idealism) was accepted by Truman in word if not in spirit. In the rule against territorial aggression in particular, Truman saw a rhetorical device that would allow him to pursue a containment policy toward the Soviet Union. In President Truman and his successors, then, the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty had normative entrepreneurs with their own reasons for supporting the norm. Dominance was achieved through the vehicle of postwar American power and global position. Given

⁸² Legro, "Whence American Internationalism".

⁸³ Lynch.

the relative power of the US, coupled with a clear US commitment to oppose conquest and annexation, most states refrained from doing so for fear of punishment.

But two states remain that had lesser incentives to behave according to US rules. The first was of course the Soviet Union. While the United States might be able to impose its will on most states – where the gap in power was so large as to seem insurmountable – the Soviet Union did not face the same set of incentives to behave according to these rules. The USSR did, however, have other incentives to observe this norm. Here, Axelrod's arguments about the role of reputation in norm adherence do play a role. The Soviet Union was engaged in a heavily ideological foreign policy, at least in terms of its rhetoric. By annexing other states in the way it had done with the Baltics, it would damage its ability to recruit additional states to its camp. Indeed, these problems were anticipated in the Cold War Kremlin.⁸⁴ And further, although the Soviet Union may (or may not) have had less to fear from US power than most other states, US retaliation for Soviet violations of territorial sovereignty was not something to be sought.

Similarly, for the US, there were reputational costs to violating this norm. Insofar as the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty assisted the US position in the world by contributing to stable international relations, violation of this norm also would lead to negative international repercussions for the US. Would-be conquerors might take their cues from American action, and would-be conquests might be increasingly wary in their relations with the US. Furthermore, for democracies like the United States, violation of the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty generates both domestic and international costs for policy makers.

⁸⁴ Jones.

The explanation for adherence to the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty rests on a combination of US normative entrepreneurship and US power; the US had the will and the means to enforce this norm, although US commitment to the norm may have been governed more by pragmatism than by idealism. Most states adhered to the norm because they feared punishment. Those states that did not fear punishment as much – namely, the USSR and the US – had their own, largely reputational, incentives to adhere to the norm.

Given that this norm has been a part of the international landscape for over eighty years, one important question speaks to the level of internalization of the norm. The reasons outlined above for adherence to the norm suggest that the norm is not deeply internalized by states, or at least that it was not deeply internalized at the start of the Cold War. If states only follow a rule because they fear punishment if they break it, the presumption is that, if the threat of punishment is removed, states will once again violate the rule because they can do so with impunity.

This view of the territorial sovereignty norm differs from those of scholars like Mark Zacher and Alexander Wendt. In presenting his interpretation of the origins of the territorial sovereignty norm, Zacher looks to a number of factors beyond the incentives of normative entrepreneurs and adherents. He argues, for example, that the increased numbers of democracies in the international system, a decrease in the economic benefits that can be derived from conquest, an increase in nationalism, and a desire to avoid trade disruptions have all contributed importantly to the growth of the territorial sovereignty norm.⁸⁵ I disagree with Zacher, not for the sake of parsimony, but because a deeper

⁸⁵ Zacher. Attina makes a similar, although less-developed, argument along these lines.

exploration of the causes he argues for the territorial sovereignty norm reveals that the causes are inconsistent with the effect.⁸⁶ This disagreement leads to an additional corollary hypothesis of my argument about the origins and impact of the territorial sovereignty norm, although one that cannot be tested today: the strength of the norm should decline with US hegemony.

If, however, US hegemony continues to last, the work of scholars like Alexander Wendt in particular suggests that, as the tenure of a norm lengthens, it may become more deeply held by actors in the system.⁸⁷ Although I will not explore the concept of internalization much further in this paper, it is interesting to consider the possibility that the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty is today so well-entrenched that the option of conquest or annexation has exited the behavioral repertoire of some states.

The principal hypothesis of the norms argument presented here is that violent state death will decline in the 20th century, and particularly after 1945. A number of corollary hypotheses are also associated with this argument. First, after 1945, states should turn away from conquest and/or occupation and toward interventions that replace regimes or leaders. As the probability of the punishment of norm violation increases, states will use alternative means to achieve their goals. Second, we should expect to see antecedents of this norm. Although I argue that the norm only became effective at preventing violent state death once it was sponsored by great powers, we know from the League of Nations Covenant that the norm had emerged in the system prior to enjoying great power support. While the norm might not have been strong enough to prevent

⁸⁶ I discuss many of these alternative (or additional) explanations for the absence of violent state death after 1945 in Chapter 4.

violent state deaths between the signing of the Covenant and the close of World War II, it might have been strong enough to prevent violent state deaths from becoming permanent. Thus, we should expect that states that die violently after 1920 (when the Covenant was signed) are more likely to be resurrected than states that die before 1920. Related and third, the effects of this norm should be more widespread than in only preventing violent state death. As the norm strengthens, past violent state deaths should be reversed; in other words, all state resurrections should increase as the norm emerges. Fourth, the decline in violent state death should be accompanied by a smaller decline in forcible territorial change. Both conquest and coercive border changes violate the territorial sovereignty norm, but conquest is the more observable, and condemned, violation of the norm. Fifth, with the strengthening of the norm and also support for the right to self-determination, the decline in violent state deaths should be accompanied by a rise in state dissolutions and state collapses. Subnational units of multi-ethnic federations, for example, will be more likely to appeal to the right of self-determination as a justification for secession. And neighbors of imploding states will be unable to respond through occupation.⁸⁸ And sixth, insofar as the norm is a product of American liberalism, it is not likely to decline before the fall of US hegemony. While this hypothesis is difficult to test fully today, it is important in distinguishing predictions of the norms argument from other, particularly balance-of-power, arguments.

⁸⁷ Also see Legro's discussion of durability in Legro, "Which Norms Matter?"

⁸⁸ The current Congolese and former Somali conflicts are telling examples of this trend. Five foreign governments have troops in Congo, but none have expressed territorial ambitions. Similarly, the US-led multinational force constituting Operation Restore Hope sought only to distribute food and bring clan fighting to a close in Somalia.

When Worlds Collide: Buffer states v. Norms

If buffer states are born to lose by virtue of their position, and states after 1945 are doomed to survive by virtue of timing, what happens to buffer states in the post-1945 era? In other words, when these two conflicting variables meet, which one trumps the other? I will argue that the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty trumps buffer state status in that even buffer states are safe from violent deaths after 1945. Buffer states, however, become increasingly vulnerable to a new type of death – regime and leader replacement by external powers – that preserves borders but allows rivals to gain a different type of advantage from buffer states.

Working prohibitive norms typically restrict the options available to decision makers. Sometimes, the norm is so effective that it is not even noticed; the prohibited behavior exits the set of options that the decision maker views as conceivable. In this case, conquest and occupation may still be present as options in the minds of political leaders, but they understand the costs they would pay if they violated the norm against conquest and occupation. Notwithstanding the materialist basis of the norm, it does act as a prior condition that restricts the options exercised by would-be conquerors.

Given that the option of conquest is extremely costly in a world with a norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty, we should expect that policy makers will turn to other means to accomplish their goals vis-à-vis buffer states. Clearly, they can no longer derive the direct benefits of territorial occupation. But, they may derive indirect benefits, and support from the buffer state, by replacing the state's regime and/or leader. A more compliant buffer state might be willing to allow troops to cross its borders during war

time. A new political leader might promote economic and trade policies favorable to the rival state to which she is indebted for her political rise. While replacing regimes and/or leaders might not be the most efficient solution for rivals seeking to control buffer states, it is a second-best solution when conquest and occupation are discouraged by the system.

It is important to note that external replacement of regimes and/or leaders usually involves some violation of the target state's territorial sovereignty. Thus, the strategy of turning from taking over states to replacing domestic political structures adheres to one part of the norm, but violates another. This facet of the norm protecting state's territorial sovereignty is a function of its materialist roots and of its shallow entrenchment in the international system. States continue to seek ways around the rules that dominate the system. The most powerful states, in restricting the behavior of others, do not want to restrict their own behavior too much. If conquest is no longer justifiable, intervention can be framed in terms of motives like self-defense.⁸⁹ Intervention also tends to involve smaller-scale conflicts than do conquest or occupation. Insofar as one of the purposes behind the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty is to prevent war, or at least major war, intervention is permissible but conquest is not.

The relationship between the safety provided by the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty and the danger faced by buffer states is therefore a complicated one. Even buffer states are protected from conquest and occupation after 1945. But the exigencies of rivalry lead to violations of the spirit, if not the letter, of the norm when the domestic structures of buffer states are altered by external powers. The norm trumps

⁸⁹ For example, a intervention might be justified in terms of protecting a state from being completely surrounded by enemies or to protect foreign nationals. Respectively, these were the Soviet justification for the invasion of Afghanistan, and the US justification for the invasion of Grenada. Jones p.185.

buffer state status, but the rivals surrounding buffer states then chip away at the core of the norm.

Hypotheses

The Context of Death

Principal Hypotheses:

1. Buffer states will be more likely to die violently than non-buffer states.
2. Violent state death will decline after 1945.

Corollary Hypotheses:

1. Buffer states will be most likely to die when one or more surrounding rivals perceives an imminent threat of losing all control of the buffer state to a competitor.
2. The decline in violent state death after 1945 will be accompanied by a rise in the number of external interventions to replace regimes and leaders in buffer states.
3. States that die violently after 1920 are more likely to be resurrected than states that die violently before 1920.
4. After 1945, the rate of reversal of previous violent state deaths will increase; state resurrections will increase after 1945.
5. The decline in violent state death after 1945 will be accompanied by a decline in all forcible territorial change. This latter change, however, will not be as significant as the change in the number of violent state deaths.

6. After 1945, the rate of state dissolutions and state collapses should increase. This increase in non-violent state death, however, should be smaller than the decrease in violent state death.
7. The rate of violent state death will continue to be low at least as long as the US remains a superpower.

Balance of Power

1. Powerful states will be more likely to survive than weak states.
2. States that form alliances are more likely to survive than states that do not form alliances.
3. Among threatened states, weak and unallied states are more likely to die than powerful and allied states.
4. (Threatened) States that form balancing alliances are more likely to survive than buffer states that join bandwagoning alliances.

Constructivism

1. Less legitimate states are more likely to die than more legitimate states.
2. A norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty will prevent state death from the mid-17th century on.

Occupation Costs

Principal Hypothesis

1. States that can generate high occupation costs for conquerors will be more likely to survive than states that are unable to generate high occupation costs.

Subsidiary Hypotheses

1. States that can generate high occupation costs for conquerors will be more likely to be resurrected than states that are unable to generate high occupation costs.
2. The effects of economic development will be indeterminate on the probability of state survival and state resurrection.

The Evolution of the Sovereign State

1. Militarily powerful states will be more likely to survive than weak states.
2. States will support the survival of similar states/states with similar regime types.

Sociology

1. Younger states will be more likely to die than older states.
2. Rates of state death should be initially low, then increase over time.
3. Rates of state birth should be initially high, then decrease over time.
4. States that exhibit the correct institutional form will survive.

Industrial Organization

1. Small, weak states are the most likely to die.
2. In times of low structural constraint, large, powerful states will be the most likely to die.
3. Younger states will be more likely to die than older states.

DEFINITIONS: WHEN IS A STATE A STATE?

Because state death has not been considered previously by international relations scholars, the topic raises important definitional issues that must be addressed before any empirical tests can be conducted. For example, how do we identify states? How do we know when a state has died? In testing one of the constructivist hypotheses discussed in Chapter 2, how do we measure international legitimacy?

My goal in defining heretofore undefined terms has been to develop clear, sensible definitions that can be translated into an effective coding scheme. Nonetheless, virtually all of the definitions presented here could be contested. I attempt to answer possible challenges to my definitions in my discussion of each term. I have also included discussions of a number of cases that are particularly difficult to code.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I propose definitions of terms germane to the project: state and state death. I challenge and revise the primary extant list of states in international relations scholarship – the Correlates of War list of members of the interstate system – on grounds of bias and uneven implementation. I also discuss extensively both my definition and my coding of state death, and include a list of state deaths since 1816. Next, I propose definitions for buffer states. I also discuss definitions of terms associated with the norms argument, such as regime and leader change and state collapse; lists of these events are included as well. The third and final section of this chapter turns to definitions of variables suggested by competing hypotheses, such as power, alliances, international legitimacy, nationalism, and

occupation costs. Where feasible, lists of cases to be included in the empirical analysis are provided.

States: Dead or Alive?

When is a State a State?

A state is an institution that is sovereign over a fixed population and territory. In its most pristine form, a state does not suffer any incursions of sovereignty. Weber defines the state as the unit claiming "a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."¹ Nettl defines the state as:

a collectivity that summates a set of functions and structures . . . a unit in the field of international relations . . . an autonomous collectivity as well as a summing concept of high social generality. It is thus in a functional sense a distinct *sector* or arena of society. . . a sociocultural phenomenon.²

Tilly defines states as "coercion-wielding organizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories."³ Clearly, a state is conceived of as having some kind of internal hierarchy, ability to wield force, and territorial boundary. A state has sovereign authority within its territory.

These definitions of statehood refer largely to a state's domestic capabilities. While conceptualizing the state in these terms is useful, the question posed in this dissertation refers to states as part of an international system. Depending upon how the

¹ Weber, p. 78.

² Nettl, pp. 562-66.

Weberian, et. al. definitions of statehood are measured, a state could be identified in terms of its political leadership, its regime, or lines on a map. For my purposes, international politics are as important to a conception of statehood as domestic politics. Thus, it is also useful to examine how international law conceives of states. For example, the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States declares: “The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other States.”

The conceptions of statehood presented above are complementary, not competitive. Many of the terms in these definitions, however, are themselves undefined. To effectively analyze cases of state death, a simple coding scheme is needed to identify states. This scheme should comprise rules that are logical and that yield a list of states that overlaps significantly with our intuition about what such a list should look like.

Of course, no such list will satisfy everyone’s intuition about the list of states in the world. A natural place to start, however, is with the Correlates of War (COW) list of members of the interstate system. The COW list of members of the interstate system forms the foundation of a number of major data sets – and consequently, quantitative analyses – in international relations scholarship. Below, I present the logic behind the criteria underlying the COW list, critique it, and then offer amendments to the list based on sounder coding rules.

The Correlates of War project defines requirements for membership in the interstate system as follows:

³ Tilly, p. 1.

- a) Prior to 1920, a population of 500,000 or more and establishment of diplomatic missions at or above the rank of chargé d'affaires by Britain and France
- b) After 1920, membership in the League of Nations or United Nations *or* a population of 500,000 or more and establishment of diplomatic missions from any two major powers.⁴

The goal of the Correlates of War, and my goal in identifying states, is to identify those states engaging in significant relations with others. Members of the interstate system constitute a subset of all states in the world at a given time. It is possible that states existed in the world that are not included in either the original or revised version of the Correlates of War list of members of the interstate system. This exclusion is justified by the purpose of the data set: to help scholars analyze international relations. For example, political units that exhibit the traits associated with statehood, but which are completely autarkic, are not properly members of the interstate system because they do not interact with other states.

While I agree with the general principle of using size and recognition as markers of statehood, or membership in the international system, the pre-1920 measurement of international recognition used in the Correlates of War project is problematic. Prior to 1920, Singer and Small measure international legitimacy exclusively by the establishment of diplomatic missions from Britain and France. The logic of relying on only these two states is not contested here; as they note, as Britain and France went, “so went the majority.”⁵ I do, however, object to the practice of relying exclusively on the

⁴ Small and Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980*, pp. 39-43.

⁵ Small and Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980*, p. 40. Given that I do not amend the use of Britain and France as the system’s “legitimizers,” I am also vulnerable to criticisms of Euro-centrism. Two responses to this criticism can be made. The first is an acknowledgement of the validity of this criticism; however, it is important to note that the revised data set I propose is significantly less Euro-centric than the original data set. Second, it is also essential to consider the feasibility of alternative approaches to revising the COW list. In order to completely avoid, or almost eliminate, Euro-centrism in the data set, one would have to either eliminate the use of legitimizers or select a number of

establishment of diplomatic missions as a measurement of international legitimacy from 1816 to 1920.

“Legitimate” states are recognized by other states. Debates over the procedures, purposes, and import of diplomatic recognition remain alive among international legal scholars today. These scholars agree, however, on the basic purposes and modes of recognition. They hold that the primary intent of recognition is to identify a state’s capacity to engage in international legal activities. Further, they agree that a number of acts can constitute either *de jure* or *de facto* recognition.⁶

Singer and Small use the establishment of diplomatic missions “at or above the rank of chargé d’affaires” as their measure of pre-1920 state legitimacy.⁷ The sending of diplomatic representatives – a necessary condition for inclusion in the pre-1920 COW list – is a strong signal to the recipient and other states, but nonetheless falls into the category of implied recognition. While this is a relatively uncontroversial form of recognition,⁸ its use as a measure of pre-1920 legitimacy is problematic. Specifically, I raise four issues with the use of this measure.

legitimizers from inside and outside Europe. The nature of the issue suggests the usefulness of legitimizers in constructing the list; relying on non-European legitimizers would be a very useful approach to take, but would also require time and linguistic skills beyond the scope of this project.

⁶ Brownlie; Chen; Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law*; Lauterpacht.

⁷ Small and Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980*, p. 40. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations states:

Heads of mission are divided into three classes, namely:

- (a) that of ambassadors or nuncios [representatives of the Holy See] accredited to Heads of State, and other heads of mission of equivalent rank;
- (b) that of envoys, ministers and internuncios, accredited to Heads of State;
- (c) that of *chargé d'affaires* accredited to Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

Except as concerns precedence and etiquette, there shall be no difference between heads of mission by reason of their class. Quoted in Brownlie, p. 353.

⁸ Chen, pp. 196-98; Lauterpacht, pp. 381-82.

First, the practice of sending permanent envoys to foreign courts was a relatively new one in the 19th century.⁹ Luigi Gonzaga, a Mantuan diplomatic agent sent to the Bavarian court in 1341, was reportedly the first permanent diplomatic resident sent from one state to another. Permanent diplomatic agents were not used with any frequency for another century. Further, the practice of establishing permanent diplomatic missions was limited to the Italian peninsula until the late 16th century.¹⁰

Second, it may be difficult to ascertain when and where diplomatic missions were established; in other words, it is difficult to implement this coding procedure. Many European and pre-colonial states did receive permanent envoys from Britain and/or France prior to their appearance on the COW list. For example, an 1801 treaty between France and Algeria permits the return of the French chargé d'affaires and states that an Algerian ambassador will be sent to France.¹¹ Missions such as this one are absent from the list of diplomatic missions used to construct the COW list of members of the interstate system.¹²

Third, the establishment of permanent diplomatic missions may have held different meanings for Europeans and non-Europeans, particularly Asians. J.C. Hurewitz asserts that, in Ottoman culture, permanent diplomatic missions were only established in

⁹ Alexandrowicz, pp. 185-86.

¹⁰ Mattingly.

¹¹ de Clercq and de Clercq, vol. 1, pp. 476-78.

¹² An additional implementation problem undermines the value of the Correlates of War list. Of 69 states that are identified from 1816 to 1919, 31 do not appear to meet the requirement of receiving missions from both Britain and France. A number of these states received missions prior to 1816, received missions prior to meeting the population criterion, or shared missions with neighboring states. Several states (particularly those entering the system in the 1910s), however, did not meet even these amended criteria for membership in the system. For the original diplomatic missions data, see Singer and Small, *Diplomatic Missions Received by Each International System Member, 1817-1970*. Additional information about the sources of these discrepancies was obtained through personal correspondence with the principal investigators.

“inferior” or subject states.¹³ States subscribing to this belief system might then refuse a permanent diplomatic residence in their state, as the receiving state would be seen as inferior to the state sending the mission. In this instance, important cultural differences may undermine the validity of the Correlates of War coding system.

Fourth, Singer and Small require that members of the interstate system receive diplomatic missions from Britain *and* France. They chose Britain and France as their legitimizers because they were the major powers of the day and engaged in the most international relations. At the same time, though, not all of their international relations overlapped. Particularly with respect to polities in Asia and Africa, their attentions were divided. Sole French recognition of a polity, however, should not exclude it from the roster of 19th century states. It is important to recognize the freedom Britain and France enjoyed by virtue of their power; they did not have to accord recognition to states too weak to withstand the European colonial onslaught. That they did so in many cases – despite the perceived barbarism of these polities – is telling. It indicates that these polities were formidable powers, and potential allies and enemies. Particularly given the limitations of the transportation technology of the times, the criterion should be amended to include states that were recognized by Britain *or* France.

These problems combine to generate an artificially low number of states, as listed in the Correlates of War. Figure 4 shows the number of state entries into the interstate system (according to the Correlates of War) from 1816 to 1920. The highest number of state entries (23) occurs in 1816, when the data set begins. Other high-entry years include 1960 (18), as decolonization occurred, 1991 (18), following the collapse of the

¹³ Hurewitz.




Figure 4

Soviet Union, and 1920 (10). While 1920 is close to the end of the First World War, most of the actual post-war state entries took place from 1917 to 1919. The spike in state entries in 1920 is not due to an actual increase in the number of states but, instead, to the switching of measurement techniques.

These data suggest that the COW list of members of the interstate system is artificially low for the pre-1920 period. This conclusion is not a surprising one, given that it is much easier to meet the criteria for membership in the interstate system after 1920 than before. The data suggest the need for another measure of legitimacy – one that maintains a commitment to finding legally capable states that interacted with like states – but that more accurately reflects the composition of 19th century international relations.

The purpose of the legitimacy criterion is to distinguish those states “sufficiently unencumbered by legal, military, economic, or political constraints to exercise a fair degree of sovereignty and independence.”¹⁴ My contention is that relying solely on the establishment of British and French diplomatic missions generates a list of 19th century states that is incomplete, at best. Further, this list is biased; some European states are omitted, and virtually all Asian and African states are left out.

If the motive behind the legitimacy criterion is to identify states that are sovereign and independent, then we should consider the practical meaning of these terms in international relations. Both sovereignty and independence have long been considered criteria for statehood. Stephen Krasner defines international legal sovereignty as “the practices associated with mutual recognition, usually between territorial entities that have formal juridical independence.”¹⁵ In the international legal

¹⁴ Small and Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980*, p. 40.

¹⁵ Krasner, p. 3.

sense, independence is defined as “the capacity to enter into relations with other states.”¹⁶ Logically, then, it would seem that states that are recognized and have already entered into formal relations with other states have met this standard.

The establishment of diplomatic missions (or, more generally, the exchange of diplomatic representatives) is the measure of legitimacy/independence selected by Singer and Small. As shown above, however, this measure is problematic both chronologically and practically. Exchanging diplomatic representatives is a relatively uncontroversial form of diplomatic recognition; it is not, however, the only such form.

“It is generally agreed [among international legal scholars] that the conclusion of bilateral treaties constitutes recognition.”¹⁷ Certainly, the conclusion of treaties testifies to a state’s ability to engage in formal international relations. Further, in a number of important cases, the conclusion of a bilateral treaty has been considered to constitute recognition.¹⁸ Lauterpacht refines this claim, though, by arguing that “it is clear that the conclusion of a bilateral treaty is a proper mode of recognition in all cases in which there is no reasonable doubt as to the intention of the parties on the subject. This would apply in particular to such treaties as a comprehensive treaty of commerce and navigation or a treaty of alliance.”¹⁹

¹⁶ Brownlie, p. 71.

¹⁷ Chen, p. 192.

¹⁸ “Sir William Scott held in *The Helena* (1801) that the Bey of Algiers must be regarded as a sovereign on account of his treaty relations with Great Britain. In 1822, the United States contended that Spain had accorded recognition to her American Colonies by concluding with them ‘treaties equivalent to an acknowledgement of independence.’ The International Association of the Congo was recognised by the majority of Powers by the conclusion of conventions. The Turkish Republican Government was recognised by the United States by the signing of the treaties of August 6, 1923. The recognition of the Soviet Government by many States was also achieved by means of bilateral convention.” Chen, pp. 192-93.

¹⁹ Lauterpacht, p. 378.

Given that both logic and diplomatic practice support the use of bilateral treaties as indicators of recognition, it seems advisable to add the conclusion of a treaty with Britain or France to the Correlates of War criteria for membership in the interstate system prior to 1920. This change does require a fair degree of caution. As Lauterpacht argues, not all treaties with all parties should be taken to imply recognition. Prudence suggests a careful development of criteria to distinguish among substantive treaties between international actors and conditions imposed on weaker parties through *pro forma* treaties. This advice is particularly important with regard to treaty relations between colonial powers and pre-colonial states. At the same time, though, it is important to remember that European treatment of pre-colonial African and Asian polities did not necessarily differ substantially from treatment of small European states.²⁰

From 1800 to 1817, France and Britain signed a combined 496 treaties with 144 separate polities,²¹ of which 23 (including Britain and France) received British or French diplomatic missions.²² Treaties with unrecognized (according to COW) states include the Treaty of accession of Hanover to the Treaty of alliance of 25 March 1815 between the Four Powers (1815), a British treaty of alliance with Persia (1814), and a French peace treaty with Tripoli (1801). At first blush, then, it does seem that many of the unrecognized treaty parties were, in fact, members of the interstate system. If their populations meet the 500,000 criterion, their inclusion in the COW list of states deserves serious consideration.

One might argue, though, that there are treaties and treaties. Does the conclusion of the Treaty of Amritsar (which settled the boundaries between British and Sikh

²⁰ Gillard, pp. 90-91.

²¹ These data have been compiled from Parry, et al. and de Clercq and de Clercq.

territory) confer legitimacy on the Sikh in the same way that the Treaty of Lunéville (in which Spain ceded Louisiana to France) indicates membership of Spain or France in the interstate system? In particular, how seriously can we take treaties concluded between major European powers and polities about to be conquered by them?

This question is answered in two parts. First, we can examine the content of treaties between European powers and pre-colonial states. Were these treaties grossly unfair - were they imposed upon leaders of pre-colonial polities? Second, we can ask whether the Europeans signing these treaties took them seriously. Did they consider the African and Asian leaders party to the treaties heads of state, or lackeys hired to preserve a façade of legitimacy by signing worthless pieces of paper? If treaties and treatment seem equal, then we must include pre-colonial states left out of the original COW list.

Histories of the colonization of Asia and Africa reveal that conquest was often preceded by bargaining, concession, and even vassalage on the part of Europeans. British envoys to the Mughal empire were required to become vassals to establish trade relations.²³ Similarly, French representatives paid tribute to African states for the protection of commerce. This type of European treatment of and by native princes was reflected in treaties between European powers and pre-colonial states. For instance, the 1832 treaty between the East India Company and the Rajah of the Punjab explicitly refers to the Punjab as a state, requires British merchants to respect the Rajah's authority, and recognizes both the Rajah and the British government as having the right to issue passports.²⁴ Similarly, an 1856 French treaty with Siam, signed prior to Siamese reception of French diplomatic missions, recognizes Siam as a state, grants equal rights

²² See Singer and Small, *Diplomatic Missions Received by Each International System Member, 1817-1970*.

²³ Alexandrowicz, pp. 93-94.

of protection to French and Siamese subjects in each other's countries, and states that France and Siam will aid each other's ships in times of distress.²⁵ Further, as Hedley Bull argues, assumptions that these treaties were universally invalid are suspect; in fact, conclusion of a treaty with a major European power often benefited individual leaders even if it undermined the sovereignty of their polity.²⁶

The content of treaties notwithstanding, it is useful to examine historical perception of these polities and treaties. The 19th century European view of the constitution of the "family of nations" was, in fact, a Euro-centric one. While the existence of other states was acknowledged, these were not originally admitted to the club of civilized nations.

Primarily, the distinction between civilized (member) and uncivilized (non-member) states was drawn along religious lines. Non-Christian states were not considered to be part of the society of nations. "States not so accepted were not (at least in theory) bound by international law, nor were the 'Civilized Nations' bound by it in their behaviour towards them."²⁷ The Spanish, in particular, seized upon religious justification for their conquests in the Americas.²⁸

This doctrine, however, met resistance when the constraints imposed by Christian international law met the exigencies of commerce. As far back as the fifteenth century, the question of the validity of treaties between Christian and non-Christian powers had been considered in Rome. Popes and scholars alike agreed that commercial treaties with non-Christian powers were valid, as the extension of commerce was the will of God.

²⁴ Aitchison, vol. 1, pp. 36-38.

²⁵ de Clercq and de Clercq, vol. 7, pp. 138-49.

²⁶ Bull, pp. 111-12.

²⁷ Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law*, p. 13.

Opinions on the validity of alliances with non-Christian states were more mixed. Alliances not directed against Christian powers and that did not augment the powers of non-Christian states were uncontested. But alliances directed against other Christian states were highly controversial.²⁹

While the primary purpose of Europeans in Asia and Africa was commerce, they frequently did form alliances with pre-colonial states against each other. The religious prohibition discussed above raises the question: how seriously was the injunction against forming alliances with non-Christian powers that were, in turn, directed against Christian states, taken? A survey of British treaties in South Asia alone yields a number of cases of explicit alliance against France, and even more instances of an Indian head of state agreeing to exclude other Europeans from his reign.

Certainly with regard to commercial treaties (the vast majority of treaties signed with pre-colonial states), validity was not questioned. In fact, House of Commons impeachment proceedings against the Marquess Wellesley included, among others, accusations of breaking treaties with East Indian states.³⁰ More recently, the International Court of Justice ruled that the 1779 Treaty of Poona, wherein the Maratha ruler granted rights of passage to the Portuguese, was valid, over Indian objections. The court's view was that:

It is sufficient to state that the validity of a treaty concluded as long ago as the last quarter of the eighteenth century, in the conditions then prevailing in the Indian Peninsula, should not be judged upon the basis of practices and procedures which have since developed only gradually. The Marathas themselves regarded the Treaty of 1779 as valid and binding upon them, and gave effect to its provisions. The Treaty is frequently referred to as such in subsequent formal Maratha documents, including the two sanads

²⁸ Donelan.

²⁹ Alexandrowicz, pp. 83-90.

³⁰ James, p. 66.

of 1783 and 1785 which purport to have been issued in pursuance of the Treaty. The Marathas did not at any time cast any doubt upon the validity or binding character of the treaty.³¹

The rendering of the ICJ's decision strongly suggests that the treaty was, and in fact continued to be, as binding on the Portuguese as it was on the Marathas.³²

Both the content and contemporary treatment of French and British treaties with pre-colonial states in Asia and Africa testify to the import and validity of these treaties. International law of recognition supports the use of such treaties as a form of recognition. Given that the Correlates of War measure of 19th century international recognition relies upon a relatively new practice and generates a biased list, the use of treaties as an alternative measure of recognition is justified. Thus, the alternative criteria for membership in the interstate system from 1816-1919 proposed here are:

- a) population of 500,000 or more, and
- b) either:
 - receipt of diplomatic missions from Britain and France
 - or:
 - conclusion of a treaty of commerce, alliance, or navigation with Britain or France

Given the critique just leveled at Singer and Small's coding process, it may seem surprising that the revised criteria include the original coding rules. Despite my objections to the exclusivity of the legitimacy measure used by COW, it is important to remember that states receiving diplomatic missions are also receiving international recognition. Thus, if a state receives a diplomatic mission but does not conclude an

³¹ Quoted in Alexandrowicz, p. 5.

³² Nonetheless, it is important to note that many treaties signed by Britain and France and pre-colonial states were patently unequal. International lawyers voice mixed opinions on the validity of unequal treaties. As explained below, however, such treaties were generally excluded from the process of identifying "new" states.

appropriate treaty with Britain or France, it should not be excluded from the list of members of the interstate system.

To date, 19 additions and 24 revisions have been made to the COW list (See Tables 1 and 2, below). Any state whose first incarnation is omitted from COW is included in the “added states” list; states included in the “revised states” list have either had a continuous existence from the date of entry to the end date of the data set or, if they die at a later time, that death is recorded in the COW list. The results thus far markedly change the face of the Correlates of War list of members of the interstate system from 1816-1920.³³

³³ Interestingly, a number of the added states – including Afghanistan, Burma, and Madagascar – exit the interstate system and are later resurrected. This phenomenon suggests a strong sense of boundaries and nationality that preceded and outlasted colonization. This is not to undermine the statehood of those members of the interstate system not reborn. In fact, relations with states like the Peshwa (also known as the Maratha) occupied a good deal of European attention.

It is also interesting to note that a number of the added states seem to have had very short lives. In fact, these states were not short-lived. Censoring in terms of the start date of the data set generates the illusion that they were members of the interstate system only very briefly. Algeria, for example, signed its first treaty with a major European power in 1662, and did not exit the system until 1830. Similarly, the first Anglo-Peshwa treaty was concluded in 1789. The impression given of short lives is an artifact of the starting date of the data set.

Table 1
States added to the Correlates of War

State	Date of Entry	Date of Exit
Afghanistan (Cabul)	1816	1879
Algeria (Algiers)	1816	1830
Annam	1875	1884
Bhawulpore	1833	1838
Bolivia	1836	1836
Burma	1826	1885
Cutch	1816	1819
Dahomey	1851	1895
Dominican Republic	1850	1861
Eastern Turkistan	1874	1877
Fouta	1841	1888
Indore	1816	1818
Madagascar	1865	1885
Nagpur	1816	1818
Peru-Bolivia Confederation	1837	1839
Peshwa	1816	1817
Punjab	1816	1846
Sind	1816	1839
Soudan	1886	1886

Table 2
Revised Entry dates for States Already in the Correlates of War

State	New Entry Date	COW Entry Date
Argentina	1825	1841
Bolivia	1840	1848
Bulgaria	1898	1908
China	1842	1860
Colombia	1825	1831
Ecuador	1844	1854
Egypt	1840	1855
El Salvador	1859	1875
Guatemala	1849	1888
Haiti	1838	1859
Hanover	1816	1838
Iran (Persia)	1816	1855
Japan	1855	1860
Korea	1884	1888
Liberia	1849	1920
Mexico	1826	1831
Morocco	1816	1847
Nepal	1816	1920
Oman	1839	1971
South Africa	1885	1920
Thailand	1827	1887
Tunis (Tunisia)	1816	1825
Uruguay	1839	1882
Venezuela	1834	1841

Between added and revised states, 13 additional states enter the interstate system in 1816. This change raises the original Correlates of War estimate (23) by fifty percent. Three states – Liberia, Nepal, and South Africa – that COW codes as entering the system in 1920 treated with Britain or France prior to that time. The spike in state entries illustrated in Figure 4 (above) becomes less glaring. Further, the 19th century composition of the system reflects more accurately the wide array of states conducting international relations at that time.

And how do you know if it's dead?

Exit from the interstate system is synonymous with the term "state death" as it is used here. The metaphor of entry and exit is perhaps particularly appropriate given Waltz's frequent references to microeconomics, where industrial organization theorists hypothesize about the conditions under which firms will enter or exit a market. **I define state death as the formal loss of control over foreign policy to another state.**

State death could be defined in one of a number of ways. "State death" has referred to internal state collapse, as in Somalia, a regime change, conquest, or division. Because international relations theories' claims about state death explicitly shy away from domestic politics, I define state death in terms of loss of sovereignty to another state. While the definition of statehood used here brings a state's international legal capabilities into specific relief, this definition of state death is also consistent with Weber's definition of a state as having a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a territory. Once a state gives up, or is forced to give up, its ability to conduct independent international relations to another state, it also concedes its authority to decide to use force to defend its territory. To further illustrate this point, imagine an ideal-typical case where a state loses its ability to conduct its foreign policy, but maintains the responsibility and authority to ensure domestic order. This former state may possess a monopoly on the use of force for one specific purpose: maintenance of domestic peace. It does not, however, possess a monopoly on the use of force within a given territory, as it is precluded from

independently deciding to use force to defend that territory. Once a state has died, the monopoly on the use of legitimate force within a territory has been lost.

This definition of state death also conforms to the notion that the preservation of sovereignty is intimately associated with state survival. Stephen Krasner defines and categorizes four types of sovereignty: international legal, interdependence, Westphalian, and domestic sovereignty.³⁴ States that have lost control of their foreign policy to another state have certainly lost their international legal, interdependence, and Westphalian sovereignty, and will probably soon lose their domestic sovereignty as well. Dead or dying states are no longer recognized as having the right to engage in international contracts (international legal sovereignty); they cannot control movement across their borders (interdependence sovereignty); and they have lost authority over the boundaries of their state (Westphalian sovereignty). Further, within the set of cases of states that lose control of their foreign policy but maintain some control of domestic policy (e.g., protectorates), the initial loss of foreign policy control typically leads to the erosion of domestic sovereignty. While it is not uncommon for states to have compromised at least one component of sovereignty, dead states generally have witnessed the loss of all types of sovereignty.

Although I argue that my definition of state death is consistent with the Weberian characterization of statehood, an important distinction remains to be made. According to another reading of the Weberian definition, one could conceive of state death in terms of

³⁴International legal sovereignty refers to the practices associated with mutual recognition, usually between territorial entities that have formal juridical independence. Westphalian sovereignty refers to political organization based on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given territory. Domestic sovereignty refers to the formal organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity. Finally,

a regime change (as in Cuba in 1959) or state collapse (as in Somalia in 1992). In these cases, though, the state is still alive in the international system; it has not exited the system, but has undergone serious internal changes. While students of comparative politics frequently label these cases of state death, since I am interested in the international pressures that may lead to state death, I exclude these categories from my definition of state death. This exclusion hinges on the notion that foreign policy capabilities must be lost to another state for a state death to have occurred. A regime change or state collapse may well compromise interdependence, domestic, or Westphalian sovereignty. It does not, however, necessarily compromise international legal sovereignty. Although some states may revoke recognition based on these changes in domestic politics, it is difficult to conceive of Cuba as having left the international system after 1959, or Somalia after 1992.

My definition of state death raises three additional issues that must be clarified. One question that demands clarification refers to state dissolution and successor states. Should states like the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary, and the Soviet Union be included as state deaths? If so, should the loss of the British and French empires also be considered state deaths?

The general rule used here has been to code a state death if there is significant, sudden loss of contiguous "home" territory. Thus, the breakup of colonial empires is not considered to be a state death of the imperial power. Loss of non-contiguous territory (cf. Pakistan in 1971) and of contiguous territory recently gained in war is also not considered to lead to state death. This distinction includes cases like Austria-Hungary and the Soviet

interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state." Krasner, pp. 3-4.

Union as state deaths, but excludes states like Britain in the 1950s and 1960s, and the Ottoman Empire (which had lost most of its territory over the century prior to World War I, after which the Empire finally collapsed).

An additional clarification refers to the degree of foreign policy making control that a state may retain. Control over foreign policy is clearly a continuous variable that I am dichotomizing for analytical simplicity. No state has complete control over its foreign policy and many states are or have been highly constrained in their foreign policy making. For example, it is difficult to claim that the Soviet satellite states exercised strong foreign policy making powers. Nonetheless, these states were technically capable of practicing some independence in their foreign policy, although the likely consequence of deviation from the party line was severe punishment by the USSR, as in Hungary in 1956. Fully occupied states or protectorates, on the other hand (cf. Belgium in 1940, Indian colonies), lack the capability to exercise an independent foreign policy. The distinction between states that are so highly constrained in their foreign policy that they have practically no option and states that literally have no options or control is a fine, but relevant, one.

State death can occur in one of four ways. First, states may die through conquest. They may be colonized, as were the Indian princely states; or they may be taken over, and sometimes parceled out, as was Poland in World War II. Military occupation is another form of state death. If occupation lasts, or is intended to last, for at least five years, as in the cases of Japan after World War II or the Dominican Republic in 1916, then the occupied state has died. States can die through federation or confederation (or reunification) with other states, as did East Germany in 1990 and Zanzibar in 1964.

Finally, state death may occur through dissolution. Cases in point are Czechoslovakia in 1991-2, and Germany in 1945. Note that while cases of conquest and occupation are always violent, unification and dissolution can also occur violently, as in the Two Sicilies' annexation to Piedmont in 1861.

Sixty-eight of 210 states have died since 1816. They are listed in Table 3.

Table 3
State Deaths, 1816-1992

State	Violent?	Year
Peshwa (Maratha)	Yes	1817
Indore	Yes	1818
Nagpur	Yes	1818
Cutch	Yes	1819
Algeria (Algiers)	Yes	1830
Bolivia	No	1836
Bhawulpore	No	1838
Peru-Bolivia Confederation	Yes	1839
Sind	Yes	1843
Punjab	Yes	1846
Papal States	Yes	1860
Modena	No	1860
Parma	No	1860
Tuscany	No	1860
Dominican Republic	No	1861
Two Sicilies	Yes	1861
Hanover	Yes	1866
Hesse Electoral	Yes	1866
Hesse Grand Ducal	No	1867
Saxony	Yes	1867
Meckelnburg Schwerin	No	1867
Baden	No	1870
Wuerttemberg	No	1870
Paraguay	Yes	1870
Bavaria	No	1871
Eastern Turkistan	Yes	1877
Afghanistan (Cabul)	Yes	1879
Peru	Yes	1880
Tunisia	Yes	1881
Egypt	Yes	1882
Annam	Yes	1884
Burma	Yes	1885

Madagascar	Yes	1885
Soudan	Yes	1886
Fouta	Yes	1888
Dahomey	Yes	1895
Korea	Yes	1905
Cuba	Yes	1906
Morocco	Yes	1911
Haiti	Yes	1915
Dominican Republic	Yes	1916
Austria-Hungary	Yes	1918
Ethiopia	Yes	1936
Austria	Yes	1938
Poland	Yes	1939
Czechoslovakia	Yes	1939
Albania	Yes	1939
Netherlands	Yes	1940
Belgium	Yes	1940
Luxembourg	Yes	1940
France	Yes	1940
Estonia	Yes	1940
Latvia	Yes	1940
Lithuania	Yes	1940
Norway	Yes	1940
Denmark	Yes	1940
Yugoslavia	Yes	1941
Greece	Yes	1941
Germany	Yes	1945
Japan	Yes	1945
Syria	No	1958
Zanzibar	No	1964
Republic of Vietnam	Yes	1975
Kuwait	Yes	1990
German Democratic Republic	No	1990
Yemen Arab Republic	No	1990
Yemen People's Republic	No	1990
Soviet Union	No	1991

Of the 68 states that have died, 51 – the clear majority – have died violently. In part because violent state deaths constitute the bulk of state deaths, and in part because the predictions of major IR theories should work best in cases of violent state death, I focus

my analysis on those states that were “killed,” rather than on those that committed suicide.

The Lazarus Effect: State Resurrection

A brief glance at the list of state deaths (see Table 3, above) reveals that a large number of states that have exited the system have re-entered. Many of the states that re-enter the system do so almost (or entirely) in their original form. This tendency is particularly true for ultimately short-lived wartime occupations (cf. the Netherlands) or for cases where geography clearly delimits national boundaries (cf. Madagascar). All such cases are coded as state resurrections.

More problematic are cases where, after a state death, a new state enters the system that contains some, although not all, of the territory belonging to the original state. Nonetheless, it seems clear that while North and South Korea both contain parts of Korea, they do not represent the resurrection of the Korean state. But other cases – such as the independence of the Indian state in 1947 (containing Punjab, Peshwa, Indore, Cutch, and Nagpur) and of North and South Vietnam in 1954 (both containing parts of Annam) might suggest resurrection in a slightly adjusted form.

In this study, states that are reborn as parts of new states are not considered resurrected states. Clearly, these states never re-enter the international system as independent actors; as subnational units, they do not have control over their foreign policy. Thus, for a state to be resurrected, it must re-enter the system in a form exact to or very close to its original one.

What About?....

Tibet

Tibet is not considered a member of the international system because it did not receive international recognition as a state during the 19th and 20th centuries. Tibet, though, is indeed a difficult case to categorize based on foreign policy making powers and international recognition. For most of its history, it was dominated by either the Mongols or, principally, by China. While it is true that the British signed a commercial treaty with Tibet in 1904, two years later they signed a new treaty with China that confirmed the 1904 British-Tibetan treaty and recognized Chinese control over Tibetan foreign policy. Five years later, in 1911, Tibet declared itself independent of Chinese rule and, in many ways, was considered an independent state until 1949.

Clearly, the Tibetan case is a controversial one. In excluding Tibet from my list of states, however, I am removing a case that would support my own argument. During the early 20th century, when Tibet might be considered a member of the international system, Tibet was clearly caught between two major powers: China and British India. While it is true that Tibet was not very powerful, historically it had only been able to form alliances with China (in other words, Tibet would request Chinese assistance during times of danger). Therefore, including Tibet in the list of members of the international system from 1911-1949 would confirm the buffer states portion of my argument. Given the timing of Tibet's presumed "death," however, this case would work against the norms argument I have presented, but less so than a case of violent state death farther away from the conclusion of World War II.

Texas

In 1836, the Republic of Texas was created and independence from Mexico declared. Ten years later, Texas was voluntarily annexed by the United States. Was Texas a member of the international system from 1836-1846?

Both Britain and France signed treaties that qualify of treaties of recognition with Texas during this time.³⁵ However, the 1840 Census of the Republic of Texas counts approximately 10,500 taxpayers (white men over the age of 21) and 12,317 slaves.³⁶ We would have to assume that, for each taxpayer and slave counted, there were an additional 21 people (i.e., women and children or tax evaders) for Texas to reach the population requirement of 500,000 and be considered a member of the interstate system.

Were Texas to be included in this analysis it would not change the results, as its death was voluntary and non-violent. Although a US-Mexican rivalry had not existed prior to the annexation of Texas (and even afterward, the level of fighting probably would not qualify for rivalry coding), the doctrine of Manifest Destiny was an important factor that led to antipathy between the two states and, indeed, war in 1846. Had Texas not been annexed voluntarily, it would have become a buffer state. As such, Texas did receive offers of support from European powers, and was not an independent republic after World War II. The inclusion of the Texan case would support the argument advanced here.

³⁵ Hertslet and Hertslet, vol. 6, p. 807; de Clercq and de Clercq, vol. 4, p. 502.

³⁶ White.

Finland

Finland entered the international system in 1917, after gaining independence from Russia. During the first half of the 20th century, the Finns attempted a number of tactics to preserve their security against a Russian threat. These included attempted (and sometimes successful) alliances with states like Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Sweden, and Germany. Like the Baltic states, it was clear that Finland was caught between the Soviets and the Germans.

In 1948, Finland signed a pact with the Soviet Union for mutual defense that also prohibited Finland from joining any organizations considered hostile to the Soviet Union. Did this agreement sufficiently constrain Finnish foreign policy to mean that Finland had exited the international system? Clearly, Finland did not have complete control over its foreign policy making powers. As stated above, however, no state has complete control over its foreign policy. Although Finland may have been more constrained than most in that the terms of its alliance treaty with the USSR were particularly confining, Finland (like Hungary) could certainly have violated the treaty and faced the consequences. Thus, Finland is not considered to have exited the system in 1948.

Nonetheless, like Texas and Tibet, Finland was a buffer state. It formed alliances prior to the 1948 pact with the USSR, was a middling strong European state, and was internationally legitimate. Including the Finnish case as a state death would once again support the buffer states part of my argument, but mildly undermine the norms part of the argument.

Soviet Bloc Countries

The foreign policy of Soviet Bloc states was clearly constrained during the Cold War. The Warsaw Pact, for example, included provisions for the maintenance of Soviet troops on satellite soil. Nonetheless, I contend that the Warsaw Pact states do not represent cases of violent state death; although their foreign policies were highly constrained by the Soviet Union, they did not formally lose control over their foreign policy powers to the USSR.

In fact, a number of examples suggest that the Soviet Bloc countries retained some control over their foreign policies. Albania withdrew from the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. Nagy's attempt to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, although punished, also exhibits greater foreign policy capabilities than one would expect of a "dead" state. Independent Yugoslav policies also led to complete withdrawal from the bloc.

The Soviet satellite states represent cases very close to the borderline of state death. They do not lie, however, over the line. It is also important to consider that, if we were to consider these cases instances of state death, we might also have to consider cases like West Germany as state deaths as well. Note as well that, if I included the Soviet bloc countries as cases of state death, they would support the buffer states part of my argument, although not the norms part of the argument.

Belgium WWI

Should Belgium during World War I be considered a case of state death? In August of 1914, the Germans overran Belgian defenses and occupied most of that country during the course of the war. At the same time, though, the Belgian king

retreated to unoccupied Belgium and continued to exercise his powers as commander-in-chief from there. Thus, Belgium's foreign policy powers were not successfully captured by the Germans. Nonetheless, World War I Belgium is clearly a case very close to the borderline of state death. Once again, though, if 1914 Belgium were to be included in the analysis, the case would only support my argument. Because World War I occurred prior to 1945, the norms part of the argument would not be operative. Belgium, however, is a classic buffer state, perpetually caught between France and Germany. In fact, the Schlieffen Plan called for using Belgium as the German route to France. At the outbreak of war, Belgium was heavily fortified and considered to be quite nationalistic; Belgium also had alliances throughout the war, although not until 1914. Again, to include the case of Belgium in World War I in the analysis would only strengthen my own argument.

Ottoman Empire

Should the Ottoman Empire be considered a state death? As discussed above, the rule used here for coding state dissolutions has been to code a state death if there is significant, sudden loss of contiguous "home" territory. Admittedly, this rule has some arbitrary features. It was principally intended to distinguish state deaths like the Soviet Union's demise from events like the fall of the British Empire. While the territory lost by the Ottoman Empire was contiguous, it was lost over more than a century. In 1807, the boundaries of the empire stretched from Bessarabia to Kuwait; only by 1924 was it reduced to its principal successor state of modern-day Turkey. Because the change was so gradual, I do not code the Ottoman Empire as a state death, and instead consider Turkey as a continuous successor to the empire.

World War II cases

Should the identified state deaths associated with World War II be considered as such when most of the states were resurrected following the war? The reason for including these cases is the same as for including all cases of states that are later resurrected: we cannot know at the time of state death whether a state will be resurrected. By excluding states that we know, today, are resurrected, we would inject a potential selection bias into the results. Consider some counterfactuals: had the Axis powers won the war, many of these resurrections may not have occurred. A somewhat reverse case refers to Allied considerations of the "German question" at the close of the war. One of the proposals on the table was to divide Germany into a number of smaller states that would approximate the German city-states prior to unification. If this plan had succeeded, should we then have removed Saxony, Bavaria, and Hanover from the list of state deaths?

The Context of Death Variables

Buffer States

The measure of this variable is straightforward. Using an existing list of enduring rivalries, I identified those states geographically located between two rivals for the duration of the rivalry. Following Wayman and Jones, D. Scott Bennett operationalizes an enduring rivalry according to the following criteria:

- at least 5 reciprocated militarized interstate disputes [MIDs] lasting at least 30 days each occur between the two states
- at least 25 years occur between outbreak of the first dispute and termination of last dispute
- if the gap between any 2 MIDs exceeds 10 years, the rivalry continues only if the territorial domain and issues remain unresolved and there is at least one MID within a period of 25 years
- the issues at stake in dyad must be connected over the life of the rivalry
- once identified, rivalry continues until these issues are settled

Once a rivalry is identified by the above rules, the first MID concerning the relevant issues (which is not necessarily the first qualifying MID) is the start date of the rivalry.³⁷

Using Bennett's list of enduring rivals, I then coded buffer states. For example, as shown in Figure 5, in identifying buffer states in the Franco-Prussian rivalry of 1850 to 1955, I drew lines from Mulhouse in France to Southern Silesia in Prussia, and from Calais in France to Stralsund in Prussia. These lines defined the boundaries of the buffer area. Any state within the buffer area was considered to be a buffer state unless a large body of water (such as the Atlantic Ocean) divided the rivals. Table 4 lists buffer states and associated rivalries from 1816 to 1992.

³⁷ Bennett. A number of alternative lists of rivalries – notably, one proposed by Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl, and even a latter list published by Bennett, are available. As Erik Gartzke and Michael Simon have shown, however, the independent effect of enduring rivalries on state behavior may be spurious. Gartzke and Simon claim that many of the effects identified by scholars working in the enduring rivalries research agenda are in fact examples of “hot hands,” statistically indistinguishable from events generated from a random distribution model. I avoid this problem by basing my analysis on a list of rivalries that explicitly requires that the conflicts constituting the rivalry be substantively related. Goertz and Diehl; Gartzke and Simon.




Figure 5

Table 4
Buffer States, 1816-1992³⁸

Buffer State	Years	Associated Rivalry
Austria-Hungary	1850-1955	France-Prussia
Austria-Hungary	1908-1970	Germany-USSR
Baden	1850-	France-Prussia
Bangladesh	1973-1992c	China-India
Bavaria	1850-	France-Prussia
Belgium	1850-1955	France-Prussia
Belgium	1877-1955	Germany-UK
Burma	1950-1992c	China-India
France	1899-1955	Germany-UK
Hanover	1850-	France-Prussia
Korea	1884-	Japan-Russia
Korea	1884-	China-Japan
Latvia	1918-1923	Ottoman Empire-Russia
Latvia	1918-	Germany-USSR
Lithuania	1918-1923	Ottoman Empire-Russia
Lithuania	1918-	Germany-USSR
Luxembourg	1920-1955	France-Prussia
Luxembourg	1920-1955	Germany-UK
Modena	1843-1919	Austria-Hungary – Italy
Mongolia	1921-1951	Japan-Russia
Mongolia	1921-1992c	China-Russia
Netherlands	1850-1955	France-Prussia
Netherlands	1899-1955	Germany-UK
North Korea	1952-1992c	Japan-Russia
Ottoman Empire/Turkey	1908-1970	Germany-Russia
Papal States	1843-	Austria-Hungary – Italy
Parma	1843-	Austria-Hungary – Italy
Persia	1816-1923	Ottoman Empire-Russia
Poland	1919-1923	Ottoman Empire-Russia
Poland	1919-1970	Germany-USSR
South Korea	1952-1992c	Japan-Russia
Switzerland	1843-1919	Austria-Hungary – Italy
Tuscany	1843-	Austria-Hungary – Italy
Wurttemberg	1850-	France-Prussia

“c” indicates that the rivalry is censored.

If an end-date for buffer state status is not indicated, the buffer state died during the course of the rivalry and has not been resurrected to date.

³⁸ Note that I adjusted rivalry years to account for dates of state entry (if the state entered after the commencement of rivalry, the first year in which the state is a buffer is the year of entry).

The Territorial Sovereignty Norm

The basic measure of the territorial sovereignty norm used here is an indicator variable for the post-1945 period. Measures of variables suggested by corollary hypotheses of the argument are discussed earlier (see discussion of state resurrection) and also later (see discussion of regime/leader replacement) in this chapter.

An additional variable that captures elements of the normative argument refers to the relationship between the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty and norms of self-determination. Insofar as these two norms are connected, we should expect that they would affect state resurrection as well as state death. One way of measuring this effect is to examine the cultural distance between conquered and conquering states. As norms of self-determination strengthen, conquest of culturally dissimilar states should be increasingly difficult to maintain; in other words, we should expect that, as the cultural distance between conquest and conqueror increases, the probability of state resurrection also increases.

One measure of cultural distinctiveness is linguistic proximity between conquest and conqueror. Using standard linguistic charts, I first identified the primary languages of each dead state and the state to which it lost its control over foreign policy. I then counted the number of language families shared by the two states. Thus, a state whose population speaks a language that is in an entirely different family from that of a conquering state receives a zero on the linguistic proximity scale. When the conquering and conquered state have the same primary language, the linguistic similarity score

ranges from 5 to 9, depending on how developed that particular branch of a language tree is.³⁹

Additional indicators of the territorial sovereignty norm are used in the case studies of Poland and the Dominican Republic. These take several forms. For example, decisionmakers in would-be conquering states sometimes make reference to a need to observe the territorial sovereignty norm. If mention of the options of long-term occupation or conquest is absent from discussion of how to rein in a wayward buffer state, this omission is also taken as an indicator of the norm. A third indicator of the norm – particularly for great powers like the United States and the Soviet Union – is reference to the reputational consequences of norm violation.

Regime/Leader Replacement

Other scholars have done an excellent job of defining and identifying regime and leader changes. There are no obvious biases in their coding criteria and available data sets on regime and leadership changes already attribute them to internal or external causes. In this study, Ted Gurr's Polity II data set and Hein Goemans' data set on war and leadership change were combined to identify over 500 cases of regime change and leader replacement. I then identified which changes were caused by actors external to the state, as well as which changes were independent of state deaths.⁴⁰ Gurr codes an externally caused regime change when the polity is “terminated in circumstances of international war, threat, or intervention . . . [and] if the nation or its component parts maintain their

³⁹ Grimes.

autonomy."⁴¹ Goemans identified a state leader as "the person who held ultimate authority and was held accountable [for policy]."⁴² Coding a leader change is definitionally straightforward; if the person holding ultimate authority in the state changes, then the leader has changed. Table 5 lists externally caused regime and leader changes from 1816 to 1992.⁴³

Table 5
Externally Caused Regime and Leader Changes, 1816-1992

State	Year	Notes
Two Sicilies	1821	Austrians intervened to restore Ferdinand IV
Spain	1823	Spanish monarchy restored by French
Portugal	1833	Quadruple alliance restored Dom Pedro
Afghanistan	1839	British replaced Dost Muhammad with Shah Shuja
Modena	1848	Francesco V exiled after Austro-Sardinian war
Tuscany	1849	France intervened against Daniele Manin
Italy	1849	Charles Albert exiled after Austro-Sardinian war
Papal States	1850	France intervened against Garibaldi
Argentina	1852	Rosas ousted after La Plata war
France	1870	Empire toppled after loss in Franco-Prussian War
Honduras	1908	Nicaraguan intervention after Honduras lost war
Nicaragua	1909	US intervened to assure free elections
Greece	1915	Entente allies ousted King Constantine
Bulgaria	1918	Regime toppled after WWI
Turkey	1918	Government resigned after WWI
Bulgaria	1935	Zveno Group deposed by Boris III
Iran	1941	Reza Shah abdicated after Anglo-Soviet Invasion
Iraq	1941	Rashid Ali resigned after British intervention
Bulgaria	1943	Regency council created to remain loyal to Germany
Rumania	1944	Atonescu overthrown; new regime in support of Allies
Finland	1944	Ryti resigned in favor of Mannerheim after Soviet invasion
Hungary	1945	Horthy ousted by Germany in favor of Szalasi
Bulgaria	1947	USSR invaded; establishment of communist regime

⁴⁰ In other words, I did not double- or triple- count regime or leader changes that occurred simultaneously with regime changes or state deaths.

⁴¹ Gurr 1990, 31.

⁴² Goemans 2000, 54.

⁴³ Secondary sources were used to determine whether states added to the COW list experienced any externally caused regime or leader changes. States whose entry dates were revised were also checked for the period prior to their entry into the COW list.

Hungary	1948	USSR installs Communist government
Rumania	1948	USSR established communist regime
Nepal	1951	Rebels from India restored Nepali monarchy
Guatemala	1954	US intervened to protect US property
Hungary	1956	Nagy ousted by Soviet Union
Dom. Republic	1965	US intervened to prevent Bosch's return to power
Cyprus	1974	Makarios temporarily deposed by a Greek-based coup
Cambodia	1975	Lon Nol ousted by Chinese and Vietnamese forces
Afghanistan	1978	Soviet-backed coup
Uganda	1979	Amin deposed after Tanzanian invasion
Rhodesia	1979	Britain briefly retook control to oversee elections
Afghanistan	1979	Amin executed after Soviet invasion
Cambodia	1979	Vietnamese intervention installed puppet government
Argentina	1982	Galtieri resigned after Falklands War
Lebanon	1982	Israel invasion of Lebanon to establish friendly regime
Grenada	1983	US invasion to "protect medical students"
Panama	1989	US invasion to oust Noriega and extradite on drug charges
Lebanon	1990	Syrians forced General Auoun to surrender

The data used in this study are based on very conservative estimates of the death of states, leaders, and regimes. I am confident that these cases identified as externally caused state, regime, and leader political death are accurate, though I recognize that I may not have included additional cases. For example, I did not include cases of suspected (or known) covert foreign intervention, unless foreign troops were on the verge of implementing these changes themselves.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ For example, I do not include U.S. involvement in the Iranian coup of 1953. See "Secrets of History: The CIA in Iran." *The New York Times*, April 16, 2000, p. 1.

State Failure/Collapse

William Zartman defines state collapse as “a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power, law and political order have fallen apart.”⁴⁵ Gary King and Langche Zeng similarly define state failure as the “complete or partial collapse of state authority, such as occurred in Somalia and Bosnia.”⁴⁶ The State Failure Task Force Report identifies five types of state failure: revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse and disruptive regime transitions, and genocides and politicides.⁴⁷ The Zartman and King & Zeng definition more aptly describe the condition of an absence of state power that my argument predicts. This condition is captured in the Polity 98 data set, which identifies periods of interregnum, during which there is a complete collapse of central political authority. This variable captures the definition of state failure proposed Zartman and King & Zeng. The cases of complete state authority collapse identified by Polity 98 are listed in Table 6.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Zartman, p. 1.

⁴⁶ King and Zeng, p. 1.

⁴⁷ Esty, et al.

⁴⁸ Note that, following the caveats issued in the Polity98 codebook, I deleted cases of “complete authority of state collapse” that were effectively cases of state death according to my definition of the term.

Table 6
Complete State Authority Collapses, 1816-1998

State	Year of Collapse
Colombia	1860
South Africa	1902-1906
Iran	1906-1920
Mexico	1911-1916
Albania	1915-1924
Turkey	1922
Bulgaria	1942-1943
Italy	1943-1944
Zaire	1960-1962
Laos	1961-1972
Cyprus	1962-1967
Dominican Republic	1965
Lebanon	1976-1989
Chad	1979-1983
Uganda	1985
Liberia	1990-1995
Somalia	1991-1998
Afghanistan	1992-1995
Angola	1992-1993
Bosnia	1992-1994
BUI (516)	1993-1995
Rwanda	1994
Comoros	1995
Guinea-Bissau	1998

One problem with the data on state failure is that they appear less comprehensive for the pre-1945 period than for after 1945. Therefore, it will be difficult to compare pre- and postwar trends in state failure, although we may be able to uncover trends in the post-World War II era.

Independent Variables for Existing Explanations

Capabilities and Alliances

Both these variables have been calculated using standard measures from the Correlates of War project. The capability variable, which is based on data from the National Material Capabilities Data Set,⁴⁹ has six components: military expenditure, military personnel, iron and steel production, energy consumption, urban population, and total population. The measure itself is calculated by determining what proportion of global resources a state holds, in a given year, on each dimension. The proportions are then averaged to obtain the state's capability score for that year.⁵⁰

Unfortunately, the state of the data used to construct the capability measure is poor in that much data is missing. Following Bremer, this problem is usually solved by (a) averaging on all available proportions (i.e., if only 5 of 6 measures are available, dividing by 5 instead of 6), and (b) dropping all observations where no data are available.⁵¹

One problem with these solutions is that data are missing systematically. In particular, small states in the 19th century are likely to be without a capabilities score. One potential solution to this problem is multiple imputation, wherein estimators for the missing variable are devised using available data. In this case, estimators could include capabilities in prior years, capabilities of neighbors, or region. These estimators are then

⁴⁹ Singer and Small, *National Material Capabilities Data, 1816-1985*.

⁵⁰This method is described in Singer, et al. I obtained capability scores as well as data on alliance patterns from D. Scott Bennett and Alan Stamm's *Expected Utility Generator*, which includes data to 1994. Bennett and Stamm.

used to predict the values of missing observations. While I have not redressed the missing data problem here by using multiple imputation, filling in missing values will be a necessary next step in testing the hypotheses discussed above against each other.

Alliances were also measured in the standard manner. The Annual Alliance Membership data set was used for states already in the Correlates of War.⁵² This data set was constructed using alliance treaties.⁵³ Thus, for states added to or amended in the Correlates of War, the treaties used to amend the list were also used to determine whether these states had formed alliances. Note that these data are incomplete in that I was not able to determine the full scope of these states' alliance patterns, only whether they were allied with Britain or France. Since alliances for added states in particular may be undercounted, the results may be biased by overstating the effect of alliances on state survival. Also note that, because the number of states engaged in a small number of alliances after 1945 (NATO, OAS, OAU, Warsaw Pact) increased, an interaction effect for alliances in the post-1945 period is also included in the model.

Legitimacy

Just as the domestic legitimacy of a regime can theoretically be measured by the level of internal support it enjoys, the international legitimacy of a state can be measured by the level of external recognition it receives. Recall from the discussion of membership in the interstate system that a new measure of recognition was used to

⁵¹ Bremer.

⁵² Singer and Small, Annual Alliance Membership Data, 1815-1965.

⁵³ Singer and Small, "Formal Alliances, 1815-1939: A Quantitative Description"; Small and Singer, "Formal Alliances, 1816-1965: An Extension of the Basic Data".

expand the original *Correlates of War* list of members of the system. While states that concluded treaties with one of the system's legitimizers should certainly be included in the system themselves, states that received diplomatic missions (or were members of major international organizations) did enjoy a higher level of recognition, or legitimacy.

Thus, the legitimacy variable is coded dichotomously.⁵⁴ In any given country-year, a state that is only recognized by treaty is coded as "0" on the legitimacy variable, while states that received diplomatic missions or were members of the League or UN are coded as "1."

At first blush, it might seem that the inclusion of this operationalization of legitimacy will bias the results, since many of the states that receive a "0" die. It is important to remember, though, that states in this data set can be separated into three types: those that only ever sign treaties ("0"), those that only ever receive missions or join international organizations ("1"), and those that conclude treaties prior to receiving diplomatic missions or joining international organizations ("0," "1"). Thus, not all states that receive a "0" die, and not all states that die receive a "0." In other words, receiving a "0" on the legitimacy variable does not perfectly predict state death because a state's legitimacy score can vary over time. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that, if the construction of this variable were to bias the results, it would lead to an overstatement of the effect of state legitimacy on state survival.

Another potential problem with the legitimacy variable is that it may serve as a proxy for power. To some extent, this is a conceptual problem with the variable, and not

⁵⁴ The legitimacy variable could be coded categorically instead of dichotomously by distinguishing states with one treaty, states with two treaties, states with one mission, and states with two missions. Unfortunately, neither the COW diplomatic missions data set nor my own data set make these distinctions. For this reason, I used a dichotomous coding of legitimacy.

with the specific operationalization used here. Given the missing data problems discussed above, however, this caveat also bears reminding.

Occupation Costs

Nationalism is expected to be the primary determinant of occupation costs. Because nationalism is difficult to measure, more indirect variables that should predict nationalism are used. These are: level of economic development, democracy, and state age.

As suggested by Rosecrance and Gilpin, among others, more industrialized or developed states are likely to have nationalistic populations. The measure for economic development used here is obtained from the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities Index.⁵⁵ This index is composed of six variables on three dimensions (military, economic, and demographic). The two economic variables – iron and steel production and energy consumption – are used here as a proxy for economic development. Note that the standard procedure of presenting these numbers as relative capabilities is used here, with a slight amendment. Instead of averaging each state's proportion (in a given year) of each variable over the total number (usually 6) of variables, I averaged each state's proportion of each economic variable present over the total number of economic variables present.

Democratic states may also be particularly nationalistic. Since populations in more democratic states presumably have more ownership of their government and are more used to self-government, they may also be more resistant to potential conquerors.

Standard measures of democracy, taken from the Polity III project, are used here.⁵⁶

Democracy is measured on a scale from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic).

Nationalism may also be affected by the age of a state. Older states may enjoy greater cohesion and therefore a stronger sense of national unity. State age was obtained by subtracting the state's date of independence or founding from the year under observation. Data on state independence and founding were taken from the *CIA World Factbook* and the *Encyclopedia Britannica* in most cases.⁵⁷

Measures of nationalism in the case studies differ from measures used in the quantitative analysis. The most important qualitative measure of nationalism is the frequency and size of nationalist revolts. Nationalist rhetoric, as espoused by state (or national) leaders, citizens, and soldiers, also may be considered indicators of nationalism.

Conclusion

The following chapter contains quantitative analyses of a number of the hypotheses derived in Chapter 2. The variables used in these analyses are constructed according to the definitions proposed here. At a very basic level, then, this chapter serves as a reference for future chapters.

In addition, this chapter is unusual in presenting definitions and measures of terms in great detail. By exposing any potential biases in my definitions and data, I hope that readers will have more confidence in their ability to assess the validity of my argument,

⁵⁵ Singer and Small, *National Material Capabilities Data, 1816-1985*.

⁵⁶ Jagers and Gurr.

⁵⁷ Where these data were not available from standard sources, histories of the states in question were used to determine dates of founding/independence.

and of my tests of alternative hypotheses. By exposing biases in data that others have used, I hope that I can reveal questions and problems in international relations scholarship that have not been addressed previously.

Nonetheless, it is true that virtually all of the definitions proposed here can be, and indeed frequently are, contested. I have attempted to justify why and where I come down on the definitions. Hopefully, this type of rigor in measurement will engender confidence in the results that follow.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

In this chapter, I provide numerous tests of my argument against alternative hypotheses. My findings indicate that, while variables suggested by some alternative hypotheses may exert an effect on some cases of violent state death some of the time, the incentives facing states that might take over other states exert the strongest effects on the probability of violent state death

This topic is conducive to quantitative testing because a large number of states has entered and exited the international system over the past two centuries. At the same time, quantitative tests are particularly difficult to conduct for this question. State death, like war, is a rare event and therefore testing techniques must be chosen carefully. In general, data sets used in international relations scholarship are incomplete, further impairing analysis. Some of the hypotheses elaborated in Chapter 2 are also difficult to test convincingly using available data. Despite these problems, quantitative analysis is useful here in eliminating certain hypotheses that purport to predict state death, and identifying others that demand further exploration.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into five sections. In the first section, I make the case that the frequency of state death justifies studying the topic. In addition to the extreme consequences of state death, I show that state death has occurred more frequently than has been thought in the past, and that it occurs nearly as frequently as war, one of the principal topics of study for international relations scholars.

Next, I test the argument that the context in which a state operates determines its probability for survival against competing arguments, principally from neorealism,

constructivism, and rationalism. To restate briefly, my argument is that the incentives facing states that might take over other states tell us more about state survival and death than the features of states that might themselves be taken over. More specifically, states engaged in enduring rivalries have strong incentives to take over the states that lie between themselves and their competitors; buffer states are therefore more likely to die than non-buffer states because surrounding rivals fear the advantage that might accrue to their opponents if the opponent takes over the buffer state at their expense. The security dilemma surrounding buffer states creates a positive incentive for rivals to conquer their buffers. I also argue that, in certain situations, states may be constrained from taking over other states. I point to the post-1945 period in particular, when a norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty enjoys great power support, making conquest an unavailable option to would-be conquerors.

My argument contrasts with hypotheses drawn from major IR theories. Neorealists argue that states that behave rationally, by balancing against power both internally (by building up their militaries) and externally (by forming alliances) will be more likely to survive than states that behave irrationally. Constructivists suggest that states that are accorded greater international legitimacy will be more likely to survive than less legitimate states because legitimacy is a meaningful social construction that bounds appropriate state behavior. Occupation costs theorists contend that states that are more nationalistic will create unacceptable costs for would-be conquerors; because predatory states anticipate these costs, they will be less inclined to take over relatively nationalistic states. Tests of my argument against these theories include variables like

power, alliances, international legitimacy, and a basket of indicators that occupation costs theorists have suggested will measure nationalism.

Third, I test corollary hypotheses of the norms parts of my argument. For example, I find a marked increase in the external replacement of regimes and leaders since 1945, when the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty gained significant strength. Fourth, I explore empirical support for alternative explanations for the clear shift away from violent state death after 1945. I ask if other phenomena coincident with the post-45 period – such as bipolarity, the advent of nuclear weapons, and increased numbers of democracies in the international system – could account for this change better than a norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty. In the discussion concluding this chapter, I assess the predictive ability of the various theories and hypotheses presented in Chapter 2. I determine which (if any) have been disconfirmed, which enjoy the strongest support from this group of tests, and which merit particular attention in the case studies to follow.

The Frequency of State Death

Given the import of a topic like state death, it is surprising that no one has studied this phenomenon comprehensively to date. International relations scholars have clearly credited at least part of Waltz's selection argument when they identify and trace socialization, or mimicking, processes in international relations.¹ But they have ignored the other presumed consequence of irrational behavior – punishment in its most draconian form: state death.

Despite the definitional problems grappled with in the previous chapter, it does seem that it would be easier to identify cases of state death than cases of state socialization. We probably can intuit when a state has left the system more easily than we can argue that State A's bureaucracy resembles State B's bureaucracy because A is imitating what it perceives as B's successful practices. If state death is an important consequence of selection, a phenomenon that upsets international life, and inherently easier to study and identify than other "selection effects," why has it been ignored until now?

The most obvious answer to this question is that scholars have thought state death to be an extraordinarily rare event in international politics. Waltz writes, "the death rate of states is extremely low."² Similarly, Wendt suggests that "the death rate of states is virtually nil."³ In this section, I show that the death rate of states is higher than has been thought previously.

68 of 210 – almost 30% – states have exited the international system since 1816. Prior to 1816, the international system was even more volatile.⁴ State death has in fact been a fairly regular feature of international relations.

At the same time, it is true that, in any given year, the death rate of states is low in absolute terms. With the exception of the World War II period, it is rare to see the death rate of states rise above two percent. Thus, state death is a regular, but rare, event in world politics.

¹ See for example Finnemore; Resende-Santos.

² Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 138.

³ Wendt, p. 279.

⁴ Robert Carneiro characterizes the system as having about 600,000 independent political units in 1000B.C., but about 200 today. Carneiro, p. 213.

Nonetheless, students of world politics have spawned an industry studying another rare, but regular, event in world politics: war. Because war is an extremely important event, we study it. We can narrow the set of well-studied rare events even more by focusing on world wars. There have been extremely few world wars, yet there is a prodigious amount of scholarship on the causes, courses, and consequences of these events.

Indeed, the incidence rates of state death and war are quite close. This similarity should not be surprising given that most state deaths have been associated with wars. Figure 6 shows the frequencies of war and of violent state death for the 19th and 20th centuries. In general, war occurs more frequently than violent state death. At times, however, violent state death has been more frequent than war.

On average, the difference between the rate of war and the rate of violent state death is just over one percent. The greatest difference between the two is in 1920, when the rate of war is ten percent, and there are no state deaths. In 1938, however, the difference between the rate of war and the rate of violent state death is almost as great, but reversed. Nine states died violently, while two wars were ongoing (Sino-Japanese and Changkufeng).⁵

In previous chapters, I have mentioned the extreme consequences that often surround state death, particularly violent state death. These consequences will be explored more thoroughly in chapters to come. In themselves, the nature and events

⁵ In calculating both the rate of violent state death and the rate of war, I divide the number of events (death or war) by the number of states in the system.




Figure 6

surrounding violent state death make this topic an important subject for study. The fact that violent state death has occurred with surprising frequency over the past two centuries only highlights the importance of this study. And insofar as war and violent state death are related events, as is usually the case, studying violent state death constitutes another approach to studying war.

Tests of Principal Hypotheses

If we return to the list of hypotheses at the end of Chapter 2, we can identify several major hypotheses on state death derived from international relations theory. They are:

From Balance of Power Theory:

1. Powerful states will be more likely to survive than weak states.
2. States that form alliances are more likely to survive than states that do not form alliances.
3. Among buffer states, weak and unallied states are more likely to die than powerful and allied states.

From Constructivism:

1. Less legitimate states are more likely to die than fully legitimate states.

From Occupation Costs:

1. States that can generate high occupation costs for conquerors will be more likely to survive than states that are unable to generate high occupation costs.

In this section, I test these prior claims on state death against my own argument that the incentives facing states that might take over other states are highly predictive of state survival and death. To reiterate, the primary hypotheses derived from my argument are:

1. Buffer states will be more likely to die (violently) than non-buffer states
2. Violent state death will decline after 1945.

Method

I use duration analysis to test the hypotheses listed above. Thus, my dependent variable is the hazard rate for states. Another way of framing this variable is as the probability that a state will die violently in a given year conditional on it not having died already. The nature of the dependent variable might initially suggest the use of logistic regression. While the results of logistic regression are essentially the same as those from duration analysis, duration analysis is the preferred method for three reasons. First, if the unit of analysis was the country-year (i.e., the U.S. in 1816 constitutes one observation, the US in 1817 constitutes another observation, etc.), use of logistic regression would violate the assumption that the observations were independent of each other. Second, given 210 countries over 176 years, the number of country-years is over 10,000, but the number of country-years in which a state dies is under 100. Thus, a logit model could be highly predictive by simply predicting that no states will die. One way to mitigate against the previous two problems is to use a time-averaged logit: to take each country as the unit of analysis, and use the mean for each independent variable over that state's lifetime. The objection to this approach is, of course, that many of the independent

variables suggested by the above hypotheses – power, alliances, legitimacy, and buffer state status – can vary over time. By taking their means we would lose that variation, and therefore the possible effects of that variation on the probability of state death.

Duration analysis solves these problems by allowing the modeler to use the state as the unit of analysis, but also include time-varying covariates.⁶ Thus, the model recognizes the US in 1816 and 1817 as the same state and aggregates the observations relevant to that state. Frequently used to analyze phenomena like marriage duration, human survival, and failure times for mechanical equipment, duration analysis is particularly well-suited for analysis of state death.⁷ As before, the data used here constitute an amended version of the Correlates of War, and have been formatted for duration analysis by including multiple observations for each case.⁸

I use duration analysis to model the hazard rate for violent state death. In this case, the hazard rate is the probability that a state dies violently in a given year, conditional on it not having died already. The hazard rate is defined as:

⁶ Importantly, duration analysis also does not impose a normality assumption on the distribution of errors, but instead offers the modeler the choice of several distributions or, in the case of Cox proportional hazard model, does not require the modeler to make any assumptions about the distribution of the errors.

⁷ Kazuo Yamaguchi offers a useful discussion of duration analysis.

⁸ Note: one problem in formatting these data for duration analysis was determining the time of origin for each state. Two separate variables could qualify as time of origin: the time the state was “born” – that is, when it formed a cohesive and independent entity; or the time that the state entered the international system – that is, when the state became sufficiently powerful to enter the system and was recognized as a state by other states. I chose the date of entry into the system as the time of origin because violent state death is a non-issue for states that are not members of the international system. In choosing the date of entry into the system, I am imposing an assumption onto the analysis to make the analysis more feasible. Thirty-six states were already members of the system in 1816, when the data set begins. To determine precisely when each of these states entered the system would not only be difficult in terms of an expenditure of resources, but also would require extending the data set back to the date of the first (of the 36) state’s entry into the system. Thus, I am assuming that the system begins in 1816; another way of thinking about this assumption is that I am dealing with left truncation by assuming that all states in the system in 1816 entered the system in 1816, even though we know that many of these states entered the system much earlier. Analyses of the data that omit the 36 states “entering” in 1816 yield essentially the same results.

$$h(t) = \lim_{\Delta t \rightarrow 0} \frac{\Pr(\text{dead}(t + \Delta t) | \text{alive}(t))}{\Delta t}$$

where t is the number of years the state has been a member of the interstate system (or, if the state was a member of the interstate system prior to 1816, t is the number of years since 1816). Specifically, I use a proportional hazard model to measure the impact of independent variables on the baseline hazard rate. In this model, the hazard rate is modeled as a function of independent variables,

$$h(t, x) = q(t)\Theta(x)$$

where:

$$\Theta(x) = e^{x\beta},$$

x is a vector of independent variables, and β is a vector of parameters to be estimated.

Thus,

$$\Theta(x) = \frac{h(t, x)}{q(t)}$$

is the “hazard ratio,” with the parameters β tapping the extent to which predictors increase or decrease the hazard rate, relative to $q(t)$, the baseline hazard. More precisely, $\exp(\beta)$ tells us how the hazard rate changes in response to a unit change in x . In the tables that follow, I report $\exp(\beta)$. Note that the null hypothesis of substantive interest is therefore $H_0: \exp(\beta)=1$, which is equivalent to $\beta=0$.

Expectations

The first two hypotheses listed above, which together constitute a neorealist model of state death, suggest that power and alliances will have a negative effect on the probability of violent state death. In the vocabulary of duration analysis, we would say that power and alliances will lower the hazard ratio for states. In other words, states that are more powerful and have more alliances will be in a lower “risk group” for violent state death. Since hazard ratios are interpreted in relation to 1, these hypotheses predict that the hazard ratios for power and alliances will be less than 1. If a variable has a hazard ratio less than 1, then an increase in that variable decreases the risk of failure (state death). Conversely, variables with a hazard ratio greater than one increase the risk of failure.

Both the state legitimacy and indicator variables for the post-1945 period are hypothesized to have hazard ratios less than one; both variables are expected to have an inverse effect on the probability of violent state death. Similarly, the occupation costs argument predicts that the age of the state and its level of economic development and democracy will improve a state’s ability to survive; thus, the hazard ratios for age, democracy and economic development also should be less than one. The buffer state variable, by contrast, should have a hazard ratio greater than one. My prediction is that buffer states are more likely to experience violent state death than other states.

Table 7
Expected Effects of Variables

Variable	Associated Hypothesis	Hazard Ratio should be:
Power	Balance of Power	Less than 1
Alliances	Balance of Power	Less than 1
Legitimacy	Constructivism	Less than 1
Level of democracy	Occupation Costs	Less than 1
Economic development	Occupation Costs	Less than 1
Post-1945	Context of Death	Less than 1
Buffer state	Context of Death	Greater than 1

Descriptive Statistics

Before presenting the results from the proportional hazards models, it is useful to take a closer look at the data. Below I provide descriptive statistics for power, level of democracy, and economic development. I do not provide descriptive statistics for alliances, legitimacy, post-1945, or buffer states because they are dichotomous variables.

Table 8
Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum, Maximum
Power	.02	.04	1.00e-06 , .38
Level of Democracy	-1.28	7.18	-10, 10
Economic Development	.02	.061	0, .74

One important feature of these statistics shared by both power and economic development is that both variables have a skewed distribution. For this reason, I use the log of power and of economic development in the analysis that follows.

Caveats

Before turning to a discussion of the results, brief mention should be made of two problems with the data analysis. First, the data set is incomplete. While I have expanded the Correlates of War list of members of the interstate system and thus created another variable – legitimacy – I do not have data on capability for states that I added or whose entry dates were revised. All the states for which capability data are available receive a “1” on the legitimacy score. For this reason, I cannot fully test the realist, rationalist and constructivist hypotheses against each other. I can, however, test the constructivist hypotheses against the hypotheses that states that form alliances will be less likely to die, that older states are less likely to die, that buffer states will be more likely to die, and that all states are less likely to die after 1945.

A second problem with the data set is the relatively low number of violent state deaths. While I argue that violent state death is more frequent than many international relations scholars would predict, the absolute number of state deaths (35 or 51, depending whether a subset or the entire data set is being analyzed) is low, creating a degrees of freedom problem. By using a model with five variables on a subset of the data with 35 violent state deaths (failures), I am pushing the bounds of this problem. Nonetheless, if any variables are significant in this specification with these data, the results will be quite telling.⁹

⁹ Note that Table 10 lists the number of failures as 50, rather than 51. This inconsistency is caused by the case of Soudan, which enters and exits the system in the same year (1886). Also note that the number of cases listed in Table 10 is 243, rather than the actual number of states, which is 210. A large number of

Results, Part I

The precise model used depends on the shape of the survivor function. The survivor function, in this case, is the probability that a state will survive until time t . Here the shape of the log of the survivor function indicates a linear relationship to t , which suggests the use of an exponential model. A Weibull model confirms this choice, as the Weibull distribution shape parameter, p , is indistinguishable from 1.¹⁰

One method I have used to deal with the degrees of freedom problem is to conduct different series of tests of each argument against my own. The first set of results tests my argument against the neorealist selection argument. Table 9 shows results for the subset of the data set that includes capability values. Since hazard ratios are conceptually more useful than coefficients, I have presented hazard ratios and indicated their level of significance, rather than including coefficients and standard errors.¹¹ Any hazard ratio less than one translates into a negative coefficient; any hazard ratio greater than one translates into a positive coefficient.

states that exit the interstate system reenter the system later. These second incarnations of states are treated as new states for the purposes of simplifying the data analysis.

¹⁰ $p=1.09$. Analyses of the data using a Cox model as well as Weibull and Gompertz distributions yield essentially the same results.

¹¹ The hazard ratio is the exponentiated form of the coefficient.

Table 9
ML Estimates of Proportional Hazard Models of Violent State Death

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)
Log of Power	.94	.9	.96
Alliance indicator	.18***		.19**
Buffer state	2.77***	2.70***	
Post-1945	.11***	.06***	.08***
LR χ^2	63.88	51.88	47.30

Number of observations: 11264 country-years

Number of cases: 225

Number of failures: 35

Dependent variable is the hazard rate: the probability that a state will die violently in a given year, conditional on it not having died already.

Hazard ratios, rather than coefficients, are presented here. The hazard ratio is the exponentiated form of the coefficient.

All tests are two-tailed.

*denotes significance at the .1 level


**denotes significance at the .05 level

***denotes significance at the .005 level

The hazard ratios should be interpreted as follows. In model 1, the hazard ratio for the post-1945 period is .11. This result means that a state in the post-1945 period is 89% more likely to survive than a state in the pre-1945 period, given that the state has not already died. Basically, states in the post-1945 world are extremely unlikely to die. In the same model, in any given year, states with alliances are 82% more likely to survive than states without alliances. The hazard ratio for the log of power suggests that state power is unrelated to state survival; further, we cannot be certain that the coefficient on the log of power is not zero ($p < 0.322$). The probability that a buffer state will die violently (given that it has not died already) in a particular year is 177% (almost two times) higher than for non-buffer states. Clearly, the effect of the buffer state variable is an extremely large one, as is the effect of being in the post-1945 period. These results are

highlighted in Figures 7-9, which show survivor curves for pre/post-1945 states, states with and without alliances, and buffer versus non-buffer states.¹²

Figure 7: Kaplan-Meier Survival Functions for Pre- and Post-1945



¹² Note that the survivor functions include cases from the entire data set (not just the subset of cases analyzed in Table 2).

Figure 8: Kaplan-Meier Survival Functions by Alliance





Figure 9: Kaplan-Meier Survival Functions by Buffer Status



Comparisons between models 1 and 3 and models 2 and 3 yield interesting results. Surprisingly, while the effect of capabilities is ambiguous, a likelihood ratio test of nested models shows that the model improves dramatically when the alliance variable is included ($p < .001$). A separate likelihood ratio test confirms the model also improves greatly when the buffer state variable is included ($p < .001$). At the same time, the substantive effect of being a buffer state is much greater than the effect of having alliances. Being a buffer state is much more risky than being without alliances.

Table 10 summarizes results from the entire data set. While these models do not include the capability variable, they do include the legitimacy variable, for reasons discussed above.

Table 10
ML Estimates of Proportional Hazard Models of Violent State Death
(including legitimacy and excluding power)

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Alliance indicator	.49		.49	.52
Legitimacy	.32***	.32***		.41**
Post-1945	.10**	.07***	.08**	.08**
Buffer State	2.47***	2.46***	2.10***	
LR χ^2	69.08	68.84	58.49	56.11

Number of observations: 12487 country-years

Number of cases: 243

Number of failures: 50

Dependent variable is the hazard rate: the probability that a state will die violently conditional on it not having died already.

Hazard ratios, rather than coefficients, are presented here. The hazard ratio is the exponentiated form of the coefficient.

All tests are two-tailed.


*denotes significance at .1 level

**denotes significance at .05 level

***denotes significance at .005 level

The results indicate that the statistical and substantive significance of the post-1945 and buffer state indicator variables are fairly stable. The legitimacy variable is also significant, and its effects are as predicted. “More” legitimate states are about 68% more likely to survive than “less” legitimate states. Figure 10 shows contrasting survivor functions for states with and without British and French diplomatic missions. Once the legitimacy variable is included in the model, the alliance indicator loses its significance; further, the alliance indicator is less substantively significant in this set of models than in the models summarized in Table 9.

Figure 10: Kaplan-Meier Survival Functions by Legitimacy



Goodness of fit tests for the models in Table 10 indicate the importance of including the legitimacy and contextual variables. A likelihood ratio test of nested models confirms that the full model significantly improves upon both the model without the buffer state variable ($p < .001$) and the model without the legitimacy indicator ($p < .005$). The model without the buffer state variable is a slightly worse fit than the model without the legitimacy variable.

Additional Tests for Robustness

These results may be sensitive to at least three changes. First, it is possible that both the alliance and legitimacy indicators are capturing the power of the state to some degree; this effect could account for the decreased salience of alliances in these specifications. Unfortunately, without additional data on capabilities of states added to the data set, it is difficult to assess this claim. Second, buffer states may be undercounted. As stated above, the buffer state variable was constructed by identifying those states geographically between two rivals. The list of rivalries used, however, omits at least one obvious rivalry that is not identified as such because the two states involved did not fight 6 or more qualifying militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) over a period of 20 years after 1816. Here, I am referring to the British-French rivalry, particularly as exhibited in the colonial race. One possible reason for the exclusion of this rivalry is that the MID data set begins at 1816; if Britain and France fought enough qualifying MIDs prior to 1816, their rivalry would not be included in Bennett's data set.¹³

Rather than adjusting the buffer state variable to 1 for all pre-colonial states, I referred to British and French treaties with precolonial states for mention of the rivalry. In other words, when Article 1 of an 1809 Treaty between Britain and the King of Cabool (Afghanistan) states "As the French and Persians have entered into a confederacy against the State of Cabool, if they should wish to pass through the King's dominions, the servant of the Heavenly Throne shall prevent their passage, and exerting themselves to the extent of their power in making war on them and repelling them, shall not permit them to cross

¹³ Note, though, that during the Napoleonic era alone, Britain and France fought a number of times.

into British India,” I changed the value of the buffer state variable to 1.¹⁴ Using this revised buffer state variable, the effects of legitimacy are not as strong, and the difference in goodness of fit between the models with and without the legitimacy variable declines. Note, though, that this set of changes is slightly ad hoc; in making this adjustment, I am basically unsystematically changing the definition of “rivalry” for one dyad. Nonetheless, this change is consistent with standard interpretations of history,¹⁵ and suggests that a general redefinition of rivalry may be in order.

Buffer states are also undercounted during the Cold War. In my coding of buffer states, I did not count any buffers for rivalries where the rivals are separated by a major body of water. Thus, the US-Soviet rivalry technically does not produce rivalries in this case. The difficulty in coding buffer states for the Cold War is, of course, that the entire world could be considered a buffer state for this period. I addressed this problem in part by conducting an additional analysis where all European states were coded as buffers for the Cold War period; the results of the analysis remained essentially the same.

A third change that might affect these results speaks to potential “clustering” of buffer states. Because many of the buffers states that die violently pertain to the same rivalry(ies), their deaths may not be independent. By including only a generic buffer state variable, however, I am assuming independence of these cases. I relaxed this assumption by constructing new indicator variables that showed when a buffer was associated with a particular rivalry. In other words, I included an indicator for being a buffer state between France and Prussia/Germany between 1850 and 1955, between China and Russia from 1857 on, and between Austria-Hungary and Italy from 1843 to

¹⁴ Aitchison, vol. 12, p. 233.

¹⁵ See for example articles in Gifford and Louis.

1919. If any of these indicator variables were substantively or statistically significant, this result would cast a suspicious light on the more general claim that buffer states are particularly likely to die. The results show, however, that none of the indicator variables attaching buffers to rivalries approached statistical significance; further, the hazard ratios for most of these indicators were close to .9 and therefore not substantively significant.

Finally, I also tested these models using the probability that a state will die – violently *or* non-violently – in a given year (conditional on it not having died already) as the dependent variable. In other words, I expanded the focus of the dependent variable from considering only violent state deaths to considering all state deaths. The decision to focus on violent state death was based on the desire to give each hypothesis a fair chance. It seems likely that the realist and constructivist hypotheses are more directly applicable to cases of conquest and occupation than those of unification or dissolution. Restricting the dependent variable to only violent state deaths also seemed reasonable because most state deaths (75%) are, in fact, violent. Nonetheless, there are good reasons to think that the buffer state hypothesis in particular may also be applicable to some (although not all) non-violent state deaths. Buffer states may recognize their vulnerability and thus negotiate themselves out of existence rather than subject themselves to an unwinnable war. Bavaria and Württemberg, two German city-states very reluctant to join the Prussian-dominated German proto-state, anticipated on the eve of the Franco-Prussian war that if they did not fulfill their alliance commitments to Prussia and negotiate entry into the German state, they would be coerced out of existence. While avoiding a war of conquest, each state was also able to use its wariness of Prussian domination to gain

concessions in the German federation.¹⁶ The results for models where all state deaths are included indicate increased substantive and statistical significance for buffer states; other results were stable.

Results, Part 2

The next two series of results focus on tests of my argument against the occupation costs argument. In predicting which states are better able to generate high occupation costs that will forestall conquest, proponents of this argument suggest the use of variables like a state's level of economic development, age, and level of democracy.¹⁷ Increased levels of all three variables should promote a state's chances for survival; they should lower the risk for states. Thus, the hazard ratio on all three should be less than 1.

As with the analyses above including state capabilities, missing data limit testing somewhat. In this case, data on economic development and democracy are not available for states added to the Correlates of War. Thus, the first table testing this argument includes these variables but the second excludes these variables but includes states added in the revised version of the COW list of states. An additional factor does not impair the analysis, but does complicate our interpretation of results. Duration analysis always refers to the baseline hazard rate, which is measured against time. Because age here is perfectly collinear with time, age cannot be included in the duration analysis. This exclusion does not mean, however, that we cannot make any inferences about the effect of a state's age on its probability for survival or death. Because the log of the survivor

¹⁶ Carr, p. 207.

¹⁷ Gilpin; Liberman.

function is essentially linear with respect to t , we know that the hazard rate for states does not really change with time. In other words, a state's age does not affect its prospects for survival.

Table 11
ML Estimates of Proportional Hazard Models of Violent State Death
Occupation costs versus the Context of Death

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log of Economic Development ¹⁸	1.00	.99	1.01	.98
Democracy score	.94*		.96	.95*
Post-45	.07***	.07***	.05***	
Buffer state	2.98***	2.75***		3.67***
LR χ^2	55.02	50.84	38.21	28.56

Number of observations: 11041 country-years

Number of cases: 211

Number of failures: 35

Dependent variable is the hazard rate: the probability that a state will die violently conditional on it not having died already.

Hazard ratios, rather than coefficients, are presented here. The hazard ratio is the exponentiated form of the coefficient.

All tests are two-tailed.

*denotes significance at the .1 level

**denotes significance at the .05 level

***denotes significance at the .005 level

Table 11 indicates that the variables suggested by the occupation costs argument perform relatively poorly in predicting violent state death. The goodness-of-fit of the model improves dramatically when the contextual variables are included. Although democracy is at times significant at the .1 level, the substantive effect of democracy on the probability of state survival is virtually zero. The hazard ratio for the log of economic

¹⁸ Note: A number of observations included a value of 0 for economic development. Because it is not possible to take the log of 0, I changed these values to 1.00e-11 (which is an order of magnitude smaller than the next smallest value of economic development) for the purpose of this analysis.

development is equal to 1 and is therefore consistent with the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the log of power is zero; moreover, the variable never comes close to statistical significance ($p < .819$ in the full model). Therefore, we cannot be at all confident that there is any relationship between a state's level of economic development and the probability that it will die violently in any given year. Note that because it would be redundant to include a variable for age in the model, and because age is the only relevant occupation costs variable for which data are available for all states, I cannot test this hypothesis on the entire data set.

Before moving on to corollary hypotheses of the principal and alternative arguments, let us return to hypotheses on state death derived from theories of the evolution of the sovereign state, sociology, and industrial organization. The relevant hypotheses are listed below:

From the Evolution of the Sovereign State

1. Militarily powerful states will be more likely to survive than weak states.
2. States will support the survival of similar states/states with similar regime types.

From Sociology

1. Younger states will be more likely to die than older states.
2. Rates of state death should be initially low, then increase over time.
3. States that exhibit the correct institutional form will survive.

From Industrial Organization

1. Small, weak states are the most likely to die.

2. In times of low structural constraint, large, powerful states will be the most likely to die.
3. Younger states will be more likely to die than older states.

The variables suggested by many of these hypotheses have been included in several of the above tests. For example, I have shown that state age has virtually no effect on the probability of violent state death; this result responds to the first hypothesis from sociology and the last hypothesis from industrial organization theory. I have also shown that power is not a significant predictor of state death. This result contradicts the first hypothesis from theories of the evolution of the sovereign state.

Now consider the remaining hypotheses in turn. The claim that states will support the survival of similar states/states with similar regime types is an interesting one, but difficult to test. The most obvious way to test this hypothesis is by examining states' alliance patterns; are democracies more likely to ally with other democracies? Are autocracies more likely to ally with other autocracies?

Michael Simon and Erik Gartzke examine this precise question and find that the relationship between regime type and alliance partners is, unexpectedly, negative.¹⁹ Although scholars had previously found a positive correlation between regime type and alliance partners, Gartzke and Simon show that these results are questionable because they cover only part of the 20th century and, ultimately, rest heavily upon the unusually ideological nature of Cold War alliances. Thus, it seems that the hypothesis that states support the survival of similar states by allying with them is not supported.

¹⁹ Simon and Gartzke.

Turning to the sociological hypotheses, we find that many of these questions have been answered as well. Figure 11 shows the 5-year averaged violent state death rate over the past 200 years. As opposed to the population ecologists' prediction, the rate of state death has been fairly constant for most of the 1816-1992 period, but then declined, rather than increased, precipitously after 1945.

What, though, of the claim that states that exhibit the correct institutional form will survive? Once again, this claim must hypothesize very quick learning during a very short period of time – in fact, it must surmise a mass epiphany in 1945 – to be supported by the data. A number of international relations scholars have attempted to show how socialization pressures lead states to create and alter all sorts of domestic institutions in order to show the correct face to the world. While states may indeed respond to these pressures by mimicking, my argument is that exhibiting the correct institutional form is not a sufficient or even necessary condition for survival. It was not states that would have otherwise died that learned how to adjust their appearances in 1945; it was states that would have otherwise conquered that changed their strategies after 1945.

Finally, only one hypothesis remains from the industrial organization theorists: that in times of low structural constraint, large, powerful states will be the most likely to die. Without being able to identify or predict the level of structural constraint in the system, it is impossible to test this hypothesis. For this reason, I do not attempt to do so.

Tests of Corollary Hypotheses

The results from tests of the principal hypotheses discussed in Chapter 2 support the argument that the level of threat a state faces is highly predictive of its probability for




Figure 11

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survival or death. In this section, I test corollary hypotheses of my argument and of the occupation costs argument to further explore their ability to account for state death.

Context of Death Corollaries

Two sets of corollary hypotheses emerge from the claim that the incentives facing states that might take over other states determine the prospects for state survival and death: one corollary hypothesis refines the claim that buffer states are more likely to die, and others extend the notion that a norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty prevents violent state death in the post-1945 era. From Chapter Two, they are listed below:

1. Buffer states will be most likely to die when one or more surrounding rivals perceives an imminent threat of losing all control of the buffer state to a competitor.
2. The decline in violent state death after 1945 will be accompanied by a rise in the number of external interventions to replace regimes and leaders in buffer states.
3. States that die violently after 1920 are more likely to be resurrected than states that die violently before 1920.
4. After 1945, the rate of reversal of previous violent state deaths will increase; state resurrections will increase after 1945.
5. The decline in violent state death after 1945 will be accompanied by a decline in all forcible territorial change. This latter change, however, will not be as significant as the change in the number of violent state deaths.

6. After 1945, the rate of state dissolutions and state collapses should increase. This increase in non-violent state death, however, should be smaller than the decrease in violent state death.
7. The rate of violent state death will continue to be low as long as the US remains a superpower.

Available data do not permit testing of the first hypothesis using quantitative analysis; this claim is therefore discussed extensively in the following case study chapters. A number of the corollary hypotheses generated by the norms part of the argument can, however, be tested quantitatively. The first of these hypotheses is that states should turn to alternative means of achieving the same goals after traditional methods are denied them. After 1945, states will cease to "kill off" other states, but will instead replace regimes and leaders. Thus, there will be an increase in external replacement of regimes and leaders after the conclusion of World War II.

Available evidence seems to support this hypothesis. Figure 12 shows external regime and leader replacements from 1816 to 1992. From 1816 to 1945, there were 22 such events, about one every six years. From 1946 to 1992, there were 19 cases of regime and leader replacement by external powers, or 1 every 2.4 years.

One method to test this hypothesis would be to conduct a Poisson test. The difficulty with the Poisson test, however, is that while it can account for the number of states in the system in any given year, it cannot account for the uneven number of years under study before and after 1945. Instead of using a Poisson test, then, I use a Mann-Whitney test to compare the means of the rates of regime and leader replacement before




Figure 12

and after 1945. Essentially, the Mann-Whitney test assigns a rank to each year's rate, and then compares the pre- and post-1945 cumulative ranks to see if they are different. My expectation is that the ranks are different – that after 1945, states are more likely to experience external replacement of regimes and leaders. The results of the test confirm this expectation. The null hypothesis that the rates of regime and leader replacement before and after 1945 are the same can be rejected at a level of $p < .0672$.

The next two hypotheses look to the timing and number of resurrections of violent state death as indicators of the strength of the territorial sovereignty norm. Figure 13 shows violent state deaths and resurrections of violent state deaths by decade, for 1816 to 1992. As expected, this graph illustrates two striking features of the twentieth century: the virtual absence of violent state death after 1945 and the visible increase in state resurrections that begins around the turn of the twentieth century and continues to the present. That all resurrections increase as of the early twentieth century adds further support to the norms hypothesis: post-1945 deaths are few and pre-1945 state deaths are more often reversed as a norm supporting states' territorial integrity and people's right to self-determination becomes more widely supported.

This evidence is also supported by more sophisticated tests. The second corollary hypothesis of the norms argument is that states that die violently after 1920 should be more likely to be resurrected than states that die violently before 1920. Considering state resurrection more carefully also allows for tests of some of the corollary hypotheses associated with the occupation costs argument. These include the possibilities that states that can generate high occupation costs for conquerors will be more likely to be resurrected than states that are unable to generate high occupation costs; and, à la Peter




Figure 13

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Liberman, that the effects of economic development will be indeterminate on the probability of state resurrection.

Below, I test these corollary hypotheses associated with both the norms and occupation costs arguments. It should be noted that testing the occupation costs argument on state resurrection presents a potential selection bias. The expectation of the argument with regard to state resurrection is that, among states that die violently, those states best able to generate occupation costs for conquerors will be most likely to be resurrected. In general, though, the argument suggests that states able to generate these costs would not have been killed (or would have faced a lower probability of dying) at all; thus, the argument should apply to the question of state death and not state resurrection. This potential bias, however, has been redressed by the general test of the occupation costs argument presented in Table 11, above.

Bearing this caveat in mind, there are several reasons to test both the norms and occupation costs arguments on state resurrection. First, the occupation costs argument is a difficult one to test given available data. The argument depends fundamentally on the power of nationalism to inspire people to protect their state. In order to test this argument, it is necessary to predict and identify nationalistic tendencies. This challenge represents the topic of many books, and the answer to the question remains outstanding. Specifically because it is difficult to test the general argument, it is important to examine subsidiary hypotheses for any support. Second, conquerors may not be able to judge occupation costs effectively prior to taking over a state. Thus, there is a possibility that the argument will be more effective when applied to the population of states that have already died. And third, limiting the analysis to dead states allows the inclusion of

additional variables, including one that is meant to represent cultural (dis)similarity between the conquering and conquered states. As before, to the degree that the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty is related to a norm of self-determination, we should expect that, if normative concerns affect the probability of state death, states that are more culturally distinct from their conquerors will be more likely to draw on their rights of self-determination and resist conquest. Table 12, below, lists the variables used in the analysis and the expected sign of their coefficient in a logistic regression on state resurrection.

Table 12
Expected Effects of Variables on the Probability of State Resurrection

Variable	Associated Hypothesis	Expected Effect
Linguistic Proximity	Context of Death (Norm)	Negative
Death after 1920	Context of Death (Norm)	Positive
Economic Development	Occupation Costs	?
Level of Democracy	Occupation Costs	Positive
Age	Occupation Costs	Positive

The dichotomous nature of the dependent variable makes logistic regression an appropriate model for this analysis. In the models presented below, the values of time-varying covariates are taken for the year of state death. The presence of time-varying covariates in the data might suggest two alternative models: duration analysis and time-averaged logit. Use of duration analysis to model this question would mean taking the probability that a state would be resurrected in a given year (conditional on it not having been already resurrected) as the dependent variable. The advantage of duration analysis for this type of question is that it allows the modeler to include time-varying covariates for different cases (states) while recognizing that observations (here, country-years) are

not independent. The difficulty with using duration analysis to model this question is that it would require data during the period of state death, which are not available.

Another model that could have been used here is a time-averaged logit. Instead of using the values of time-varying covariates at the time of death, means of these variables over a state's lifetime could have been used. It is important to note, however, that these time-varying covariates may vary widely over a state's lifetime; economic development at the time of death is probably a much better predictor of nationalism during occupation than an average of economic development over the state's lifetime. Further, the available data begin at 1816, while many of the states in the data set were members of the interstate system prior to the nineteenth century. Thus, a time-averaged logit would not include the means of variables over a state's lifetime, but only over the state's lifetime since 1816.

Missing data have clearly affected the choice of model used here; they also affect the possibility of testing the various hypotheses discussed above against each other on the entire population of states. As for the tests of the occupation costs argument on state death, data on economic development and level of democracy are only available for states included in the COW list. Thus, two sets of results are presented: Table 13 includes economic development and democracy but excludes states added to the COW list, and Table 14 excludes economic development and democracy but includes these additional states.

Table 13
Logistic Regression on State Resurrection
(includes only violent state deaths, with economic development and democracy)

Independent Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Linguistic Proximity	-.43 (.27)	-.36 (.22)	-.35 (.22)		-.51** (.21)
Log of Economic Development	-.06 (.09)	-.08 (.08)	-.09 (.08)	-.13 (.07)	.02 (.06)
Democracy (at death)	-.10 (.19)	-.1 (.19)			
Age at death	-.001 (.001)				
Death after 1920	3.41** (1.62)	3.48** (1.64)	3.58** (1.67)	4.28** (1.55)	
Constant	.37 (2.39)	-.39 (2.05)	-.26 (2.08)	-2.19 (1.53)	3.24** (1.21)
Probability > Chi ²	.009	.005	.002	.003	.019
LR Chi ²	15.47	15.07	14.73	11.83	7.92
Percent correctly predicted	88.24	88.24	88.24	94.12	76.47

N=34. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

**Statistically significant at .05

***Statistically significant at .005

Substantive significance for Table 13, Model 3

Linguistic Proximity

Probability of Resurrection	At 75 th percentile	At 25 th percentile	Difference
	.23	.71	-.48

Note: values for all other variables are held at their means

Post-1920

Probability of Resurrection	Death after 1920	Death before 1920	Difference
	.82	.11	.71

Note: values for all other variables are held at their means

Table 14
Logistic Regression on State Resurrection
(includes only violent state deaths, without economic development and democracy)

Independent Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Linguistic Proximity	-.38* (.21)	-.38* (.21)	-.32* (.18)	-.45** (.18)		-.20* (.12)
Age at death	.0002 (.001)					
Post-1920	3.22** (1.25)	3.23** (1.24)	3.62*** (1.17)		3.41*** (1.17)	
Colony	-.75 (.97)	-.76 (.96)		-2.44** (.90)	.35 (.75)	
Constant	.75 (.95)	.80 (.88)	.21 (.44)	2.51*** (.81)	-.47 (.57)	.96** (.40)
Probability > Chi ²	.0003	.0001	.0000	.0034	.0003	.0820
LR Chi ²	20.92	20.91	21.91	11.38	16.57	3.03
Percent correctly predicted	84.00	84.00	78.43	80.00	72.00	70.59

N=50. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

*Statistically significant at .1

**Statistically significant at .05

***Statistically significant at .005

Substantive significance for Table 14, Model 2

Linguistic Proximity

Probability	At 75 th percentile	At 25 th percentile	Difference
	.62	.85	-.23

Note: values for all other variables are held at their means

Death after 1920

Probability	Death after 1920	Death before 1920	Difference
	.95	.42	.53

Note: values for all other variables are held at their means

The results from both sets of logits are fairly consistent. The only two variables that appear to bear a relationship to the probability of resurrection are the timing of state death and linguistic proximity between the conquered and conquering states. Both variables are associated with the norms argument, although linguistic proximity also could be considered part of the occupation costs argument. To the degree that cultural similarity is

a predictor of a reaction (or not) to violations of self-determination rights, it also could be considered a predictor of nationalism. Nonetheless, none of the other variables associated with the occupation costs argument appear to affect state resurrection. As predicted, the effect of the log of economic development not only indeterminate, but also very close to zero. Surprisingly, the effect of democracy is not only not significant, but is also negative. Age does not appear to affect state resurrection at all. Note that these results are consistent with the earlier test of the occupation costs argument, as seen in Table 11.

The next corollary hypothesis of the norms argument is that all violent state deaths are more likely to be reversed after 1945. As with the test of the change in external replacements of regimes and leaders, above, a Mann-Whitney test confirms that the number of state resurrections was different before and after 1945 at $p < .0176$.²⁰ If we make the cutoff one year earlier – if we consider resurrections before and after 1944 – the result is even more dramatic. We can reject the null hypothesis that the number of resurrections is the same before and after 1944 at $p < .0037$.

Mark Zacher's work provides evidence in favor of the hypothesis that forcible territorial change decreased after 1945, but that this decrease is smaller than the decrease in violent state death. Zacher finds that the number of territorial redistributions has halved from the nineteenth to the late twentieth centuries. Further, he notes at least 17 forcible territorial changes since 1946.²¹ The number of forcible territorial changes,

²⁰ Unlike the test for regime/leader replacements, however, it is difficult to compare rates of state resurrections because it is unclear what the denominator would be for the ratio. One reasonable denominator might be the number of states in the system; in this case the results of the Mann-Whitney test indicate that we can reject the null that the pre- and post-1945 rates are the same at $p < .0272$.

²¹ Zacher.

therefore, has decreased since 1945, but not as significantly as the number of violent state deaths.

The one remaining corollary hypothesis of the norms argument that can be tested here is that the rate of state dissolutions and collapses should increase after 1945. Given available data, this argument is also difficult to test; only four dissolutions are included in the list of state deaths in Table 3 of Chapter 3. The Polity 98 data set, as discussed in Chapter 3, does code for cases of complete state authority collapse from 1816 to 1998. However, the pre-1945 data on state authority collapse is incomplete; nonetheless, these data are charted in Figure 14. Although we cannot conduct a satisfactory test for a difference before and after 1945 for state collapses (there is clearly no difference in dissolutions), we can test for post-45 trends. The State Failure Task Force does find an increase in state failures since 1955, but their definition of state failure is quite broad and includes revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime transitions, and genocide/politicide. Esty, et al.. My definition of state failure for the purpose of testing this hypothesis is considerably narrower and comes closest to the genocide/politicide category (it does not overlap completely; however, there are probably cases of what I would consider state collapse in the other types of failure identified by the task force). The Polity IV data set lists 26 cases of complete state collapse since 1954.²² They are graphed according to year in Figure 15. While it is difficult to make an assessment based on available data, it does indeed look like the number of state collapses has increased since 1955, although this might not be true for the rate.

²² Cuba 1959; Dominican Republic 1964-6; Nicaragua 1979-81; Bosnia 1992-95; Cyprus 1963-68; Guinea-Bissau 1998; Liberia 1990-96; Sierra Leone 1997-present; Chad 1979-84; Congo (Zaire) 1960-63; Congo (Zaire) 1992-present; Uganda 1985; Burundi 1992-1996; Rwanda 1994; Somalia 1991-present; Ethiopia




Figure 14

1974-75; Ethiopia 1991; Angola 1992; Lesotho 1998; Comoros 1995-96; Iran 1979; Lebanon 1975-90; Afghanistan 1978-79; Afghanistan 1992-96; Cambodia 1975-76; Laos 1961-73.




Figure 15

The testable corollary hypotheses to the argument advanced here, then, appear to support the argument advanced in this dissertation, which suggests that the incentives facing states that might take over other states determine which states will die when. I argue that rivals face a strategic imperative to take over the states that lie between themselves and their opponents. As shown above, buffer states are more likely to die violently than non-buffer states. I also argue that a norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty constrains states from taking over states they would like to conquer after 1945. A consistent feature of all the empirical results presented thus far is the stark decrease in violent state death after 1945. Because this change in state behavior could be attributed to a number of different causes, I developed and tested corollary hypotheses of the norms argument. Tests of available data indicate support for these hypotheses; in contrast, principal and subsidiary hypotheses suggested by alternative arguments receive little or no support from available evidence.

The Post-1945 Effect

The argument that a norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty works to prevent violent state death is a difficult one both to develop and to prove. While normative arguments are generally challenging, in this case the situation is complicated by the fact that the post-1945 period is rife with a number of unique or unusual historical phenomena. How, then, can we know that states refrain from taking over other states during this period because they are concerned about norm violation, as opposed to a multitude of other factors coincident with the strengthening of this norm?

I have employed a three-pronged strategy to answer this question. First, in both the theoretical chapter and in the case studies that follow this chapter, I lay out the history of the emergence and strengthening of this norm. Second, I develop and test a number of corollary hypotheses associated with the argument. And third, I explore alternative explanations for the post-1945 shift away from violent state death. Having conducted a number of tests of subsidiary hypotheses in the previous section, I now turn to a brief discussion of empirical evidence for alternative explanations for this postwar trend.

At least three alternative explanations also could potentially predict a decrease in the incidence of violent state death after 1945. The first alternative explanation refers to the bipolar nature of the Cold War world. Neorealists in particular have suggested that bipolar systems are associated with lower rates of war and greater system stability. While this hypothesis itself has not been supported by available evidence, it is important to consider the potential effects of bipolarity on violent state death. However, any explanation suggesting that there is a relationship between system polarity and levels of violent state death also must suggest that a different relationship will hold once system polarity changes. In other words, if bipolarity accounted for the shift away from violent state death after 1945, we should expect that violent state death would return to the international system after the end of the Cold War. The past decade of history does not provide evidence for an increase in the numbers of violent state deaths.²³

A second alternative explanation for this trend looks to the potential restraining power of nuclear weapons on state behavior. Like bipolarity, nuclear weapons entered

²³ Further, as Dale Copeland and Ted Hopf have argued, past periods of bipolarity and multipolarity do not support the neorealist claim that bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar systems. Copeland as well as Bueno de Mesquita have also challenged this claim on deductive grounds. Bueno de Mesquita; Copeland; Hopf.

the international scene very close to 1945. Unlike bipolarity, nuclear weapons continue to exist today. The logic behind the argument that nuclear weapons might prevent violent state death suggests that states with nuclear weapons will only engage in limited wars with similarly armed opponents because they do not want to reach the nuclear brink. It is important to remember, however, that most states do not have nuclear weapons. The potential restraining effects of these weapons, then, would not enter into the calculations of most states or rivals. Were nuclear weapons more widely proliferated, my assessment of their effect on the probability of state death might then be different.

A third potential explanation for the post-45 change in violent state death engages the democratic peace research program. If democracies tend not to fight each other, and if there are more democracies in the international system after 1945 than before, perhaps this “empirical regularity” accounts for the observed pattern in the data. This argument predicts stepwise decreases in the rate of violent state death that occur in tandem with “waves” of democratization. The post-1945 decrease in violent state death does not, however, occur in stages; there is instead a very sharp break after 1945 that does not appear to be consistent with this version of the democratic peace proposition.

A more sophisticated version of this general argument, however, might be more promising in its potential to explain the change in violent state death. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Smith offer a nuanced argument for the democratic peace that generates a number of propositions that could be applied here.²⁴ They suggest, for example, that democracies are less likely to engage in territorial wars than are autocracies because democratic leaders have incentives to

²⁴ Bueno de Mesquita, et al..

provide public goods to their supporters, while autocratic leaders face an opposing set of incentives. Because violent state death usually takes the form of conquest or occupation, if there are more democracies in the international system, perhaps rates of conquest and occupation decline because democracies have fewer incentives to engage in conquest. The relevant set of cases to consider in considering this argument is the set of states engaged in rivalries after 1945. If most rivalries are democratic-democratic (a phenomenon which should not occur, according to democratic peace theorists), the argument suggests that the rivals will be less likely to take over the buffers between them. If most rivalries are autocratic-autocratic after 1945, then the argument does not suggest a shift in patterns of violent state death. In fact, most post-1945 rivalries are mixed; one rival is a democracy (or close to a democracy), and the other is an autocracy (or close to an autocracy).

What behavior should we expect from “mixed” rivalries with respect to buffer states? If autocratic states believe that their democratic rivals are unlikely to absorb buffer states, they might be more reassured about the potential consequences of exercising restraint with respect to the buffer area. On the other hand, a fundamental part of the argument is that autocratic leaders have very strong incentives to take over territory that can then be distributed among their supporters. Autocracies facing democratic rivals might then be *more* likely to take over buffer states than autocracies facing autocratic rivals, because they would expect less competition over territory from their rival.

Another important element of the argument advanced by Bueno de Mesquita, et al., as well as others, is that democracies are more competent warfighters than non-

democracies.²⁵ Autocracies facing democratic rivals might then be less likely to take over buffer states because they fear war with their rivals. At the same time, an additional proposition derived from this argument is that autocratic leaders are less concerned about losing wars than are democratic leaders. Given the strong incentives for territorial expansion faced by autocratic leaders (according to Bueno de Mesquita, et. al.) combined with their relative willingness to lose wars, the logic of this argument does not lead to a prediction of fewer cases of conquest and occupation after 1945, when most rivalries are mixed, as opposed to before.

Conclusion

The consistent message from the preceding data analysis is that buffer states are born to lose, and that states after 1945 are doomed to survive in form if not in function. Tests of corollary and competing hypotheses support the claim that the change in state behavior after 1945 is due to the growing strength of a norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty. Another repeated lesson of the analysis is that attributes of or behaviors exhibited by states are not very consequential for state survival or death. There is little that states can do to affect their own chances for survival. Instead, the fates of states are determined by geography and timing.

The data, thus far, therefore support my argument that it is essential to understand the incentive structures facing would-be conquerors in order to predict violent state death. Additional tests would be useful to test the hypotheses examined above more

²⁵ Also see Lake, "Powerful Pacifists"; Schultz and Weingast.

comprehensively. A good deal of the analysis in this chapter was constrained by missing data. I expect that the results would be more convincing if a more extensive list of states were used. As explained in Chapter 3, the analysis here is based on a revised and expanded version of the Correlates of War List of Members of the Interstate System. The revised list includes states that concluded treaties with Britain or France as members of the interstate system; a next step in expanding the list would be to widen the group of state “legitimizers,” for example by including states that concluded treaties with China and Russia, as well as Britain or France.

Even within the existing data sets, there are missing data. Additional data collection, combined with the use of multiple imputation would constitute important steps toward filling in these blanks. In particular, missing data on power and alliances for states in the old and new data sets often limits the ability to test certain hypotheses against each other. Similarly, a lack of data on pre-1945 state collapses hinders analysis of the impact of developing international norms on state failure. Given the proliferation of recent scholarship on state collapse, these data would be particularly useful in placing this phenomenon in historical context.²⁶

Although this analysis is limited to violent state death, a different set of models could help shed more light on the general topic of state death. A competing risks model, for example, would allow assessment of the risk of violent versus non-violent state death, or even more fine-grained types of state death. With additional data, this model also could be used to examine less extreme changes in a state’s ability to control its foreign policy. In order to conduct such an analysis, we would need a data set that treats foreign

²⁶ Esty, et al.; King and Zeng; Zartman.

policy control as a continuous variable, and perhaps distinguishes and ranks losses of sovereignty from limited trade dependence on one end to violent state death on the other.

One argument that I have not been able to test well, given available data, is the occupation costs argument. The prediction that states with nationalistic populations will generate high occupation costs for would-be conquerors is difficult to assess; although I have used indicators of nationalism suggested by proponents of this argument, these indicators are weak at best. One direct indicator of nationalism would be nationalist revolt; comprehensive data on nationalist revolts would, at the least, allow stronger tests of the hypothesis that nationalistic occupied states are more likely to be resurrected than societies that are less nationalistic. Relying on a much smaller number of cases, I examine exactly this kind of data in the following case studies of Poland and the Dominican Republic. In these cases, I find continued support for the claims that buffer states face a high likelihood of death, and that the territorial sovereignty norm alters state behavior after 1945.

POLAND: THE PHOENIX STATE

Of all European states, Poland is the state that has died and been resurrected more than any other. Partitioned in the eighteenth century, annexed in the early 20th, and dominated during the Cold War, Poland has clearly been at the mercy of her neighbors for much of the past 250 years. Polish history therefore raises a seminal question: why has Poland been a constant target of invasion?

In this chapter, I present an historical analysis of Poland's deaths and resurrections over the past two and a half centuries. Specifically, I examine three periods in Polish history: the eighteenth century partitions, the World War II annexation, and the near-intervention of 1956. For each of these events, I ask four questions. First, why did the invasion of Poland occur? My expectation is that Poland's deaths were due to its geography. A perpetual buffer state, Poland has tried to prevent itself from being taken over by Russia, Austria, and Prussia in the 18th century, by the USSR and Germany in the 20th, and by the USSR during the Cold War. In exploring the causes of invasion, then, I will look for evidence of rivalry around Poland prior to invasion. In addition to the indicators of rivalry used for the quantitative analysis (i.e., a history of violent conflict between two states), I look to the statements of heads of state and their advisors for evidence of rivalry. I also use this chapter as an opportunity to test the corollary hypothesis of the buffer states argument: that buffer states will be more likely to die when one or more surrounding rivals fears loss of all indirect control over the buffer. In these situations, I expect that rivals will prefer trading tentative indirect control over more

of the buffer state for direct control over less of the buffer state. In other words, once rivals perceive that a buffer state is slipping into their enemies' camp, they prefer cooperating with their opponents to partition the buffer state over risking the possibility that they will lose all control over the entire buffer state. Thus, I expect that each instance of invasion should be preceded by movement on the part of a rival – or even on the part of Poland – that leads at least one rival to fear that Poland will be used against it in the future. These movements could include territorial incursions, alliances, or even domestic reforms that move Poland (literally or figuratively) away from one state and toward another.

The second question I ask in each case of invasion is: Did the would-be conquerors anticipate costly nationalist resistance in taking over Poland? This question speaks directly to the occupation costs argument, which competes with my explanation for state death. Although the occupation costs argument was not supported by the quantitative analysis in the previous chapter, limits on available data make compelling statistical tests of this claim difficult. Therefore, I will spend a fair amount of time exploring this argument in this chapter as well as in the following chapter on the Dominican Republic.

The occupation costs argument makes general and specific predictions with respect to the Polish case. The general prediction is that, over time, Polish nationalism should increase and, in response, would-be conquerors should be less inclined to take over Poland. A very broad outline of Polish history appears to support this claim; Poland was partitioned for over a century after 1795, annexed for less than a decade in 1939, and only (although very effectively) indirectly controlled by the Soviet Union after 1945.

This trend in great power behavior toward Poland, however, is also consistent with my argument that a norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty prevents violent state death after 1945. One way to better assess the explanatory leverage of the occupation costs argument is to look closely at particular periods of Polish history. Specifically, the occupation costs argument would predict that, if strong signs of nationalism preceded decisionmaking about invasion, invasion would be deterred. One obvious sign of nationalism that should deter invasion is nationalist revolt. Although nationalism has many expressions, nationalist revolt is an extreme expression of nationalism; cases where nationalist revolts occur in anticipation of invasion should therefore constitute easy tests for the occupation costs argument. Note that one issue in assessing nationalist revolts is the composition of the revolts – one could argue, for example, that a revolt with broad popular participation is more expressive of nationalism than a revolt carried out primarily by aristocrats. Given the nature of Polish society, however, aristocratic resistance to the notion of occupation could very well signal high impending costs to would be conquerors. Particularly in the 18th century, the Polish nobility controlled enough resources to mount credible and costly challenges to Polish kings as well as foreign occupiers.

The third question I will ask in each instance of invasion is: Did Poland attempt to behave according to realist principles? Like the occupation costs argument, the neorealist selection argument was not supported by the quantitative analysis in the previous chapter. Nonetheless, I attempt to present another test of the argument here. For each case, I will look for evidence of Polish military buildups and attempts to form alliances in the face of threats from surrounding great powers. If Poland failed to follow

realist prescriptions in 1795 and 1939, but not in 1956, the neorealist argument will find some support in this case. If however, Poland died and died again despite attempts to behave like a realist, I will take this as further evidence that rational behavior does not necessarily lead to state survival, and irrational behavior does not necessarily lead to state death.

The final question I will ask in each case is: Why was Poland resurrected? This part of the analysis speaks to both the occupation costs and norms arguments. Occupation costs theorists would expect that nationalist revolts in occupied societies should lead conquerors to withdraw due to the high costs of occupation. The norms argument predicts that resurrection is more likely to occur after World War I, when the territorial sovereignty norm starts to gain support from major powers. These two arguments could be viewed as complementary, rather than competing, in instances of resurrection. It would be easiest to distinguish the predictions of the arguments in situations of revolt and resurrection before 1919, or in situations of no revolt but resurrection after 1919. The former case would support the occupation costs argument but not the norms argument, and the latter case would support the norms argument but not the occupation costs argument. But what if Polish resurrection was both preceded by nationalist revolt and decided during or after 1919? In this case, it is more difficult to assess the relative explanatory power of these two arguments. One way of doing so is by examining the case more closely. For example, a case where resurrection immediately followed revolt would support the occupation costs argument. If, however, revolts occur for a long period of time without resurrection, the explanatory power of this argument should not be considered to be as great.

In general, I expect the Polish case to serve as a better illustration of the buffer states part of my argument than the norms part of my argument. In large part, this is because, for most of the period I discuss here, the territorial sovereignty norm is not operative in the international system. Therefore, I expect to find only limited evidence in support of the norm in the 1919 and 1945 resurrections, as well as in the near-intervention of 1956.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into three parts. In the following section, I consider the three 18th century partitions of Poland. I find that, in the face of multiple nationalist uprisings, the response of Russia, Austria, and Prussia was not withdrawal but advance. I also find that the pace of security dilemmas left little room for consideration of the value of buffer states. A brief discussion of the interregnum of occupied Poland from 1795 to 1919 follows. During this period, repression, rather than a resurrection of the Polish state, consistently followed repeated insurrections against the rule of partitioning powers. I will argue that the rebirth of Poland in 1919 is better explained by the changing international normative landscape after World War I than by the effect of nationalist uprisings on occupying powers.

Next, I turn to the annexation of Poland during World War II. Once again caught between two great powers, Poland experienced a fourth partition in 1939 as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. The final case examined here is the would-be intervention of Poland by the Soviet Union in 1956. In many respects, this case represents the dog that didn't bark; not only did the Soviet Union refrain from conquering Poland, it also exhibited restraint by not intervening in Poland. At the same time, the Soviets invaded Hungary. The conventional wisdom regarding this little-studied event is that the Soviets decided

that they could not countenance the very high occupation costs anticipated in Poland. Thus, this final case is a difficult one for my argument, since most extant analyses of this event attribute its outcome to a competing hypothesis. I will use recently released primary sources to show that, in Soviet eyes, the anticipated occupation costs in Poland and Hungary were about the same in 1956. The variation in Soviet behavior is therefore not due to a variation in occupation costs but, rather, to differences in the Polish and Hungarian roles as buffer states. After a brief discussion of the role of norms in constraining Soviet behavior in October 1956, my conclusions follow.

The Partitions of Poland

In 1764, Stanislas Augustus Poniatowski, the last king of Poland, acceded to a throne stripped of much of its former glory. Once one of the primary powers in Central Europe, Poland had fallen to the position of buffer state between Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Indeed, by 1717 Poland was considered by many to be an unofficial Russian protectorate. By 1795, Poland had completely disappeared from the European map following a series of partitions by Russia, Austria, and Prussia.

This turn of events was surprising in that, compared to many other European states, Poland's appeared to be in a strong position. "The historical Poland, in 1770, was a vast country, extending from the Baltic almost to the Black Sea, and lying between Russia and Germany, with an area of about 280,000 square miles, and a population roughly estimated at eleven and a half millions. It stood third in the list of European

countries as regards its extent, and fifth as regards its population.”¹ At the same time, Poland’s economic and military straits were dire. Poland’s state revenue was equal to one-seventy-fifth that of France and smaller than England’s revenue from stamp-paper alone.² And in the first year of King Stanislas’ reign, the Polish army numbered approximately 12,000 ill-trained men – not even one-tenth the size of the Austrian army, and closer to one-twentieth of that of the Russian forces.³ While in absolute terms, Poland might have been considered a middle power in its own right – with its vast land and territory, important grain production and access to the sea – compared to its immediate neighbors, Poland was indeed a weak state.

Conventional wisdom attributes the decline and eventual death of the Polish state to its paralyzing domestic structures.⁴ In addition to an electoral monarchy, Poland was distinguished by a parliament, or *Sejm*, possessing great powers that could do even greater harm. The first of these powers, after the election of the king, was the *liberum veto*. This institution allowed any single member of the *Sejm* to veto any agreement on the floor of the Diet. Given its frequent use by the 18th century, the *liberum veto* almost always served the cause of gridlock while also preserving the liberty of the Polish nobility (or *szlachta*), which was ostensibly its principal purpose. The many direct consequences of the *liberum veto* included prolonged and unpredictable *Sejms*, kings reduced to figureheads, and a general inability to prevent or effectively deal with crises.

Another practice contributing to the difficulties of Polish politics was the common precedent of dissatisfied *szlachta* to form rival governments, or confederations.

¹ Eversley, p. 15.

² Zamoyski, p. 5.

³ Lukowski, p. 10.

⁴ See for example Eversley, pp. 18-19; Lukowski, p. 8.

Frequently, these confederations were supported by the armies of the founding *szlachta* and any others they might recruit to their cause. More often than not, various confederations unintentionally functioned as crowbars used by neighboring powers to lever their way into Polish politics.

The deep attachment of the Polish nobility to these institutions that granted them unusual privilege and power often led to nationalist revolts in response to attempts to curtail these powers. Indeed, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in his pre-partition *Reflections on the Government of Poland*, identified these practices as essential to the Polish nation. On the issue of reforming the Polish government, he wrote: "I cannot possibly repeat it too often: think well before laying hands upon your laws, especially those that have made you what you are."⁵ Thus, the seeds of nationalism that could spark into revolt and, in turn, make conquest costly for any power eyeing Polish territory, were firmly planted.

The duration of these paralyzing institutions cannot, however, be attributed solely to *szlachta* jealous of their powers. The electoral monarchy, the *liberum veto*, and the right to confederate also served the interests of neighboring powers – in particular Russia and Prussia – who wanted to keep Poland weak enough to exercise indirect control with little or no contest. As shown below, repeated attempts to modify the Polish constitution met with resistance no less fierce from external as well as internal powers.

In 1772, 1792, and 1795, Poland's neighbors slowly dismembered her until the Polish state vanished from the European map. The 18th century partitions of Poland clearly illustrate Poland's status as a buffer; they also demonstrate how partition accelerated as rivals' fears of losing control over the Polish buffer became more acute.

⁵ Rousseau and Kendall, p. 26.

At the same time, Poland's partitioners were not deterred by clear and consequential resistance to their occupation. The partition period represents an excellent laboratory for the occupation costs argument because it was so prolonged; the Poles took advantage of numerous opportunities to express their resistance to partition and occupation, yet Russia, Prussia, and Austria forewent just as many opportunities to withdraw from Poland in the face of resistance. The Poles were virtually helpless in preventing the death of their state. In addition to the failure of revolt in deterring aggression against Poland, attempts at neorealist-like balancing also failed to save Poland. A victim of unfortunate geography, Poland disappeared from Europe for over a century, and was only reborn in 1919, as the international normative landscape was dramatically changing.

Why Was Poland Partitioned?

The rivalries surrounding 18th century Poland are easy to identify. As early as 1764, when the issue of succession to the Polish throne arose, nearby great powers were jockeying for influence over the Polish buffer. Despite various maneuverings among Poland's *szlachta*, what was clear from the outset was that Russia would, in effect, decide the question. It did not take long for Catherine, Empress of all the Russias, to decide on her former lover, Stanislas Augustus Poniatowski. Catherine's telegram to Poniatowski illustrates the extent of her control: "I am sending at once Count Keyserling as ambassador to Poland to declare you king after the death of the present monarch and, in the event of his not proving successful so far as you are concerned, I want it to be Prince

Adam [Czartoryski].”⁶ The Russian choice was to be backed by approximately 70,000 troops.

These tactics, as well as the choice, were initially objected to by neighboring powers. Both Austria and France preferred a king from Saxony, and particularly wanted a Poland independent of Russian influence, but both retreated in the face of Russian reassurance. The Turks also sought a Poland free of foreign influence, but were in favor of a native king. And despite an offer of the throne by a rival Polish party to his brother, Frederick of Prussia supported the Russian decision in the interest of maintaining his good relations with Russia.⁷ Indeed, Frederick’s view of the succession was a prescient one, and illustrated the multiple rivalries that would shape Poland’s fate. He had always planned to recapture the port town of Danzig (or Gdansk, in Polish), but knew that he could not do so without the consent and collusion of his Russian rival.⁸ Frederick outlined his strategy for acquiring Polish territory by quoting Victor Amadeus of Savoy, “My son, it is necessary to eat the Milanese like an artichoke, leaf by leaf. . . . That is how it is necessary to profit and gain . . . sometimes a city, sometimes a district, until all is eaten.”⁹

Surprisingly, King Stanislas quickly demonstrated his desire to act as more than a figurehead by proposing a number of reforms, including amending the *liberum veto*, that could strengthen the Polish state. Ratification of such reforms would threaten surrounding rivals’ control over an increasingly independent Poland. Not surprisingly,

⁶ Kaplan, p. 13. Prince Adam was Poniatowski’s cousin.

⁷ Kaplan, Chapters 2 and 3.

⁸ Virtually the same problem faced Adolf Hitler in 1939.

⁹ Quoted in Kaplan, pp. 20-21.

both Prussia and Russia objected to these changes in the Polish Constitution.¹⁰ In response to these attempted reforms, Russia used the threat of invasion to encourage Poland to sign the “Perpetual Treaty Between the Polish Commonwealth and the Empire of All Russia.” The most important elements of the treaty were a Russian guarantee of Poland’s territorial integrity and preservation of the Polish constitution.¹¹ Poland had tried to wriggle out of its shackles, but had been caught and re-bound even more tightly.

The treaty was perceived as an outrage by key members of the *Sejm*, who confederated at the small fortress town of Bar. The Barists declared their intention to take up arms to defend the Polish state against internal treason and external oppression, objecting particularly to the imprisonment of several prominent political figures by Russia. The Barist revolt soon provided important opportunities for Russia’s rivals to challenge, or at least chip away at, her domination of Poland.

The first such opportunity fell into Turkish hands. The Porte had objected strongly to the 1768 treaty with Russia, concerned about growing Russian control in Poland. When the Barists appealed to the Porte for assistance against Russia, the Turks declared war on Russia.

The Russo-Turkish war also provided excuses for other states to intervene in Poland. The first to do so was Austria; with what appeared to be genuine concern to prevent war from spilling over its border, Austria cordoned off its border with Poland in such a way as to include the town of Zips (also known as Spisz), which was part of Polish lands, in 1768. This action was not objected or responded to until 1770, after Austria had begun levying taxes and reversed its original position (stated in 1769) that the rights of

¹⁰ Indeed, these two powers had codified their intention to maintain the Polish Constitution in a 1764 treaty.

¹¹ Eversley, p. 41; Kaplan, pp. 89-90.

the Polish crown would be preserved. Austria now claimed that Zips belonged to Hungary and, therefore, to Austria. Further, in August 1770, Austria extended its cordon deeper into Polish territory, occupying parts of the Polish Ukraine.

While the Prussians had actively been considering a Polish partition for some time, Frederick stepped very carefully. He would not be the first to make a move into Polish territory, but the Austrian occupation afforded him a golden opportunity. In a letter to the Prussian ambassador to Russia, Baron Solms, on February 2, 1769, he wrote:

Count Lynar came to Berlin to marry his daughter to the son of Count Kameke. He is the man who concluded the peace of Kloser-Zeven; he is a great politician and still keeps informed about European affairs from his village, to which he has returned. Count Lynar has a rather curious idea concerning Russia that might appeal to the interests of the princes and that might improve the present conditions in Europe. He suggests that Russia offer to the court of Vienna for its assistance against the Turks the town of Lwow, with its environs, and Spisz; that Polish Prussia with Warmia and the right of protection over Gdansk be given to us; and that Russia, to indemnify herself for the expenses of the war, take whatever part of Poland would be convenient; and then Austria and Prussia, neither being envious of the other would in emulation of each other, aid Russia against the Turks.

The plan has some luster; it appears seductive. I believed it my duty to send it to you. Although it seems to me that it is more brilliant than sound, you know the way of Count Panin's thinking; either you will suppress all this, or you will judge what is opportune to employ.¹²

Solms' response to Frederick's letter indicated a Russian commitment to preserve Poland intact. But as the war threatened Prussia's borders as well, Frederick needed little prompting to enclave the towns of Elblag and Warmia. By January of 1771, Frederick received indications from Solms that the mood in St. Petersburg was now in favor of

¹² Kaplan, p. 112. Count Panin was Catherine the Great's chief advisor on Poland.

partition. Soon after, a conversation between Catherine and Frederick's brother, Prince Henry, confirmed Solms' perception.

'Why shouldn't we all take something?' [Catherine] said to Henry – although he could not be sure that she was serious. Frederick, he pointed out, had set up a cordon sanitaire, but, unlike the Austrians, he had not annexed any land. 'But,' laughed the empress, 'why not take the land anyway?' A moment later Count Chernyshev came up to me and talked on the same subject... 'Why not take the bishopric of Warmia? After all, everyone ought to have something.'¹³

Several months later, on June 14, Frederick sent a "Draft of a Secret Convention between His Majesty the King of Prussia and the Empress of all the Russias" to Solms in St. Petersburg. The convention stated Prussian and Russian "ancient rights" to specific Polish territories, provided mutual guarantees of Prussian and Russian possession of these territories, committed to offering similar territories to Austria, and declared that both states would work to win Polish consent for the plan.

Given that Austrian actions had precipitated Russian and Prussian plans for partition, it was surprising that the Empress Maria Theresa now balked at the notion of dismembering Poland. She objected to the plan on moral grounds, and reassured King Stanislas' brother that she meant to guarantee Polish territory as well as see Poland extricated from Russian domination. Soon after making these promises, however, on the advice of their advisor Prince Kaunitz, both Maria Theresa and Emperor Joseph accepted that, if Russia and Prussia were to carve up slices of Poland, Austria must have her share as well. Having agreed to the idea of partition, Austria now insisted on an exactly equal slice of the pie. Indeed, the Austrian claims were so extensive as to alarm first Prussia and then Russia. In response to Prussian and Russian objections, Prince Kaunitz argued

¹³ Lukowski, p. 64.

that the particular territory at issue was the only truly valuable portion of Austrian spoils from the partition. Even with this territory, Polish Austria would be a “narrow...and exposed strip of land;” if this territory were not granted to Austria, Kaunitz contended, the balance of power in the region would be upset.¹⁴ Frederick wryly expressed his concern to the Austrian ambassador: “Permit me to say that your mistress has a very good appetite.” Similarly, in Russia, Catherine’s advisor Count Panin feared that the Austrian demands were so excessive that they would completely eliminate Poland as a buffer state. “Poland must remain for ever as an intermediary State destined to prevent collision between her three neighbors. We should therefore leave to it a force and existence suitable for such a destination.”¹⁵

Faced with such strong opposition to her claims, Austria amended her demands; on August 5, 1772, all three powers signed the partition convention in St. Petersburg. According to the terms of the treaty, Prussia received 5 percent of Poland’s territory and 580,000 inhabitants; Russia took 12.7 percent of the territory and 1.3 million people; and Austria received 11.8 percent of Polish territory, and 2.13 million inhabitants. Approximately one-fourth of Poland was now transferred to Prussia, Austria, and Russia, and under the terms of the treaty, the state that remained was required to retain its old constitution.

The first Polish partition was characterized by great power concerns about rivals’ gains. Russia had exerted indirect control over Poland for many years prior to partition. When that indirect control was threatened, the response was advance, not retreat. Seeing the opportunity for territorial gain, first Austria, and then Prussia and finally Russia

¹⁴ Kaplan, pp. 170-171.

¹⁵ Eversley, pp. 54-55.

moved to permanently occupy various parts of Poland. They were attentive to distributing the spoils equally, so as to preserve the balance of power. But they also left a wounded Poland in their midst, to serve as a buffer between the three rivals – a buffer that would separate their territories but be unable to resist their wills in the future. And it was the future that concerned, not only the Poles, but also other European powers. As Edmund Burke stated after the first partition: “Poland was but a breakfast...where will they dine?”¹⁶

In 1782, ten years after the first partition, war pitted Russia against Sweden, Prussia, England, and the Netherlands. Frederick William of Prussia, never missing an opportunity to undermine Russia’s influence in Poland, proposed a new Prusso-Polish alliance. The *Sejm*’s reaction to this proposal was extreme in its expression of opposition to Russian domination. The *Sejm*, which had confederated itself so as to remove the possibility of use of the *liberum veto*, insisted on the withdrawal of all Russian troops from Poland, and set about amending the Constitution.

The proposed constitutional reforms were drastic. The monarchy was to be made hereditary. Both the *liberum veto* and the right to confederation were abolished. A system of checks and balances between the monarch and various parts of the *Sejm* was established. Merchants were to sit in the *Sejm*. And perhaps most importantly, the army was to be increased to 100,000 men.

The Russian reaction to these amendments was equally extreme. Once again, the Polish buffer had taken action that threatened Russia’s indirect control. On November 6, Russia’s Ambassador Stackelberg warned the *Sejm* that “Her Majesty the Empress,

¹⁶ Zamoyski, p. 202.

giving up with regret the friendship which she had vowed to His Majesty the King and the Most Serene Commonwealth, cannot regard otherwise than as a violation of the treaty the least amendment of the constitution of 1775.”¹⁷ At the same time, Austria looked on the developments in Poland favorably, seeing a stronger Poland as a buffer state more likely to survive.¹⁸

The initial lack of reaction from Russia was due primarily to her involvement in war with Turkey. Catherine’s attitude toward the new constitution, however, was clear. “How dare they alter the form of a government that I guaranteed!” she cried upon hearing the news.¹⁹ She instructed plans for an invasion of Poland to be drawn up against the end of the Turkish war. But even when peace with the Porte was achieved, Catherine still faced potential opposition from Austria and Prussia, who on February 7, 1792 had signed an agreement to protect the territorial integrity and independence of Poland. Austria and Prussia also committed to protect a free Polish constitution, but not necessarily the one under which the King then governed. Austria in particular expressed a strong desire for Russia to accede to the treaty.²⁰

Catherine’s plan was to divert Austrian and Prussian attention by embroiling them in war with revolutionary France. Leopold II, Austria’s Emperor, obeyed; Frederick William was more recalcitrant, and soon took steps to betray two allies at once. Rather than encouraging Russia to accede to the treaty with Austria guaranteeing Poland’s territorial integrity, he consented to Catherine’s suggestion that Prussia and Russia

¹⁷ Quoted in Zamoyski, p. 309.

¹⁸ Lukowski, pp. 142-3, 146; also see Schroeder, p. 26.

¹⁹ Quoted in Zamoyski, p. 347.

²⁰ Zamoyski, p. 354.

engage in a new partition of Poland. Both parties understood that Prussia's share of the spoils was contingent on her involvement with the war against France.²¹

Instead of invading Poland outright, Catherine chose to exploit opposition to the new Constitution. High-ranking *szlachta* who had opposed the reforms were invited to St. Petersburg in March 1792. On May 14, they formed a confederation at Targowica, and requested Russian aid. Catherine, of course, readily consented; she demanded that the Constitution of 1791 be rescinded and that the king and the *Sejm* accede to the Confederacy of Targowica.

Poland had little choice. Badly outnumbered and out-armed by the Russians, the king agreed to accede to Targowica. Historians agree that, initially, Catherine only sought to reestablish control over Poland. But she would be unable to manage her alliance with Prussia if she did not agree to a new partition.²² At the same time, Austria, on the losing side of its war with France, began demanding indemnities in the form of Polish land. Austrian demands were rejected, and Prussia and Russia secretly signed a new treaty of partition on January 23, 1793.

As in the case of the first partition, Austria objected to the inequality of the settlement. Prince Kaunitz's replacement, Baron Thugut, instructed Austria's ambassador to Russia to broach the topic with Catherine. The ambassador stated, "with regret, that the Emperor will decide to seek in Poland, after the example of these two Courts, an acquisition which, by right and justice, is due to him, but this must be inevitable in default of some other scheme of indemnity." In the same vein, a letter from Emperor Francis to Catherine read, "I insist persistently in demanding for Austria an

²¹ Lukowski, p. 147.

²² Zamoyski, pp. 389-390; Eversley, p. 119.

absolute equality of acquisition and other advantages with Russia and Prussia.”²³ Indeed, Austria’s concerns for equality outstripped her desire to maintain a Polish buffer state. In response to the Russian reply that, were Austrian demands to be honored, nothing of Poland would be left, the Austrian ambassador answered, “What does it matter in comparison with the danger that will arise to Austria, if she has not an equivalent to that obtained by Prussia?”²⁴

Following the second partition, Poland’s neighbors – and in particular Austria – were concerned for the survival of the Polish state only insofar as it affected their own. In a letter to the Austrian ambassador to Russia, Baron Cobenzl, Francis’ advisor Thugut wrote:

Still worse than the fear of the Polish insurgent is my dread of new measures of Prussian dishonesty and turbulence. The Prussian troops have begun their march towards Poland, and General Igelstrom makes no protest, but enters into an understanding with them. But we can by no means allow the Prussians to remain for any length of time in Poland, still less to take up a position in Cracow. The Emperor desires no change, and no acquisition in Poland, but only the right of garrison in certain border fortresses. But all this would be changed by a fresh aggrandizement by Prussia. Russia will know how to prevent this, and we beg to be informed of what she intends to do in opposition to Prussian rapacity. Reinforcement of the Russian army is the first thing to be done; and then – in the name of Heaven! – postponement of the Turkish war. The Emperor approves of the Russian plans and is ready to co-operate for their fulfillment; but at this moment the war with Turkey would be fatal, and Prussia would forthwith attempt new encroachments. Austria, in order to oppose her, would be forced to make peace with France on any terms. Above all, we must be fully assured that Russia will not share her favour between us and Prussia. If Russia were to allow Prussian troops in Poland, we too should have to march in to secure our portion in the last partition.²⁵

²³ Quoted in Eversley, p. 133.

²⁴ Quoted in Eversley, pp. 134-35.

²⁵ Quoted in Eversley, p. 191.

Austria had less to fear on this score than in the second partition. Having favored Prussia in 1792-3, Catherine decided to approach Francis to conclude a secret treaty of partition in 1793 that would exclude Prussia, thereby reducing its share in the next partition. The only outstanding questions were: which power would receive which territory?; and, would a Polish buffer be preserved?

Austria sought compensation for the second partition as well as a share of the third.²⁶ The main bone of contention appeared to be the disposition of Cracow, desired by both Austria and Prussia. At the same time, the notion of retaining a tiny Polish buffer state surfaced in Prussia and was considered in Russia and, later, in Austria.²⁷ For the Austrians, however, the value of Poland as a buffer state had been severely undercut by the second partition, which brought Russia and Prussia almost to Austria's borders.²⁸ Ultimately, after presenting Prussia with a *fait accompli* in the form of the secret Austro-Russian treaty, the Russian ambassador to Prussia rejected the plans to retain a buffer, "referring to the late outbreak in Poland, which had indisputably proved the necessity of partitioning so volcanic a territory."²⁹

Poland was to be partitioned in its entirety. Russia received the most, with more than 46,000 square miles and 1.2 million people; Prussia and Austria both took approximately 18,000 square miles of Polish territory, but Austria gained 1.5 million new inhabitants as well as the prize of Cracow, while Prussia received about 1 million people. King Stanislas was forced to abdicate as well as, in one of his last acts as monarch, to inform all foreign diplomats that their commissions were ended, in view of the end of

²⁶ Eversley, p. 205.

²⁷ Eversley, p. 9; Lord, pp. 487, 496.

²⁸ Schroeder, p. 122.

²⁹ Eversley, p. 239.

Poland. A train of diplomats from France, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands, and the Vatican left Warsaw one by one.

In the 18th century Polish partitions, the net benefit of conquest had more to do with strategic concerns over rivals' gains than with the value of Polish territory per se. Although some territories were intrinsically valuable (the salt mines at Lwow were an important source of income, and Danzig was a critical port for Prussia), most of the wrangling over territory reflected Russia's, Prussia's, and Austria's desire to avoid a situation in which a rival's power was augmented at their expense. These three states – and Prussia and Austria in particular – were engaged in a true security dilemma. Had Poland abutted only one of these states, it is not clear that her demise would have been as certain or as complete. The competitive spiraling of rivalry appears to have sealed Poland's fate.

How can we explain the timing of the partitions? Poland was a buffer state for many years prior to the first partition – why did Russia, Austria, and Prussia wait so long to take her over? Part of the answer to this question must lie in the fact that Poland was very effectively controlled indirectly by Russia before 1772. It appears that, once this control was threatened, partition was imminent; and because Poland was surrounded by rivals on all sides, Austria and Prussia would not have countenanced a unilateral Russian partition.

A related question regarding the Polish partitions is: why would Russia trade sole indirect control over all of Poland for direct control over part of Poland, loss of any control over other parts, and the resumption of indirect control over the rump state? Once again, the history of the partitions suggests that partition schemes were consistently

initiated by Austria or Prussia. Wary of Russia's influence in Poland, the two German states preferred a clear division of the Polish pie to Russia's hazy domination.

At what point did concerns over rivals' gains outweigh the desire for a buffer state? To the end of Poland's life as a state, schemes for maintaining a shrinking Polish buffer were presented in the highest circles of Russian, Austrian, and Prussian government. The Poles themselves were convinced that their value as a buffer state provided an assurance of survival.³⁰ The fact that the negotiations over the third partition – the one that was to bring the three powers' boundaries into direct contact – were lengthier and more difficult than those over the first and second partitions, further implies nervousness about directly abutting each other.³¹ It appears that, in each case, the independent action of one rival – Austria's occupation of Zips before the first partition, Russia's plan to divert Prussia and Austria while she invaded Poland before the second partition, and Austria's determination not to be left out of the final division of Polish spoils – induced sufficient fears of relative loss to overcome the desire to maintain a buffer state.³²

What did – and did not – drive the underlying dynamic of partition is clear. Poland's conquerors were determined to win – or at least stand their ground – in the game of great power politics. One of the cardinal rules of this game was that a rival's gains must be matched.³³ Once one rival claimed a slice of Poland, the others must do the

³⁰ Lukowski, p. 49.

³¹ Lord, p. 481.

³² Paul Schroeder makes a similar argument. "Poland's weakness, combined with Russia's growing power and invulnerability and the rivalry between Prussia and Austria, which made both of them seek an alliance with Russia, laid the groundwork for the first partition of Poland. They did not, however, make it inevitable or even probable. Catherine and her advisers would have preferred to maintain Poland outwardly intact under Russian domination...Partition instead came about mainly as a by-product of events, a means to other ends." Schroeder, p. 12.

³³ Schroeder, pp. 6-7.

same. Thus Poland was a victim of geography – caught between three powers jealous of their standing, there was literally nothing she could do to prevent herself from, in Frederick the Great's choice phrase, being eaten like an artichoke – leaf by leaf.

Did Poland's Conquerors Anticipate Occupation Costs?

Polish nationalism was evident during the course of the partitions. Nationalist revolt and parliamentary resistance hindered, but did not halt, the conquest of Poland at each step. Because most of this resistance was carried out by Polish nobles, one could argue that it did not properly constitute nationalism. I object to this argument on two counts. First, although most arguments about nationalism refer to popular sentiment, nationalism is not by definition restricted to the middle or lower classes. Claims in the name of patriotism made by nobility should not be disqualified as nationalist claims simply because they lack a groundswell of popular support (if, on the other hand, these movements faced widespread popular opposition, their nationalism would be in doubt). Second, the fundamental logic of the occupation costs argument is that would-be conquerors should make a cost-benefit calculation when considering taking over another state. On some level, then, strong resistance – be it from a class of nobles who essentially control a country's military forces or from volunteer citizen-soldiers – should deter conquest in all its forms.

The 18th century Polish partitions do not, however, support the occupation costs argument. It was clear to Russia, Austria, and Prussia that the Poles would resist their occupation. Nationalist revolts occurred between the first and second and second and

third partitions, giving Poland's conquerors a taste of what was to come. Their response to this resistance was, however, not retreat but advance. Nationalism only led to greater repression.

The first example of nationalist revolt occurred in protest of Russia's strongarm tactics in keeping Poland within the Russian sphere of influence. But this rebellion, instead of saving Poland from Russian domination, led to Poland's downfall. As mentioned earlier, in response to the unequal treaty recently imposed by Russia, Polish nobles confederated at Bar. The Confederation of Bar was clearly a nationalist revolt against Russian domination. The Russian response to the Confederation was not restraint, but repression; the potential occupation costs of a rebellious Poland were undaunting.

One piece of evidence that could be taken as weak support for either the occupation costs or the norms argument was the great powers' repeated insistence on having the *Sejm* ratify the treaties of partition. This act was, however, quite hollow. In 1773, despite the fact that Poland had just suffered a crushing defeat in the war, the members of the *Sejm* refused to lend their consent to the first partition. While the king had already consented, knowing that he had no army with which to resist the invading forces, the *szlachta* appeared intractable. The *liberum veto*, which the great powers insisted on maintaining to keep Poland biddable was, ironically, suspended so as to allow for an easier ratification. Bribes and threats were handed out generously.³⁴ Still the *szlachta* resisted. Finally, on September 22, 1773, Adam Poninski, the Marshal of the *Sejm*, asked for approval of the treaty yet again. Met with silence, Poninski asked again.

³⁴ Eversley, p. 60; Kaplan, p. 180.

Hearing silence again, he asked a third time. In the absence of a vote, Poninski claimed that the *Sejm* had approved the partition treaties on September 30.³⁵

Thus, both the process and the formalization of partition were costly for Poland's conquerors prior to the first partition. Further, Polish resistance to foreign domination and invasion continued to be fairly constant. The Russian, Prussian, and Austrian response to this resistance, was not, however, withdrawal. They were not deterred by the prospect of rebellious citizens. On the contrary, resistance was used as a justification for partition. Indeed, the preamble to the Treaty of Partition signed in St. Petersburg in August 1772 stated:

In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity! The spirit of faction, the troubles and intestine war which had shaken the Kingdom of Poland for so many years, and the Anarchy which acquires new strength every day...give just apprehension for expecting the total decomposition of the state...at the same time, the Powers neighbouring on the Republic are burdened with the rights and claims which are as ancient as they are legitimate.³⁶

From 1772 to 1788, Poland appeared to have accepted its fate, returning in its truncated form to its position as a Russian vassal. Stackelberg, the Russian ambassador, was seemingly successful in maintaining his charge, but in truth he was helped considerably by the conservative *szlachta* who opposed any change in the Polish constitution. Poland was considered so stable that Catherine withdrew most of her troops in 1780.³⁷

When a reforming Poland threatened to drift away from the Russian sphere in 1788, Catherine was delayed in taking action by her involvement in war with Turkey. Once the war concluded, she turned her attention to her wayward buffer. Surrounded by

³⁵ Kaplan, p. 181.

³⁶ Davies, vol. I, pp. 521-523.

³⁷ Lukowski, p. 117.

a threatening Russia and an indifferent Prussia, Poland had little choice. But once again, resistance emerged from many quarters. Allegedly spurred on by Jacobin sentiments, rebellious Poles were ruthlessly suppressed by Russian troops, and the now uncontrollable Targowicans ignited further strife. The embers of insurrection were again met with repression instead of retreat.

The events surrounding the conclusion of the second partition contain eerie echoes of the first. Like its forerunner, the second treaty of partition blamed Polish resistance for the fate of Poland. Catherine wrote to her new ambassador to Poland, Count Sievers, that "From the beginning, we have endeavoured to found our relations to Poland on an enduring basis, but the Poles, instead of meeting our advances with corresponding friendship, have only manifested the bitterest hatred; and then it came to our first partition in 1772, our consent to which, as all the initiated know, was only wrested from use by the force of circumstances."³⁸

The second partition also resembled the first in the partitioners' insistence on ratification by the *Sejm*. A large proportion of the members, once again, objected vehemently to the partition scheme; a number of them were carted off to jail. Russian Ambassador Sievers then managed to get the *Sejm* to agree to the new treaty with Russia, but faced even stronger opposition when the treaty with Prussia came to the floor. Sievers' strongarm tactics were literally met with the silent treatment; the deputies agreed to express their dissent through silence. Borrowing a page from Poninski, the erstwhile Marshal of the *Sejm* during the ratification of the first partition, Sievers turned this silence on its head, reading aloud the terms of agreement with Prussia, and declaring that

³⁸ Quoted in Eversley, p. 125.

silence equaled assent. Poland had lost almost half its territory and more than half of its population. Warsaw was now barely more than thirty miles from Prussia.

Severe territorial losses and a return to the Russian yoke did not sit well with many of Poland's nobles and soldiers. Plans for insurrection began even before the treaties of the second partition were signed. Led by Tadeusz Kosciuszko, these plans came to fruition on March 24, 1794.

Weakened by war, occupied by foreign powers, and lacking a clear domestic authority structure, Poland was not expected to be able to raise a consequential revolt against her conquerors. But the rebels defied expectations, making their opposition to conquest both clear and costly. With mostly peasant irregulars, Kosciuszko forced the Russians to withdraw from Warsaw in less than a month. Where Russia's General Igelstrom had failed, Frederick William arrived from the west to lay siege to the city. A combined force of 40,000 Prussians and Russians attacked against 26,000 Polish defenders, many of whom were citizen volunteers.³⁹ From late July to September 2, Prussia attacked and Warsaw held. Finally, Frederick William was forced to raise the siege.⁴⁰

Kosciuszko's uprising was clearly born of nationalist sentiment in opposition to the partitions of Poland. Just as clearly, the surprising success of the insurrection imposed serious and unexpected costs on both Russia and Prussia. But as in the days leading to the first and second partitions, the Russian and Prussian response to nationalist rebellion was not to give in, but to make an even stronger effort to crush revolt. Even while the insurrection was ongoing, Catherine wrote to Austria's Emperor Francis that

³⁹ Lord, p. 425.

⁴⁰ Zamoycki, pp. 427-28.

“The time is come when the three neighbouring Courts must use their efforts, not only to extinguish the smallest spark of the fire which has been kindled in their neighborhood, but also to prevent its ever being rekindled out of the cinders.”⁴¹

With Warsaw safe for the moment, Kosciuszko turned east to meet the advancing Russians. Barely a month after the Prussian siege of Warsaw had been lifted, Kosciuszko was captured.⁴² The Russians also captured Warsaw after routing the Polish army and, infamously, massacring the citizens of the nearby suburb of Praga. Poland could do little more than surrender.

On October 24, 1795, Austria, Prussia, and Russia signed the final treaties of partition. Poland was dead, and her conquerors meant her to stay that way. Included as a secret article in the treaties was the following:

In view of the necessity to abolish everything which could revive the memory of the existence of the Kingdom of Poland, now that the annulment of this body politic has been effected...the high contracting parties are agreed and undertake never to include in their titles...the name or designation of the Kingdom of Poland, which shall remain suppressed as from the present and forever.⁴³

Poland’s partitioners may have feared Polish nationalism, but they dealt with that fear by committing to crush the Polish nation, rather than by being deterred by the high costs of occupation that nationalists, left unchecked, were expected to impose.

Given the constraints of geography, one of the few avenues available to the Poles was to generate high occupation costs for their conquerors. Just prior to the first partition, Jean-Jacques Rousseau suggested precisely this strategy. “You cannot possibly keep them from swallowing you,” he wrote. “See to it, at least, that they shall not be able

⁴¹ Quoted in Eversley, pp. 204-05; see also Lukowski, pp. 172-73.

⁴² Lord, p. 483.

to digest you.”⁴⁴ In this respect, at least, the Poles followed his advice consistently – before each of the three partitions. And yet, contrary to the expectations of Rousseau, the rebelling Poles, and proponents of the occupation costs argument, nationalist revolt evoked exactly the wrong response from Poland’s threatening neighbors. Retreat in the face of occupation costs was not the only solution available to Poland’s conquerors. For example, when the costs of occupying Poland proved troublesome for Prussia after the second partition, part of the solution was to seek compensation in the form of additional Polish territory, rather than to give up the territory already acquired.⁴⁵ Instead of being disheartened by resistance, Poland’s conquerors were angered. Defeats at the hands of Polish nationalists did not lead to retreat; they led to advancement and greater repression.

Did Poland Behave According to Realist Principles?

Given Poland’s situation in the late 18th century, what policy recommendations would a neorealist have made to increase the odds of its survival? Neorealism suggests that states balance their way out of difficult situations. States should balance internally, by building up their military power, and externally, by forming alliances to help counter threatening states.

Even before the first partition, King Stanislas recognized that Poland would have to change its ways in order to survive. The king proceeded to attempt a number of reforms, including amending the *liberum veto*, that could strengthen the Polish state. Once the general state structure was sufficiently strong, the king planned to move on to

⁴³ Davies, vol. I, p. 542.

⁴⁴ Rousseau and Kendall, p. 11.

additional efforts at internal balancing. The plan to amend the Polish Constitution, however, backfired. Poland's neighbors supported the constitution precisely because it made it easier for them to exert influence in Poland. Once this influence was threatened by the proposed constitutional reforms, surrounding rivals quickly moved in to slice away at various parts of the Polish state. Thus, instead of deterring surrounding great powers nervous about their control over the Polish buffer, Polish attempts at internal balancing only angered these powers and hastened the demise of the Polish state.

Moreover, although Poland was more successful in forming alliances than in increasing its own military strength, 18th century Polish history reveals a fundamental danger of neorealist reasoning: allies cannot always be trusted. Following the first partition, King Stanislas first sought an alliance with Russia that would also permit an increase in the Polish armed forces. Once his appeal was denied, the *Sejm* responded favorably to an alliance offer from Frederick William, while proposing extreme constitutional reforms that included the strengthening of the army. Once again, Russia opposed the reforms; and while Prussia claimed to support the new constitution, Frederick William fully intended to betray his Polish ally as soon as it was in his interest to do so. As Frederick William's ambassador Lucchesini wrote to his master after the alliance treaty was signed, "Now that we hold these people in our hand, and the future of Poland depends only on our combinations, this country may serve your Majesty either as a theater of war and as an eastern screen for Silesia, or it can become in Your Majesty's hand an object of barter at the peace negotiations."⁴⁶ Lucchesini's words were prophetic. By January 1792, after Russia had intimated its intentions to reward Prussia with

⁴⁵ Schroeder, pp. 144-45.

⁴⁶ Quoted in Zamoycki, p. 322.

additional Polish territory if Frederick William did not interfere with Russian plans, Lucchesini was again sent to Poland, where he indicated that Prussia would not honor its alliance; his protestations met with willful denial on the part of the Polish king and his ministers.⁴⁷ In response to a Polish appeal for help, Lucchesini replied, "My master does not consider himself bound by the treaty of 1790 to defend by his army the hereditary monarchy, as established by the Constitution of May 3, 1791."⁴⁸ Even when it seemed that allies – like Prussia and Austria – had strong incentives to balance against Russia by preserving the Polish state, these powers quickly betrayed their Polish ally when their rivals began Polish land grabs. Although Poland attempted to behave as neorealism suggests, attempts at balancing made Poland more vulnerable to partition, instead of more likely to survive. Poland's attempt to balance against power could not be realized precisely because the powers she could turn to for help were as interested in taking over Poland themselves as they were in preventing their rivals from taking over Poland at their expense.

At the time of the second partition, the Polish army numbered at most 65,000 men – well short of the intended 100,000. Arms were scarce and difficult to come by. Reliable allies were even harder to find, with Austria tied up in France and Prussia disavowing its commitments. Poland was once again in dire straits. King Stanislas attempted to extricate his country by appealing to Prussia to honor its alliance commitment, by requesting aid from Britain, and by offering the Polish throne to

⁴⁷ Zamoyski, p. 355.

⁴⁸ Quoted in Eversley, p. 100.

Catherine's grandson, Grand Duke Constantine. Catherine rejected this suggestion, demanding once again that the king accede to the Confederacy of Targowica.⁴⁹

Between the first and second partitions, then, Poland sought to behave as a realist, strengthening its military and reaching out for alliances. Although the Poles achieved limited success on both scores, this success was not sufficient. In Paul Schroeder's words, "There was no way Poland could have played the current game of international politics successfully, even had it been endowed with greater strength, skill, and realism; the game itself was stacked against Poland and all other intermediary bodies."⁵⁰ At the mercy of her neighbors, efforts at balancing were futile for Poland.

Why Was Poland Resurrected in 1919?

The 1795 partition of Poland endured for over a century. Given the length of the partition period, the survival of a Polish nation – although not a Polish state – that continued to seek resurrection is truly surprising, and represents strong evidence of Polish nationalism. In this section, I briefly examine the long history of partitioned Poland in order to better understand the causes of Poland's resurrection in 1919. During this interregnum in Polish statehood, the Polish nation was expressed in several incarnations, from the autonomous Duchy of Warsaw and Congress Kingdom, dominated by France and Russia respectively, to the rebirth of an internationally recognized Polish state in 1919. I explore further the argument that populations that can generate high costs for their would-be conquerors will tend to avoid conquest and, if conquered, will soon be

⁴⁹ There is no need to discuss further the Prussian response, and although British public opinion favored Poland, there was little Britain was willing to do on Stanislas' behalf.

restored to independence. This claim is at odds with the argument advanced in this dissertation. Instead of expecting a positive correlation between nationalist uprisings and state resurrection, my expectation is that states are more likely to be resurrected after World War I, when international norms of self-determination and territorial integrity are greatly strengthened.

How can we distinguish the predictions of these two arguments with respect to the timing of the resurrection of Poland? The occupation costs argument suggests that resurrection should be in response to nationalist uprising or rebellion against occupation. The norms argument suggests that resurrection should occur soon after the conclusion of World War I. While it is clear that the resurrection of Poland did occur immediately after World War I, it could be that the rebirth of the Polish state also coincided with a series of rebellions against Germany, Russia, and Austria. Were this the case, it would be difficult to ascertain which argument provided more explanatory leverage over the question of Poland's resurrection. As I show below, however, this was not the case. During 124 years of occupation, the Poles rose up against the partitioning powers on multiple occasions. In many cases, these uprisings were well-organized and costly to the occupiers. In none of these cases did rebellion lead to resurrection. Resurrection of the Polish state was instead dependent on a change in the international normative landscape that made the plight of the Poles both more convincing and less acceptable to the great powers of the day.

⁵⁰ Schroeder, pp. 77-78.

The Role of Nationalism

The history of the interregnum period is characterized by a series of nationalist revolts against Poland's conquerors. These revolts were most intense under the government of the Congress Kingdom, a Polish region with limited autonomy under Russian rule. In evaluating the role of nationalism in the 1919 resurrection of Poland, I explore the size and shape of these insurrections and, importantly, the nature of great power response to repeated Polish nationalist revolt.

On the night of November 29, 1830, Polish revolutionaries stormed the Warsaw Palace where the Grand Duke Constantine, Tsar Nicholas' proxy in the Congress Kingdom, resided. Despite initial confusion as to which side they should support, the citizens of Warsaw ultimately rallied behind the revolutionaries, denying the city to its Russian occupiers. An insurrectionary government was established, and the *Sejm* officially took the Polish throne away from the Tsar, thereby violating the 1815 constitution of the kingdom.⁵¹ Once again, Poland sought independence.

For the next nine months, Polish and Russian forces fought throughout the kingdom. Efforts to gain external support were in vain; for obvious reasons, neither Prussia nor Austria could support the uprising, and other powers were leery of getting involved in a conflict with Russia. Under the circumstances, fighting alone, the Poles were surprisingly successful against the Russians, routing their foes in several key battles. By September 1831, however, Warsaw capitulated.

That the Poles, few and friendless, were able to fight the Russians for so long is a testament to their commitment to the cause of national independence. That the Russians

⁵¹ The 1815 Constitution essentially made the Congress Kingdom an autonomous region of Russia, and a kingdom of the Tsar.

were relatively unsuccessful against the Poles until about August 1831 speaks to the costs inflicted on the Russian army. But the response to the 1830 insurrection was not a granting, or even an increase, in Polish independence or autonomy. Instead, the rights and privileges accorded the Congress Kingdom in the 1815 constitution were severely curtailed. The Polish language was eliminated from official use, local self-government in Lithuania was abolished, and wide-reaching policies were established to eradicate all remnants of a Polish state. The imposition of occupation costs led to the opposite results than the one the Poles had hoped for. Lest the lesson was not clear, Tsar Nicholas spoke to Polish nationalists in 1835: "If you persist in nursing your dreams of a distinct nationality, of an independent Poland...you can only draw the greatest of misfortunes upon [your]selves."⁵²

For the moment, at least, it seemed that Nicholas' lesson was not lost on Russian Poland. But in 1846, another uprising appeared in Cracow, which had been absorbed by Austria. The insurrectionaries succeeded in freeing Cracow, raising an army of six thousand, and engineering outbreaks in additional parts of partitioned Poland, once again inflicting significant and clear costs on the occupying powers. But after seven months of fighting, Austrian and Russian forces suppressed the revolt.

Compared to all the preceding revolts in partitioned Poland, the January Insurrection of 1863 was the most widespread and the most intense. At the start of the insurrection, organization was poor, and leaderless Poles faced twenty-to-one odds against the Russians in the Congress Kingdom. But by spring, the Poles had regrouped, and the insurrection started to spread to parts of Poland that had been absorbed by Austria

⁵² Wandycz, pp. 122-23.

and Prussia. And by the summer of 1863, the underground "National Government" essentially controlled the kingdom, despite the continued presence of Russian forces. The Russian response to this improbable success was to continue fighting the Poles for more than a year; the insurrection was finally put down in October 1864.

Once again, Polish nationalism had reared its head and demonstrated its ability to inflict severe costs on Poland's conquerors. And, once again, Poland's conquerors responded to nationalist uprising by attempting to eradicate, rather than accommodate, Polish nationalism. Thousands of people were executed, imprisoned, or deported to Siberia. The title of "Kingdom of Poland" was eliminated; the Congress Kingdom was to be known henceforth as "Vistula Land." Intensive Germanicization and Russification campaigns were launched in the various sectors of partitioned Poland. Any vestiges of local self-government were eradicated. Official, or even public, use of the Polish language was severely restricted. Polish property was confiscated. At the same time, particularly in Russia, ethnic minorities that had resided in prepartition Poland were levered away from the Polish nationalist cause; Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Ruthenians began to find their own nationalities. The strategy of dividing prepartition Poland from itself was to prove extremely consequential for the future death and survival of Poland.

Nineteenth-century Poland was characterized by insurrection and revolt against the partitioning powers. Although these rebellions varied in success and strength, it must have been clear to the occupying states that Poland would not, as Rousseau had suggested at the time of the first partition, be easy to digest. Continued nationalist revolts made Poland a costly conquest. But the reaction to the repeated violent expression of Polish nationalist sentiment led, without fail, to a backlash against the Poles. Indeed, if the

partitioning powers were going to be deterred by the threat of nationalist insurrection, it is unlikely that they would have executed the second and third partitions in the eighteenth century. The Poles, however, never seemed to learn the lesson that revolt alone would not gain them freedom; instead, revolt would lead to a curtailment of whatever liberties they retained. The occupation costs that both the Poles and occupation costs theorists expected would lead to a resurrection of the Polish state were met with brutal repression in every instance of insurrection.

The Role of the Territorial Sovereignty Norm

During the First World War, debate and conflict eddied about Poland from the inside and out. Polish nationalists disagreed on the best strategy to reunite and free Poland; some favored an alliance with the Central Powers, while others looked to Russia (help from the West was not considered until later in the war). At the same time, each of the three partitioning powers sought to tempt the Poles to their cause by offering various packages of autonomy and even independence. Poland was a literal and figurative battleground.

Schemes for a new Poland ran a narrow gamut; it was proposed that Poland would be an independent state closely "allied" with Russia, Austria, or Germany, depending on the nationality of the author of the plan. Bethmann-Hollweg considered both a Poland united with Austria and an independent Polish buffer state, while Tsar Nicholas claimed support for a unified Poland under Russian suzerainty. When in the spring of 1915 the Central Powers succeeded in pushing eastward, all of Poland came under their rule. As the Polish economy was subjected to the needs of the German war, Bethmann-Hollweg

began considering a new set of proposals that would link a semi-independent Polish buffer state to Germany instead of Austria. In November 1916, Germany and Austria issued the Two Emperor's Manifesto declaring the establishment of an autonomous Polish Kingdom carved out of Russian Poland.

Backed into a corner, Russia responded to the manifesto with appeals to the west. Stating her support for a unified, independent Poland, Russia was able to recruit allies for this cause from London, Paris, Rome, and Washington. The "Polish Question" was no longer restricted to Central Europe. International support for the self-determination of Poland was strong, as evidenced by Woodrow Wilson's January 22, 1917 speech to the US Senate:

No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property. I take it for granted, for instance, if I may venture upon a single example, that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent, and autonomous Poland, and that henceforth inviolable security of life, of worship, and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own.⁵³

While Wilson's commitment to the restoration of a Polish state was probably sincere, Russian rhetoric was shallow at best. Russia's strategy was to gain western support for her cause against the Central Powers, while at the same time to plan for a resumption of control over Poland after the war.

When the Tsarist regime was overthrown on March 12, 1917, the Bolsheviks also stated their commitment to an independent Poland based on the principle of self-

determination. The manifesto of the Provisional Government declared that “the creation of an independent Polish state, comprised of all the lands in which the Polish people constitute a majority of the population, would be reliable guarantee for lasting peace in the new Europe of the future.” This new Polish state was, of course, to be allied with Russia.⁵⁴ The principle of self-determination was more sincerely expressed by Wilson,⁵⁵ whose Thirteenth Point argued that:

An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

The retreat of the Central Powers in the fall of 1918 was unexpectedly quick and peaceful. The occupiers left, literally handing Poland back to the Poles. Certainly, the fact that Austria-Hungary itself no longer existed, that Germany was badly wounded, and that Russia was undergoing a revolution created an auspicious situation for the Poles. In the midst of these fortuitous circumstances, the remaining great powers – and in particular the US – took advantage of the opportunity to apply an emerging norm and resurrect the Polish state. The 1919 resurrection of Poland not preceded by revolt, but by idealism.

Although Polish nationalists undoubtedly worked for the rebirth of their state, the road to success was not paved with nationalist uprisings. In the case of the interregnum of the Polish state from 1795 to 1919, it is easy to separate out the predictions of the

⁵³ Woodrow Wilson, Address to the Senate. January 22, 1917. Wilson, et al., vol. 40, pp. 533-534.

⁵⁴ Wandycz, p. 355. Similarly, Gerhard Weinberg argues that the major powers operated under the assumption that the oppressed nationalities of Central and Eastern Europe would be granted their own statehood. Weinberg, pp. 9-10, 15.

⁵⁵ For a more extensive discussion of Wilson’s commitment to the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity, please refer to Chapter 2.

occupation costs argument and the normative argument with respect to the resurrection of Poland. The occupation costs argument would predict that resurrection followed nationalist revolt against the occupying powers. Many such revolts occurred; none led to the rebirth of Poland. The normative argument predicts that the rebirth of Poland depended fundamentally upon international support of norms of self-determination and territorial integrity. Publicly declared support for such norms played a key role in Poland's resurrection. Insofar as Polish nationalists may have played a part in creating a new Poland, it was in pleading their case to the Western powers on the basis of these norms that they found the key to success. Indeed, the actual resurrection of Poland was not preceded by any nationalist uprisings like those occurring in 1830, 1848, or 1863. Poland had been very effectively repressed since the January Insurrection. Thus, not only did nationalist uprisings not correlate with resurrection, resurrection did not follow a nationalist uprising. It was not the costs of occupation, but the adherence to an emerging international norm, that led to the rebirth of Poland.

Poland in World War II: The Fourth Partition

Poland in 1919 was in both a better and a worse situation than in 1772. This new Poland was smaller in terms of territory and resources, but also more powerful relative to her neighbors. Poland enjoyed strong international support for her existence, but was despised by the two great nearby European powers, Germany and Russia. Amazingly, Poland had preserved a cohesive nationalist spirit through more than a century of

partition, but the Poles were to find, once again, that nationalism alone could not guarantee survival.

In examining the Nazi-Soviet decision to annex Poland in 1939, I find that, although low-level rivalry existed between these two states, one of the main reasons for the elimination of the Polish state in 1939 was resentment over the loss of territory on the part of both Germany and the USSR. Although it was not exactly the same shape and size as Poland in 1772, Poland in 1919 had been carved out of its 18th century partitioners' territories. Nonetheless, even though Hitler had clear cause for resentment, it is uncertain whether he would have invaded Poland had Stalin refused to fall in with the plan to partition. And further, had Hitler invaded Poland without Stalin's collusion, Stalin probably would have responded with or without Western or Polish assistance. Thus, although the dynamics of rivalry may not have been the principal force behind the annexation of Poland, they appear to have constituted a necessary condition for the event.

If the 1939 invasion occurred because of rivalry, it also occurred in spite of Polish nationalism. The strength of Polish nationalism was evident both prior to the 1939 annexation as well as in the history of occupied Poland in World War II. In the interwar period, the Poles sought to rebuild the Polish state by expanding their territory to their prepartition borders. And during World War II, despite the unparalleled repressiveness of both the Nazi and Soviet occupation regimes, Polish resistance to foreign occupation was constant. Polish nationalism, however, did not succeed in either deterring Nazi and Soviet aggression, or in convincing them to withdraw from their costly conquest.

The 1939 invasion therefore cannot be attributed to a lack of Polish nationalism. Can it be explained by a failure to follow realist principles in Polish foreign policy? The

historical record suggests that this was not the case. As in the 18th century, Poland continued to attempt to balance against power in the 20th. Particularly in the interwar period, Polish leaders sought to follow realist dictates. Ultimately, however, both the Poles and their leaders had to come to terms with the fact that their new state would be quickly eliminated. Thus, neither the occupation costs argument nor the neorealist selection argument provides a better explanation for the Nazi-Soviet invasion of Poland than the buffer states argument.

Did nationalist resistance or international norms lead to the resurrection of Poland in 1945? I argue that occupation costs did not drive resurrection; the Western powers had always intended to resurrect Poland, and the Soviets also wanted a Polish state to serve as a buffer against Germany after the war.⁵⁶ Both “sides” of the alliance espoused the doctrine of self-determination during and after the war. Thus, not resurrecting Poland was not an option. The only outstanding question was, in what form was Poland to be reborn?

Why did Germany and the USSR Invade Poland in 1939?

German and Soviet antipathy to the Poland resurrected in 1919 was immediately manifest. For the Russians, this sentiment only increased during the brief Soviet-Polish war of 1920. At one point during the war, the Russians were very close to taking Warsaw. In debating whether to enter and take over the city at the risk of angering the Entente powers, Lenin wrote, “If the War Department...believe Warsaw can be taken, it

⁵⁶ Trachtenberg, p. 4.

must be taken...if it is possible from the military point of view. But from the *political* [it is] most important to kill Poland.”⁵⁷ This time, however, Poland refused to be killed, and instead quickly defeated the Soviets.

The Polish victory over Russia may have been more of a curse than a blessing. In the Treaty of Riga, which officially concluded hostilities in March 1921, the Soviet Union acceded to most of Poland’s territorial claims. Although Poland was closer to reconstructing herself in her past image, she was also closer to destruction by adding to Russian enmity.

For similar reasons, Germany despised Poland, too. General von Seeckt, founder of the modern German army and its commander during the early 1920s, was representative of German opinion. He wrote in September 1922, “Poland’s existence is intolerable, incompatible with the survival of Germany. It must disappear and it will disappear through its own internal weakness and through Russia – with our assistance.”⁵⁸ During various conferences among high-ranking Soviet and German officials held in the interwar period, multiple schemes to repartition Poland were aired and even planned.

Through much of the rest of the 1920s, Germany, frequently abetted by the Soviet Union, pursued a number of policies whose primary or secondary intent was to isolate Poland. Germany joined the League of Nations and convinced many Western powers that the German-Polish border was unfair while the Soviet Union sponsored revolutionary activity in Poland and conspired with Germany, as well as Lithuania, to threaten Polish interests if not the Polish state itself. At the same time, Poland was

⁵⁷ Quoted in Korbel, p. 54.

⁵⁸ Quoted in Kolasky, p. 7.

undergoing an economic and administrative crisis, plunged into depression while trying to integrate parts of a state that had been separated for over a century.

During the interwar period, relations between Germany and the Soviet Union were relatively friendly. In fact, an important part of the glue of this friendship was their shared hatred of Poland. In February of 1920, an unnamed Soviet official outlined plans to invade Poland, and solicited German help from a Berlin diplomat.⁵⁹ During the Russo-Polish war, the Soviets similarly assured Germany that the pre-Versailles boundary with Germany would be respected as the Russians marched west. General von Seeckt is reputed to have devised a plan to attack Poland from the west as early as 1919, potentially with Russian assistance. Several years later, the Germans pressured Russia against signing a nonaggression pact with Poland, particularly as such a pact might be taken to recognize, implicitly, Poland's western borders. In 1925, Russia cautiously asked what the German response would be if another Russo-Polish war broke out; Germany assured the Soviets that she would stand aside. Thus, to the degree that the locomotion of rivalry led to the destruction of Poland in 1939, the rivalry was not a very old one.⁶⁰

By 1937, however, the German-Soviet rivalry was clear. The Anti-Comintern Pact, clearly directed against the Soviet Union, was established.⁶¹ Soviet-subsidized Communist activity in Germany had begun in the 1920s and never ceased. Germany's international stature was increasing as she began to show signs of expansionist designs and, further, succeeded in rearming. Both states had good cause to be wary of the other, but Poland had better cause to be wary of both. Nonetheless, Poland attempted to take

⁵⁹ Korbelp. 28.

⁶⁰ Korbelp, pp. 28-9, 84, 112-113, 192, 188-189.

advantage of the emerging rivalry by signing nonaggression pacts with both the Soviet Union and Germany, both of whom in turn used the “Polish card” to balance each other.

While Germany and the Soviet Union considered each other rivals for hegemony over central Europe, if not the world, they also recognized that a temporary friendship could be mutually beneficial. A Nazi-Soviet pact would buy each state time to build up sufficient strength to defeat the other while at the same time eliminating the state that both despised more than any other. Both Hitler and Stalin recognized the short-term advantages and the long-term dangers of such an agreement; each sought to outfox the other.

After Germany annexed Austria and then Czechoslovakia in 1938, Stalin sent strong signals westward that he was inclined to an agreement to repartition Poland. By this time, both Hitler and Stalin had clear plans to take over (at least parts of) Poland. Starting in 1937, Stalin began a purge of Polish communists who might voice resistance to a new partition. And Hitler had always planned to expand eastward – it was just a question of when.

Hitler’s view of the timing of a new takeover of Poland also drove the timing of Germany’s approaches to the Soviet Union. In 1939, Hitler knew he would attack Poland that year; further, to attack before the autumn rains began was essential. Also essential was the collusion of the Soviet Union; only with his eastern flank quiet could Hitler turn to the west. As he stated in a 1933 conference of his ministers, “We cannot do without Russia’s cover for our rear with respect to Poland.”⁶² Although the *Lebensraum* he envisioned extended into Soviet territory, he preferred to fight the Russians later rather

⁶¹See Bullock, p. 706.

⁶²Quoted in Kolasky, p. 54.

than sooner. In the summer of 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union began secretly to discuss the terms of a Nazi-Soviet pact.

The content of the Nazi-Soviet pact that was revealed to the world in August 1939 was fairly standard in Germany and the Soviet Union renouncing the use of force against each other, foreswearing any alliance against each other, and agreeing to resolve peacefully any problems that might arise between the two states. A critical section of the agreement – the “Secret Supplementary Protocol” – was, however, not revealed. The second article of this protocol reads:

In the event of a territorial rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state, the sphere of influence of Germany and the USSR shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula and San.

The question of whether the interest of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments. In any event both governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement.

Germany invaded Poland on September 1, one week after the pact was signed. For the two following weeks, the Poles fought a losing battle against the advancing Germans. By the end of the fortnight, the German army was approaching Warsaw. Surprisingly, to the Germans, the Soviets had not yet invaded. Indeed, by now the Germans had crossed over into the part of Poland allocated to the Soviet Union in the secret protocol.

Soviet hesitation in invading Poland can be attributed in part to Stalin’s plan to allow the Axis and Allied powers to take each other out while the Soviet Union waited on the sidelines to collect more than her share of the spoils that states weakened by war

would not be able defend. Nonetheless, Stalin was unpleasantly surprised by the speed of the German advance, and was forced to invade Poland earlier than he had planned.

The Red Army crossed into Poland on September 17. By October 5, the entire country had been overrun. The Polish leadership had fled to Romania, whence they expected to be able to travel to Paris. The Allies had declared war on Germany on September 3, but mobilization was slow, and they had been patently unable to defend Poland. For the Germans and the Russians, all that was left was to decide precisely what to do with what Soviet Premier Molotov called "that monstrous brat of Versailles."

One of the options that was kept alive by the secret protocol was the possibility of maintaining a truncated independent, or semi-independent, Polish state. This new Poland could serve two purposes: first, it could buffer Germany and the Soviet Union from each other; and second, it could assuage the Western powers objecting to the invasion and, further, give them an excuse not to intervene on Poland's behalf. The idea for a Polish buffer state emanated from and was considered most seriously in Germany. Stalin, however, objected to the notion of a rump Poland by arguing that they should "avoid anything which might in the future create friction between Germany and the Soviet Union," and therefore avoid any actions that would "allow an independent state of Poland to exist."⁶³ Hitler acceded to Stalin's wishes, but it might have been better for the Soviet Union if he had not. As Robert Tucker argues, the maintenance of a Polish buffer state would have afforded the Soviets sufficient warning to prepare for the Nazi attack in June 1941.⁶⁴

⁶³ Quoted in Garlinski, p. 26

⁶⁴ Tucker, p. 622.

In order to understand the events of September 1939, it is necessary to think about why Germany and the Soviet Union wanted Polish territory. Without question, the primary reason was that they resented losing territory they had counted as their own for almost 150 years when the Polish state was recreated after World War I, and then expanded, at Russia's expense, in 1921. At the same time, it is not at all clear that the Nazi-Soviet pact could have been concluded, or implemented in the same manner, were it not for the growing rivalry between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Earlier in the interwar period, when the two states enjoyed relatively friendly relations, they independently came up with plans to partition all or part of Poland, but none of these came to fruition. Only when they began to fear each other's gains sufficiently did they act upon a recognized need to partition Poland. German gains, both in terms of an increase in military power and the absorption of surrounding territory, were hard to miss. But Hitler was also nervous of a growing Russia.⁶⁵ There was no question that Hitler wanted to attack Poland, but there was also no question that he dared not risk doing so without Stalin's consent. Neither could afford a two-front war – Germany faced France and Britain to the west, and the Soviet Union was threatened by Japan in the east. Neither, also, could afford for the other to become too strong to defeat. The Soviet Union would have countenanced a full German annexation of Poland no more than Germany would have accepted the reverse outcome. Hitler and Stalin harbored few illusions about each other – they each knew the other would attack eventually. In the meantime, a temporary truce and partition of Poland bought much-needed time and resources. While rivalry was not in this case a sufficient condition for the partition of Poland, it was a

⁶⁵ Tucker, p. 594.

necessary condition. Had the Soviet Union and Germany not been rivals for control over Central and Eastern Europe (and even each other) at the time, their plans for Poland would have lain fallow; although they would have liked to take over Poland in this counterfactual, they would not have needed to do so – without a rival on her other side, Poland would stay where she was. This dynamic played out clearly in the contrast between the interwar period and the late 1930s. During a time of friendship between Germany and the Soviet Union, none of the multiple plans for Poland's death was executed; only when the two states began to see each other as rivals were they able to, once again, seal Poland's fate.

Did the Nazis and Soviets Anticipate High Occupation Costs in Poland?

The hallmark of Polish foreign policy in the interwar period was stubborn independence. Poland's emergence from the partition period as a reconstituted state was considered miraculous by many (Poles and non-Poles alike), and the Polish leadership was determined that this new Poland would survive. At the same time, Poland was surrounded by resentful enemies, in particular Germany and the Soviet Union. Indeed, the first few years of Poland's new existence were filled with a number of minor wars with smaller neighbors and one large war with Russia.

The Soviet-Polish war was principally fought over the Ukraine. As the First World War concluded and the Germans marched west, the new Soviet government sought to reestablish control over the old Tsarist empire. Part of this empire, of course, also comprised part of prepartition Poland. Thus, in April of 1920 Poland marched on

the Ukraine, ostensibly to liberate it from the Russian yoke, but in fact probably to reunite it to the current Polish state. Polish nationalism was thus strong enough to take the Poles to war. That the Poles would fight invasion and occupation was also clear. A continued commitment to preserve their independence was not expected to vanish with the government as it crossed the border to Romania.⁶⁶ But both Germany and Russia had dealt with Polish nationalism before, and they were clearly not afraid of it.

Did Poland Behave According to Realist Principles Prior to 1939?

As soon as it was resurrected, interwar Poland began to build up its military. Having lived under foreign domination for so long, the Poles realized that main strength was needed to preserve the survival of their state. Poland thus immediately followed a neorealist policy of balancing against power, both internally and externally.

⁶⁶ The fleeing government quickly became a Government-in-Exile. Recognized as the official Polish state by the Allied powers, the Government-in-Exile nonetheless played a very ambiguous role in the war. The Polish Government never formally surrendered to either the Germans or the Soviets. The issue of governments-in-exile, and in particular the Polish Government-in-Exile is a perplexing one in the context of this dissertation; technically, the state may not have "died," as control over foreign policy was never formally ceded, and yet the recognized government does not control any territory of the land it is recognized to govern. As Ian Brownlie has noted, the legal status of governments-in-exile is ambiguous, although slightly less so when they have been deprived of their territory through the illegal use of force. On some level, however, the phrase "government-in-exile" implies an understanding that the so-called government no longer controls its state's foreign policy. Although it has not formally given up this capability, the phrase "government-in-exile" formally indicates an understanding, by the government and its allies, that it has been lost.

Nonetheless, given sufficient support, there are actions a government-in-exile can take to restore itself to its territory, and the Polish Government-in-Exile was certainly thorough in this respect. In addition to directing the Polish underground (although, in fact, most autonomy was delegated to operatives in Poland itself), the major accomplishment of the Government-in-Exile was the raising of a new Polish military. Some soldiers who had escaped to Hungary and France were reformed into units, the tiny Polish navy had snuck away from the Germans just before the start of hostilities, and Polish nationalists from around the world were also recruited to the cause of restoring Poland. Importantly, all of these units were incorporated into and commanded by either the French or the British military. While thousands of Poles fought for Poland from outside Poland there was not, technically, a Polish army. Brownlie, p. 65.

The first test of this policy was the Soviet-Polish war. Given its young age, the military effectiveness of Poland against its admittedly weakened (both internally and externally) eastern neighbor was astonishing. Within a few weeks, the Polish army captured Kiev. But soon after, the Soviets retaliated and were quickly just outside Warsaw. Roundly defeating the Russian army in the Battle of Warsaw, the Poles continued to drive the Soviets so far eastward that the Russians sued for peace.

In developing enough strength to defeat the Soviets, the Poles had clearly pursued a policy of internal balancing. But winning the war did not cow Poland's enemies – instead, it angered them further. These initial consequences of pursuing a neorealist policy were therefore ambivalent for Poland's chances of survival.

Poland's fierce commitment to independence led to the rejection of a number of offers of alliance from both Germany and the Soviet Union, on the grounds that the terms of the alliance would essentially subjugate Poland to one or the other power. Poland, however, did recognize the need for establishing alliances. In addition to her historically close relationship with France, Poland was a member of the League of Nations and, further, attempted several times to create regional alliance blocs first with Scandinavian and then with Baltic states. None of these attempts was successful.

Although Poland attempted to behave like a realist in the interwar period, the prescriptions of realism were not always entirely clear. Certainly, Poland sought to build up its internal strength and, in fact, was relatively successful in this venture, as evidenced by the result of the Russo-Polish war. By 1939, Poland's army (including the reserve) consisted of two million soldiers.⁶⁷ External balancing was more problematic. Reliable

⁶⁷ Garlinski, p. xviii.

allies were hard to find. Poland was despised by its two most powerful neighbors, and despised them in turn for over a century of partition. Poland also felt betrayed by the lack of support from Britain and particularly France during the war with Russia as well as during Germany's attempts to rejoin the club of nations. Attempts were made to ally with a number of the smaller surrounding states,⁶⁸ but these attempts were not successful. Alliance in general was simply a particularly difficult prospect for Poland at this time; the Poles felt betrayed by most of the great powers, and also knew that none of the powers had strong incentives to preserve an independent Poland. The international climate faced by Poland at the time was so murky that it is difficult even to distinguish which alliances would have constituted balances, and which bandwagons. Certainly, alliances with the smaller powers would have been attempts to balance against Germany and Russia. But would an alliance with Germany *or* Russia (or perhaps even France) have meant bandwagoning with a powerful neighbor, or would it have meant balancing against another, equally powerful, neighbor? When it became clear that the German star was once again on the rise, Poland pursued both and neither strategy. She signed treaties with the rising and declining regional hegemon, but neither of these treaties was a full-out alliance.

After annexing Austria and then Czechoslovakia in 1938, Germany initially turned to Poland as a potential ally.⁶⁹ Poland had participated in the partition of Czechoslovakia, and the Polish desire for more territory in the Ukraine was well-known. Thus, Germany suggested that Poland cede Danzig and a route across the "Polish Corridor," which separated East Prussia from the rest of Germany, while taking a hefty

⁶⁸ Although, as Jozef Garlinsky notes, Poland never made the obvious attempt to ally with Czechoslovakia, a partnership that could have proved very mutually beneficial. Garlinski, p. 2.

chunk of the Ukraine in exchange. The Nazis also wanted Poland to join the Anti-Comintern pact, which many neighbors had already signed. Consistent with its short history of an uncompromisingly independent foreign policy, Poland refused the agreement on the grounds that it would amount to subjugation to a Germany whose motives could not be trusted.⁷⁰

The Poles were, of course, absolutely right in not placing their trust in Germany. Immediately after Poland declined to ally with Germany, negotiations for the Nazi-Soviet Pact began. Hitler planned to invade Poland as soon as the pact was signed on August 23, 1939. But then, an announcement from Britain apparently caused him to rethink his plans. Britain and Poland had concluded an alliance obligating them to defend each other against any third-party [read: German] aggression. The alliance, meant to deter Hitler from striking east, only led to more stalling tactics.⁷¹ Hitler temporarily suspended operations for the attack on Poland, and began talking with the British and the Poles. His strategy in these negotiations was to ask for demands so great that no Polish government would accede to them, thus giving Germany a plausible excuse to invade.⁷² When the Poles proved more accommodating than he had expected (which meant, in fact, that they were being less accommodating in terms of Hitler's sinister strategy), he turned to blunter instruments, instructing his minister to withhold Germany's demands of Poland until after the last possible moment when there would still be time for negotiations.⁷³ Within days, Germany invaded Poland; within weeks, the new partition of Poland was complete.

⁶⁹ For a brief description of the negotiations, see Weinberg, pp. 32-33.

⁷⁰ See Bullock, p. 663.

⁷¹ Weinberg, pp. 41-43.

⁷² Bullock, p. 694.

⁷³ Read and Fisher, Chapter 28. Also see Weinberg, p. 43.

What, if anything, could Poland have done to forestall this fate? Strong enough to defeat a weakened Russia in 1921, Poland in 1939 did not possess anything near the strength of Germany and the Soviet Union combined. In addition to its military woes, Poland faced a dilemma in terms of the timing and location of mobilization; it was not at all clear whether the Poles should defend their borders or their major industrial centers, or whether they should mobilize early and damage the economy or mobilize later, risking a quick defeat.⁷⁴ Nonaggression pacts had been concluded with both Russia and Germany; an eleventh-hour alliance was formed with Britain and France. Neither set of allies was immediately dependable – Germany and the Soviet Union violated their agreement to annex Poland, while Britain and France could not mobilize in time to save her. In neorealist terms, Poland behaved as rationally as was possible, attempting to balance against Russia and then Germany from its rebirth in 1919 to its repartition in 1939. But a realist foreign policy could not save Poland from its own geography.

Why was Poland Resurrected in 1945?

At least two explanations predict the resurrection of the Polish state after World War II. First, given the strength of Polish nationalism prior to the war, occupation costs theorists would expect this sentiment to continue during the Nazi and Soviet occupation. Even if potential occupation costs were not sufficient to deter invasion, this argument predicts that such costs would make conquest brief because of the expenses Polish nationalists would inflict upon their occupiers. In direct reply to this claim, Peter

⁷⁴ Weinberg, pp. 48-49.

Liberman argues that withdrawal is not the only – or even the most efficient – response to nationalist rebellion in occupied societies. Occupying powers, particularly when they occupy an industrialized area, can effectively marshal modern technology to ruthlessly repress their rebellious subjects. The case of Poland in World War II is consistent with Liberman's analysis. Polish resistance to German and Soviet occupation was constant, but German and Soviet response to resistance was unprecedented in its ruthlessness. Inflicting costs on their occupiers therefore produced an unexpected backlash for the Poles.

A second explanation for Poland's resurrection in 1945 is that the great powers fighting the Axis viewed the 1939 annexation of Poland as a violation of international principles that had to be rectified. Indeed, the immediate cause for British and French entrance into the war was the German invasion of Poland. Throughout the war, the Allies never doubted that they would resurrect the Polish state if they defeated Germany. Further, unlike the post-World War I resurrection of Poland, not all of Poland's occupiers were on the losing side of World War II. Albeit as a rhetorical veil over an intended policy of domination, the Soviets also appealed to international norms of territorial sovereignty to bring Poland back from the dead.

The Role of Nationalism

Despite the ostensibly different natures of their regimes, the respective Nazi and Soviet occupations of Poland were similarly brutally repressive and inhumane.⁷⁵ Germany annexed most of its newly acquired territory to the Reich, but formed a

⁷⁵ See Bullock, pp. 702-728.

supposedly autonomous region called the “*General Gouvernement*” of what had formerly been a chunk of southwest Poland. It was in this region that the most horrifying elements of Hitler’s plans for world domination were carried out. Poles were deported from the newly annexed territory to the *General Gouvernement*. The luckiest ones essentially became slave laborers. The unlucky ones – the intelligentsia, the disabled, the politically active, and, of course, the Jews from Poland and beyond – were victims of systematic mass murder in the concentration camps built in the *General Gouvernement*. These policies were implemented in the full knowledge of, and some times in response to, Polish resistance. The city of Warsaw, capital of Poland, exemplified this resistance at key moments. Warsaw fought against the advancing Germans; the Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto fought their Nazi persecutors; the remaining Poles in 1944 rose against their German occupiers. In each case, Warsaw was ruthlessly suppressed; in 1944, Hitler ordered the city razed.

The Russians were hardly more humane. Poles were deported to Siberia, many if not most of them dying on the way. Soldiers were imprisoned and often executed in concentration camps. One of the most brutal acts of the Soviet occupation of Poland was the execution of five to fifteen thousand captured Polish officers in Katyn Forest, near the Russian-Belorussian border. All elements of Polish nationalism were to be wiped out in Soviet Poland. Indeed, the Belorussian and Ukrainian territories annexed by Russia were quickly cleansed of Poles and “elected” to join the USSR.

Despite the surrounding horrors, the Poles managed to sustain an organized resistance throughout the war. Under the direction of the government-in-exile in London, railroads were sabotaged, raids were conducted, and information as well as people were

smuggled out of Poland. The repression by both conquerors, though, was brutally effective as well as brutal. The underground army was simply not capable of doing much in terms of resistance. And Germany and the Soviet Union continued to conspire over Poland, this time to prevent or at least limit the negative effects of resistance. Jozef Garlinsky reports that, in March 1940 German and Soviet officials secretly conferred and shared their experiences and strategies for dealing with Polish resistance.⁷⁶

When, as part of the price for Soviet-Allied cooperation, the Allies agreed to the installation of a Communist government in post-war Poland, the Poles were outraged. While the great powers had consented to Soviet indirect control of Poland, the Poles had not. Recognizing that they were being transferred from one vise to another, the Polish Underground planned "Operation Tempest," an uprising in the Warsaw countryside that would drive out the Germans and allow the Poles to regain control of at least part of the country before the approaching Russians arrived. But when the order came to begin the operation, the underground was instructed to act in the city itself, not the countryside, where most of the preparations had been made and weapons stored. The Polish position, never very strong, was now untenable without assistance. Potential assistance was nearby; the Red Army was camped on the banks of the River Vistula, within 100 yards of Warsaw, and could certainly have come to their aid.⁷⁷ But the Soviets stopped to let the Germans wipe out the Poles before they themselves attacked the Germans.

Constant resistance on the part of the Poles was met with ruthless repression by the Germans and Soviets. Contrary to Polish expectations, rebellion only made their occupiers think about how best to crush the Poles, not how best to retreat from Poland.

⁷⁶ Garlinski, p. 38.

⁷⁷ Syrop, p. 6.

Were it not for the victory of Allies committed to the principle of territorial sovereignty, it is likely that Poland would have reverted to its state of partition on a permanent basis.

The role of the territorial sovereignty norm

That Poland would be resurrected if the Allies won the war was never in question. That the Allies would win the war was less questionable after, in June 1941's Operation Barbarossa, Germany marched across Russian Poland and invaded the Soviet Union. Recognizing the Government-in-Exile was the first indication that the USSR would accede to a new Poland. Even when, as a result of the Government-in-Exile's demand for an explanation for the Katyn massacre (for which the Soviet Union did not acknowledge responsibility until 1989), the Soviet Union broke relations, Stalin took steps to create a Polish army on Soviet soil. Polish soldiers were released from concentration camps to join the Red Army. The few Polish communists remaining on Soviet soil were groomed to head a new government.

The question, then, was not whether there would be a new Poland, but what would it look like? And, more specifically, how independent would it be? The principles of the Atlantic Charter clearly endorsed Wilsonian ideals of self-determination and territorial integrity, but Churchill and Roosevelt were more pragmatic than idealistic. It was clear that, in the liberation of Europe, the Soviets would get to Poland first. What, then, could the other Allies do to prevent the establishment of Soviet indirect rule over Poland? Given that they could do very little and, further, that the Soviet role was crucial to the war effort, it was agreed at the Tehran conference (and confirmed at Yalta) that

Poland would fall within the Soviet sphere of influence.⁷⁸ International norms required the resurrection of a Polish state, but the demands of war highly constrained the future independence – although not the existence – of that state.

The Soviet refusal to assist the catastrophic Warsaw Uprising caused tension between Stalin and his Western allies. But, as with the issue of Poland's future, pragmatism won out over idealism. The alliance could not be jeopardized for the sake of Poland, as long as Poland was to continue existing in some ostensibly independent form. The Red Army marched through all of 1939 Poland, and pushed her west. The territories annexed by the Soviet Union were retained, but Poland was compensated at Germany's expense. This new Poland had shrunk in terms of territory, population, diversity, and liberty. Although land was taken from Germany to recreate Poland, Poland in 1945 was still smaller than Poland in 1939. And finally, Poland was drastically altered politically; home to an imposed Communist government, and severely constrained in foreign and domestic policy.

The story of Poland in World War II is undeniably tragic. But perhaps the most tragic aspect of the story was that there was little or nothing Poland could do to evade her fate. Once again, contrary to the expectations of occupation costs theorists, the specter of nationalism did not at all frighten Poland's would-be conquerors. In the face of stubborn independence and even war in the 1920s, a well-organized underground during the war, and a massive (and massively hopeless) uprising as the threat of being transferred from one prison to another approached the Poles from the east and west, both the Germans and

⁷⁸ For a discussion of Western views on the future of Poland, see Weinberg, pp. 732-34.

the Russians simply planned for further repression that would eradicate and/or silence the Poles. Nationalism did not prevent conquest; nor did it lead to resurrection. Instead, the resurrection of Poland was governed by the international principles laid out by the victorious powers, particularly the United States and Great Britain. But while these principles meant that Poland would be reborn, commitment to the principles was sufficiently shallow to allow the Soviet Union to serve as midwife. It was clear that Poland must reappear on the map of Europe, but although the Western allies might have preferred liberal democracy in addition to formal territorial sovereignty, they were willing to accept one without the other. Thus, Poland was one of the first states to exemplify one of the great paradoxes of international relations in the post-war era: that a state could retain its formal ability to conduct its foreign relations, but in fact be penetrated in all aspects of its sovereignty by a country that, in another time, would have – and in fact had – taken it over completely.

October Spring, 1956

As in the late 18th century, Russia sought sole indirect control over Poland after the Second World War. Although a small native group of Communists had survived the Soviet purges of the late 1930s, Stalin quickly attempted to replace these potentially independent-minded and nationalistic Communists with his own henchmen. By 1948, opposition parties had been eliminated or co-opted. As Davies notes, the transition from the interwar Second Republic to the post-war People's Republic was hardly a challenge

for Stalin. "In 1944-48 there was no one left," he notes, "apart from Mikolajczyk and a few scattered and leaderless remnants of the AK – who might have opposed the communists."⁷⁹ Strict communist control over Poland was reinforced in 1949, with the expulsion of Polish Nationalists like Wladyslaw Gomulka from the Party, and the induction of Konstanty Rokossovski, a Soviet citizen of Polish descent, as head of the Polish armed forces. Rokossovski's membership in the Politburo was particularly odious to most Poles; as a Soviet officer in the final days of World War II, he had commanded the troops that failed to give assistance to the Warsaw rising.

The Polish People's Republic seemed well under the Soviet thumb. But if the past was any guide, resistance, and then repression, would soon occur. Indeed, in 1956, riots in Poznan, an internal shake-up in the Polish Politburo, and a newly-chartered independent course all threatened the Soviet Union's indirect control over Poland. In this section, I examine the Polish so-called "Spring in October." Interestingly, this case does not fit the pattern of the 18th century partitions or the World War II annexation of Poland. In response to Polish moves toward greater independence, the Soviet Union not only did not take over Poland, it also chose not to intervene militarily. This outcome is particularly puzzling in light of events in Hungary occurring at about the same time. Like the Poles, the Hungarians sought greater independence from Soviet control. In many respects, the two rebellions look very much alike. Why, then, intervene in one country but not the other?

To answer this question, I first undertake to explain why the Soviets considered invading Poland at all. A series of events in the early 1950s, from Stalin's death to the

⁷⁹ Davies, vol. II, pp. 575-76. Mikolajczyk was the head of the Government-in-Exile; "AK" is the Polish abbreviation for the underground, or Home, army.

defection of a high-ranking Polish officer, led to a political opening in Poland. This opening was followed by demands from workers for a higher standard of living. Knowing that its grasp on power was increasingly tenuous, the Politburo sought to remake itself by releasing and then appointing Wladyslaw Gomulka as First Secretary. As Gomulka rose to power, Soviet concerns over events unfolding in Poland also grew. Khrushchev himself flew to Poland to engage in a tense confrontation with the Polish Premier-designate. Although many of the details of these events have not yet been revealed, recent scholarship offers a fairly complete picture.

The question of why Budapest and not Warsaw, however, remains. In my discussion of this puzzle, I argue that the Soviet decision to invade Hungary but not Poland speaks directly to the corollary hypothesis of the buffer states argument advanced here. Fears of losing Hungary to the West were much stronger than fears of losing Poland. Both were buffer states, but the threat to Soviet indirect control was more acute in Budapest than in Warsaw. While Poland sought greater freedom domestically, including the recall of Soviet "advisors" and officers, Hungary's Imre Nagy declared Hungary's neutrality and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Hungary, not Poland, was at risk of being co-opted by a rival. In other words, the dynamics of the security dilemma surrounding buffer states were much more acute in the Hungarian versus the Polish case. Khrushchev could concede Gomulka's demands without worrying about keeping Poland in the Soviet bloc; the same was not true for Hungary.

My argument contradicts the conventional wisdom regarding this issue – that Khrushchev chose to intervene in Hungary rather than Poland because he anticipated higher occupation costs in Poland. If supported, this explanation would offer

considerable ammunition to the occupation costs argument. I will argue, however, that this interpretation is incorrect. The key difference between Hungary and Poland was not anticipated occupation costs, but the nature of the demands for independence.

If the dynamics of the buffer state argument explain why the USSR executed a military intervention in Hungary but not Poland, what role (if any) did the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty play in 1956? In the concluding part of this section, I will argue that the territorial sovereignty norm played a limited, though positive, role in both preventing an invasion of Poland and permitting an invasion of Hungary.

Why Did the Soviets Consider Invading Poland in 1956?

With Joseph Stalin's death on March 5, 1953 came confusion and, for many in the Soviet bloc, the hope of an era of increased freedom. Signs of such freedom quickly emerged in Poland. Lieutenant-Colonel Jozef Swiatlo of the Polish Security Police defected to West Germany in December 1953 and, within a year, began broadcasting to Poland on Radio Free Europe.⁸⁰ Swiatlo's broadcasts condemned the ruling leadership of Poland and painted the most accurate picture to date of the repressiveness of the regime, as well as its level of dependence on the Soviet Union. Konrad Syrop notes that the only Communist Swiatlo praised was the then-imprisoned Wladyslaw Gomulka; ironically, Swiatlo himself had arrested Gomulka three years earlier.⁸¹

⁸⁰ Syrop, pp. 20-21.

⁸¹ Syrop, p. 22.

By December 1954, Gomulka had been quietly released from his imprisonment. Then, in 1955, the next bombshell struck. Poet Adam Wazyk published the "Poem for Adults" in the August 21 issue of *Nowa Kultura*, the official journal of Polish writers. Wazyk's work constituted an explicit criticism of the hypocrisy and injustice underlying the Communist regime.⁸² Despite negative reaction from the authorities, that the censors had permitted Wazyk's poem to be published at all seemed to herald a time of greater artistic, intellectual, and perhaps political freedom.

Events in the Soviet Union reinforced this sentiment. In February of 1956, the Polish interwar Communist party was rehabilitated. One week later, in his famous "secret speech," Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin, revealing many of his more ruthless policies and accusing him of creating a "cult of personality." According to Tony Kemp-Welch, Khrushchev's speech led to a storm of questions in Poland about how to view the Polish and Russian roles in World War II, the trustworthiness of the Politburo (whose members, by virtue of having supported Stalin in the past, had just committed an about-face by applauding Khrushchev's speech), Poland's territorial boundaries, and most importantly, Poland's future.⁸³ The Polish government's ability to respond to these questions was hindered by the mysterious death of their First Secretary, Boleslaw Bierut, in Moscow approximately two weeks after Khrushchev's speech. Edward Ochab was quickly selected to replace Bierut and, by June, had announced the release and rehabilitation of thousands of prisoners.

Less than a month later, in late June 1956, the workers of the Zispo Locomotive Factory in Poznan began to express loudly their dissatisfaction with Poland's current

⁸² Adam Wazyk, "Poem for Adults." Reprinted in Zinner, pp. 40-48. Original translation by Lucjan Blit.

⁸³ Kemp-Welch.

economic situation. Faced with price inflation and wage depreciation, and rebuffed by the Warsaw authorities, the workers began a labor action on June 28. Before long, the Zispo workers were joined by others from all over Poznan. Quickly, what had started as a peaceful demonstration turned into a violent riot. The local Party offices, prison, and radio jamming station were attacked. The workers carried signs reading 'BREAD and FREEDOM' and 'RUSSIANS GO HOME.'⁸⁴ Fighting between the workers and militias continued for two days; 'Black Thursday' finally ended on the night of Friday, June 29.

Both the Soviet and, for obvious reasons, the Polish leadership were very much concerned by the Poznan riots. Although force was used to suppress the demonstration, the government's official response acknowledged the legitimacy of the workers' grievances and the need to pursue a new economic policy in Poland. As the Poles sought for new leadership to meet these challenges, the Soviets looked over their shoulders, concerned that Poland remain within the Communist fold.

On October 19, the Eighth Plenary Meeting of the Polish Central Committee commenced. First Secretary Ochab made two announcements. The first was that Gomulka and two of his supporters, formerly imprisoned, were to be inducted into the Central Committee. The second announcement was that Khrushchev, accompanied by a high-ranking Soviet delegation, was scheduled to arrive in Warsaw that very day.

Khrushchev's visit and Gomulka's rehabilitation were not independent. The Soviet Premier was very much concerned by events occurring in Poland, particularly by information that the Central Committee members closest to the Soviet Union – like Marshal Rokossovski – were to be booted out and replaced by Polish nationalists like

⁸⁴ Davies, vol. II, 584.

Gomulka. Indeed, Gomulka demanded Rokossovski's removal as a condition of his assuming the position of First Secretary. Gomulka also demanded that Soviet advisors and officers be recalled from the Polish armed forces.⁸⁵ Partly in response to these demands and partly in response to an apparent rise in anti-Soviet sentiment in Poland,⁸⁶ Khrushchev decided to take action by scheduling an unprecedented trip to Warsaw.

Although the precise details of the meeting between Khrushchev and his delegation and the Polish Party members remain unclear, documents have recently come to light that reveal many of the key moments. Khrushchev's own memoirs reveal the nature of his concern regarding events in Poland:

It looked to us as though developments in Poland were rushing forward on the crest of a giant anti-Soviet wave. Meetings were being held all over the country, and we were afraid Poland might break away from us at any moment.

In Warsaw, an important meeting of the [Polish] Central Committee was under way. We had no time to lose. We expressed our urgent desire to meet with the Polish leadership, to hear their side of the story, and to let them know how we viewed the situation...

The situation was such that we had to be ready to resort to arms if the threat of an armed struggle in Poland became real and if we were in imminent danger of being cut off from our army.⁸⁷

That the Soviets were very close to an armed invasion is also supported by the notes of the meeting taken by a member of the Polish Central Committee:

Khrushchev's first words were as follows: "We have decided to intervene brutally in your affairs and we will not allow you to realize your plans." We immediately thought that if someone puts a revolver on the table we will not talk...The subsequent talks were somewhat calmer. Comrade Mikoyan reported the perspective of the Soviet delegation. He said that the Soviet Union has certain military forces on GDR territory and is concerned that changes by us after the VIII Plenum might lead to a

⁸⁵ Gluchowski.

⁸⁶ For a description of Polish anti-Soviet sentiment at this time, see Machcewicz.

⁸⁷ Khrushchev and Talbott, pp. 199,200. The army Khrushchev refers to in the last sentence is the Soviet army in East Germany.

difficult situation, with a loss of communications to these military forces, especially if Poland wants to break away from the bloc uniting our states.⁸⁸

Indeed, a Soviet invasion appeared imminent. Soviet battleships had taken up position in the Bay of Gdansk and, as further noted by the Central Committee:

At this time, we received reports that the Soviet army stationed in Poland began to march on Warsaw. As to our question about what this means, the Soviet comrades explained that it was part of some military exercise planned a long time ago. We explained to the Soviet comrades that, notwithstanding the facts, in the eyes of Polish society this military exercise will be understood as an attempt to put pressure on the Government and Party. We demanded the return of the Soviet armored units to their bases. The Soviet comrades told Marshal Rokossowski, who was taking part in the discussions, to transmit to Marshal Konev the wishes of the PUWP [Polish United Workers' Party] Politburo, to halt the military exercises, which of course did not happen. Smaller units of the Polish armed forces were also moved in the direction of Warsaw, on the orders of Marshal Rokossowski, who, when asked, admitted: "I wanted to secure selected positions in Warsaw." Of course, Rokossowski did not inform the PUWP Politburo about his orders, merely confirming, after we asked about it, that he had given the orders.

The talks with the Soviet delegation went on for the whole day. The atmosphere was very unpleasant, inhospitable. Our side was calm but determined. Near the end of the talks, now calmly, comrade Khrushchev explained: "It doesn't matter what you want, our view is such that we will have to restart the intervention." We again assured the Soviet comrades that their fears concerning Poland's departure from the bloc of socialist states was groundless.⁸⁹

Despite the threatening actions of the Soviets, Gomulka appears to have been able to call their bluff, convince them of his intentions to keep Poland within the Soviet bloc, or both.

Central Committee member Aleksander Zawadzki's notes of the meeting support the first interpretation:

⁸⁸ Notes from the completed discussions of 11 and 12 January 1957 between the delegates of the Chinese People's Republic and Poland. Included as "Document 4" in Gluchowski, p. 8. trans. by L.W. Gluchowski.

⁸⁹ Notes from the completed discussions of 11 and 12 January 1957 between the delegates of the Chinese People's Republic and Poland. Included as "Document 4" in Gluchowski, p. 8. trans. by L.W. Gluchowski.

At this point, 9:00 [p.m.], Comrade Gomulka vehemently protests against the movement of Soviet and Polish tanks – [which brings about] sharp clashes with the Soviet comrades. Comrade Khrushchev – that in Germany [there is] a huge Soviet army...Comrade Mikoyan – go ahead, do it, but you will assume a great responsibility in front of the Party, the nation and the brother countries! (directed at Gomulka). Again, about the list of new Politburo [members]...[and its] distribution in Warsaw.

9) Comrade Khrushchev. 1) regarding the [Soviet] advisers – that rather reluctantly they will give it to us [Soviets will concede]. That he [Khrushchev] feels pained by the position of Comrade Gomulka on the issue of the advisers. That the Soviet Union saw it as its duty [to send advisers to Poland]. He [Khrushchev] admits that they [Soviets] travelled here with the purpose of telling us their views, interpretations, and to influence us...But we [the Poles] will not entertain anything. Very determined concerning the issue of Comrade Rokossowski. [Soviets concerned] That this is how Gomulka has come [to join] the leadership of the [Polish] Party, with such a position.⁹⁰

Why did Khrushchev give in? Mark Kramer has found evidence that, as Soviet troops moved toward Warsaw, Polish units loyal to the new regime made threatening counter-moves. Engaged in a prolonged game of chicken, Khrushchev and Gomulka returned to the negotiating table. Stalemate, however, continued, and Khrushchev and his cohort returned to Moscow on October 20 without having gotten what they came to Warsaw for.

Voting for the new Polish Politburo took place on October 21. The hated Rokossowski and his fellow pro-Soviet comrades were not elected; Gomulka became First Secretary, replacing Ochab. Syrop reports the comments of a radio broadcaster just prior to the voting: “This is spring in October – the spring of awakened hopes and of awakened national pride, the spring of true international proletarianism and of determined

⁹⁰ Aleksander Zawadzki's Notes, translated by Gluchowski. Included as “Document 3” in Gluchowski, p. 7. NB: Ellipses and bracketed/parenthetical notes are from the original translation. trans. by L.W. Gluchowski.

will to mark out our own Polish way to socialism.”⁹¹ By the next day, Khrushchev had conveyed assurances that the Soviet advisors would be recalled from Poland.⁹²

Why Did the Soviet Union Invade Hungary but not Poland?

The events of Poland’s October Spring were watched closely by neighbors in Hungary. Indeed, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 began with demonstrations meant to convey solidarity with Polish reformers. As in Poznan in June, however, demonstrations quickly turned to riots. Similarly to Gomulka, Hungary’s Imre Nagy demanded the removal of Soviet troops from Hungary. The two revolutions appeared to be following parallel courses. But when, approximately one week after the Hungarian revolution had started, a full-scale Soviet invasion commenced, it was clear that the revolutions would in fact meet very different fates.

What accounts for Soviet invasion in Hungary and Soviet restraint in Poland? I will briefly examine a number of explanations for this puzzle, ranging from Soviet fears of a domino effect in the Soviet bloc to an expectation that occupation costs would be higher in Hungary than in Poland to variations in Gomulka’s and Nagy’s demands of the USSR. I argue that the key difference was Gomulka’s relative restraint in charting out an independent course in foreign policy; by keeping Poland in the Warsaw Pact and clearly allied with the Soviet Union, Gomulka could assure Khrushchev that Poland would not defect to the west. Nagy, on the other hand, both sought Hungary’s withdrawal from the

⁹¹ Syrop, 136.

⁹² See Letter from Khrushchev to Gomulka, Document 5 in Gluchowski, p. 10. trans. by L.W. Gluchowski.

Pact and declared Hungary's neutrality; the possibility that Hungary would be 'lost' to the Soviet Union's main rival could not be countenanced.

One argument that has been suggested to explain the variation in Soviet behavior toward Hungary and Poland in 1956 refers to the negative demonstration effects of revolution. Kramer notes that the Soviets were receiving reports from Czechoslovakia and Romania that the revolution was spilling over Hungary's borders.⁹³ Such a spillover would certainly threaten the stability and cohesion of the Warsaw Pact. While spillover concerns may have been genuine, what is not clear is why the Soviets would have selected Hungary, rather than Poland, as their target. After all, the Polish revolution had itself spilled over into Hungary, thus serving as the original cause of the spillover. Ruthless suppression of the Poles would therefore have been expected to suppress all the revolutionaries taking action in their image, while an invasion of Hungary would leave the Polish reformists to continue to implement their new agenda.

Jakub Zielinski advances an interpretation of this puzzle that relies heavily upon the role of signaling by the Soviet military to the Polish and Hungarian leaders, respectively. It was made clear to the Poles, argues Zielinski, that too much independence would not be tolerated; the Hungarians, on the other hand, received the opposite signal – that reform was acceptable. The relevant signal to the Poles, according to Zielinski, was Khrushchev's threatening visit to Warsaw on October 19. Nagy, by contrast, received assurances that he could reform in peace. "[Nagy] explicitly asked whether a concession with regard to multiparty democracy and Soviet military withdrawal would be acceptable to Moscow. The Soviets answered in the affirmative.

⁹³ Kramer, 192-193.

Their only condition was that Hungary did not become an anti-Soviet state and that people associated with the prewar regime be barred from power.”⁹⁴ The problem with this analysis is that Khrushchev conceded to Gomulka much more than Zielinski admits. As noted above, Khrushchev agreed to the withdrawal of Soviet advisors and troops from Poland; no such concession was forthcoming with respect to the Hungarian case. By contrast, the import of Hungary remaining in the Warsaw Pact was clearly stated to Nagy. Thus, if anything, the Poles received the “green light” for reform, while Nagy was given an explicitly limited set of conditions under which Hungarian reform could take place.

In contrast to the above explanations, I argue that the puzzle of the Soviet invasion of Hungary but not Poland can be solved by analyzing the respective roles of Poland and Hungary as buffer states in the Cold War between the Soviet Union and United States. An important element of the general argument of this dissertation is that buffer states are more likely to die than non-buffer states because the surrounding rivals are engaged in a security dilemma over control of buffer states. This general argument does not, however, explain why some buffer states die but not others; nor does it explain the timing of buffer state death. As suggested in Chapter 2 and discussed above, though, the ability of a rival to maintain indirect control over its buffer may shed some light on these subsidiary questions. Prior to the partition period, for example, Russia was content to maintain indirect control over Poland. The emergence of rivals in Austria and Prussia made the maintenance of indirect control both more important and less likely. As Poland threatened to break away from Russia’s influence, Catherine the Great became willing to trade indirect control over all of Poland for direct control of a small part, and the

⁹⁴ Zielinski, p. 222.

resumption of indirect control over a Polish rump state. Thus, among buffer states, we might expect that those behaving in ways that threaten the indirect control of rivals over them would be more likely to die, and to die sooner.

The relevant feature of successful indirect control is the alignment of foreign policy. As 18th century Poland began to attempt military reform and the establishment of new alliances, her demise became increasingly likely. A similar logic applies in the 1956 cases of Poland and Hungary. Hungary, not Poland, threatened to secede from the Soviet bloc. Although Gomulka fought for the removal of Soviet advisors and officers from the Polish military, he explicitly and frequently endorsed the alliance with the Soviet Union, to the extent that he associated the survival of Poland with the maintenance of the alliance. Nagy, by contrast, explicitly stated a desire to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact and declare neutrality. In Kramer's words:

It seems likely that Nagy's expressed desire to renounce Hungarian membership in the Warsaw Pact was one of the factors that induced the CPSU Presidium on 31 October to reverse its decision of the previous day. To be sure, Nagy had spoken many times in earlier years about the desirability of Hungarian neutrality, but his decision to raise the issue with Mikoyan and Suslov at this delicate stage must have come as a jolt in Moscow. Once Soviet leaders were confronted by the stark prospect of Hungary's departure from the Warsaw Pact, they realized how much their influence in Hungary had waned."⁹⁵

It was not the desire to prevent spillover or poor signaling on the part of the Soviets, but the fear of losing Hungary to the other side – a fear not present with respect to Poland – that sent Soviet tanks to Budapest rather than Warsaw.

⁹⁵ Kramer, pp. 189-90.

*Did Anticipated Occupation Costs Lead the Soviets to Intervene in Hungary but not
Poland?*

The conventional wisdom regarding the varying outcomes in Budapest and Warsaw in 1956 is that Khrushchev chose to intervene in Hungary rather than Poland because he anticipated higher occupation costs in Poland. If supported, this explanation would offer considerable ammunition to the occupation costs argument. I will argue, however, that this interpretation is incorrect. Although the Soviets did anticipate resistance in Poland, anticipated occupation costs cannot account for a variation in outcome because the occupation costs anticipated by the Soviets in Budapest and Warsaw were virtually the same.

Khrushchev hesitated in ordering an invasion of Poland in part because it appeared that the Polish military were not entirely loyal to Rokossovski and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it was expected that the Poles would violently resist any such interference. Kramer suggests that Khrushchev anticipated high occupation costs in Poland and, for this reason, decided not to intervene:

[Quoting Khrushchev on October 20/21:] 'Finding a reason for an armed conflict [with Poland] now would be very easy, but finding a way to put an end to such a conflict later on would be very hard.' The stand-off on 19 October had demonstrated to the Soviet leadership that most of the Polish troops who were not under Rokossovski's command, especially in the KBW [Polish Internal Security Forces] were ready to put up stiff resistance to outside intervention. Khrushchev and his colleagues also seem to have feared that Polish leaders would begin handing out firearms to 'workers' militia' units who could help defend the capital...
...Khrushchev's reluctance to pursue a military solution in such unfavourable circumstances induced him to seek a *modus vivendi* with Gomulka whereby Poland would have greater leeway to follow its own

'road to socialism.' Gomulka reciprocated by again assuring Khrushchev that Poland would remain a loyal ally and member of the Warsaw Pact.⁹⁶

Khrushchev had good reason to worry about both the loyalty of the Polish military and the reaction of the Polish people. Apparently, many Polish troops resisted the suppression of the Poznan riots in June, and continuing demonstrations clearly exhibited the mood of Polish civilians.⁹⁷ If the loyalty of the Hungarian military and populace was (relatively) assured, then this explanation would be a convincing one for the Soviet decision.

To assess the loyalty of the Hungarian military and population, I look first to the initial demonstrations in Budapest on October 23, during which Hungarian First Secretary Erno Gero requested Soviet military aid to quell the insurgents. Although they initially were uncertain as to their response, the Soviets ultimately acceded to Gero's request. According to Grzegorz Ekiert, the Soviets believed that the mere demonstration of force would quell insurrection.⁹⁸ Kramer describes the nature of the Soviet forces deployed:

By the early morning hours of 24 October, thousands of soldiers from the USSR's two mechanized divisions in Hungary had entered Budapest, where they established a command centre at the main building of the Hungarian National Defence ministry. They were soon joined by thousands more Soviet troops from a mechanized division based in Romania and two divisions from the Transcarpathian Military District in Ukraine. The combined interventionary forces were placed under the command of General Malinin, who maintained constant liaison with an 'emergency operational group' of some 80 high-ranking officers from the Soviet General Staff and the main staffs of the Soviet ground and air forces. All told, some 31,500 Soviet troops, 1130 tanks and self-propelled artillery, 380 armoured personnel carriers, 185 air defence guns, and numerous other weapons were redeployed at short notice to Budapest and

⁹⁶ Kramer, pp. 172-3.

⁹⁷ Kramer, p. 168.

⁹⁸ Ekiert, p. 63.

other major cities as well as along the Austrian-Hungarian border. Two Soviet fighter divisions, totalling 159 planes, were ordered to perform close air-support missions for the ground forces; and two Soviet bomber divisions, with a total of 122 aircraft, were placed on full alert at airfields in Hungary and the Transcarpathian Military District.⁹⁹

Despite its firepower, this first intervention was a clear failure. Resistance was not only evident, but also very effective against the vulnerable Soviet tanks and artillery. Hungarian troops, rather than fighting in cooperation with the Soviets, fought alongside their countrymen. Instead of repressing the revolution, the intervention only succeeded in aggravating it.

Thus, it was demonstrably clear to the Soviets that the Hungarians also would resist invasion. Further, the loyalties of the Hungarian army were in question.¹⁰⁰ Soviet envoys Anastas Mikoyan and Mikhail Suslov reported from Budapest on October 30 that:

The political situation in the country, rather than improving, is getting worse...The peaceful liquidation of the remaining centres [of resistance] can effectively be excluded. We will try to liquidate them using the armed forces of the Hungarians. But there is a great danger in this: the Hungarian army has adopted a 'wait-and-see' position. Our military advisers say that the attitude of Hungarian officers and generals toward Soviet officers has deteriorated in recent days, and that there is no longer the trust which existed earlier. It may well be that if Hungarian units are used against the uprising, they will go over to the side of the insurgents, and it will then be necessary for the Soviet armed forces to resume military operations.¹⁰¹

The evidence thus does not suggest that the anticipated occupation costs generated by Polish, as opposed to Hungarian, nationalists, were significantly higher. Both populations and, importantly, both militaries were considered unreliable in their support

⁹⁹ Kramer, pp. 184-85.

¹⁰⁰ Ekiert, p. 54.

¹⁰¹ Quoted in Kramer, p. 188.

of a Soviet intervention. The occupation costs that could have been foreseen by the Soviets therefore appear to be roughly equal.

How Did the Territorial Sovereignty Norm Affect Soviet Decisionmaking?

The second major element of the argument advanced in this dissertation is that a norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty prevents violent state death after 1945. It is important to note that, while the Soviets considered taking military action in Poland in 1956, and did take such action in Hungary, in neither case did they attempt to annex their wayward satellites. Can Soviet restraint be explained by the power of the territorial sovereignty norm? To what degree did this norm affect the decision to execute a military intervention at all?

The role of the territorial sovereignty norm in restricting Soviet behavior appears to be positive, but small. A survey of the English-language literature on the Polish (as well as Hungarian) events of 1956 does not reveal any conversations among the Soviet leadership that suggest that permanent occupation or annexation of Poland (or Hungary) was even considered as an option. As Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink argue, the absence of discussion of behavior prohibited by a norm may count as evidence for the strength of the norm.¹⁰² In other words, it could be that the proscription against annexation and occupation was so powerful after 1945 that the option exited the Soviet behavioral repertoire. The apparent absence of discussion of this option is particularly interesting in this case, as the Soviets displayed few scruples in annexing half of Poland and all of the Baltic states in 1939 and 1940. Yet, sixteen years later, they do not appear

¹⁰² Finnemore and Sikkink.

to have considered territorial expansion into an adjacent state whose sovereignty they had certainly violated in the past.

Despite the fact that the evidence above is consistent with the normative component of my argument, I do not take it as strong confirmation of the argument. The normative argument does seem to explain Soviet restraint in this case more convincingly than other arguments attempting to account for the post-1945 change in behavior (such as the democratic peace, market integration, or nuclear weapons arguments discussed in Chapter 4). To the degree that the accepted explanation must be more powerful than competing hypotheses, the normative argument fares well with respect to Soviet behavior in 1956. Nonetheless, I am hesitant to take this restraint as “proof” of the strength of the normative argument.

The territorial sovereignty norm explicitly prohibits the violent conquest of states. While military interventions that replace regimes and leaders do not constitute blatant violations of the territorial sovereignty norm, they are hardly consistent with the principles underlying the norm. Ironically, however, it does seem that the norm played a role in *permitting* the Soviet invasion of Hungary. At the same time that the Soviets were managing the Polish and Hungarian revolutions, the French, British, and Americans were facing an emerging crisis in the Middle East. Following General Abdel Nasser’s announcement of the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the French and British blockaded and launched air raids on Egyptian cities. The Western military intervention in Egypt

could have been taken as justification for the Soviet invasion of Hungary – a sort of ‘tit for tat’ in the game of norm infringement.¹⁰³

More likely is the possibility that the Suez crisis both distracted Western attention away from Hungary and created a split in NATO that prevented the Western powers from taking a strong stance against Soviet intervention in Hungary. In other words, the consequences of violating the territorial sovereignty norm were mitigated by circumstances. As Kramer argues, however, the Soviets probably would have invaded Hungary even without the convenience of the Suez crisis. Nonetheless, events in the Middle East did create what Khrushchev called a “favourable moment.”¹⁰⁴

Although the Soviet Union does not appear to have been severely punished for the Hungarian invasion, existing global reaction was negative. In November 1956, the United Nations passed a number of resolutions regarding Hungary. These included a demand for Soviet withdrawal, a demand to be allowed to send economic and medical aid to Hungary, a call for all UN members to send aid to Hungary, a demand that the Soviet Union cease deportations of Hungarians, and finally, a demand that UN observers be permitted to enter Hungary.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, the Soviets appreciated that, almost alone among the great powers, the United States held the upper moral hand by virtue of its abstention from the Suez intervention.¹⁰⁶ Note, however that, prior to the invasion, the US prohibited NATO forces from acting to defend Hungary.¹⁰⁷ Ultimately, the most expensive independent cost of violating the norm appears to have been a temporary loss

¹⁰³ The logic of this argument is suggested by Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband. This particular argument is, however, purely speculative and neither confirmed nor disproved by available evidence. Franck.

¹⁰⁴ Kramer, p. 192.

¹⁰⁵ Karpinski, p. 70.

¹⁰⁶ Kramer, p. 213

of reputation with respect to less developed countries the Soviets had been wooing prior to the invasion.¹⁰⁸

Of all the reactions to Polish revolts discussed in this chapter, the case of Poland in 1956 most represents the so-called “dog that didn’t bark.” Even without barking, however, this dog sheds considerable light on state death and survival. Although it is not entirely clear why the Soviets turned to intervention over occupation or annexation, the Hungarian example shows that anticipated occupation costs were not driving Soviet decisions to intervene in one country or the other. At the same time, the comparison between Poland and Hungary in 1956 illustrates the notion that buffer states that threaten to escape indirect control are more likely to suffer negative consequences than more compliant buffers. And finally, although the Soviets were not deeply concerned with violating international norms, the evidence indicates that they did pay attention to these norms and appreciated that current events created propitious circumstances for norm violation.

Conclusion

Why is it that Poland, since the late 18th century, has lived under the constant threat of annexation or, at a minimum, intervention? Occupation costs theorists might suspect that the Poles were not sufficiently nationalistic, that they were unable to make annexation too expensive for their various conquerors to bear. Polish history belies this

¹⁰⁷ Kramer, p. 207; also see Ekiert, p. 64.

¹⁰⁸ Ekiert, p. 213.

supposition. The Poles were constantly, even violently, nationalistic. Nationalism, however, could not save them from three partitions, over a century of repression, another annexation, and at least one would-be intervention. Indeed, Polish history from 1956 to the present only confirms this claim, as Poland remained under Soviet indirect control until 1989 – notably, the end of the US-Soviet rivalry that characterized the Cold War and Poland's buffer state status.

At the same time that they might chastise the Poles for their lack of nationalism, occupation costs theorists also might argue that the strength of Polish nationalism led to Poland's resurrection in 1919 and 1945. As shown above, however, nationalist insurrections, while common in occupied Poland, did not correlate with resurrection. Rather, in both cases, powerful states appealed to international norms of self-determination and territorial sovereignty to justify a Polish rebirth.

The performance of the occupation costs argument in explaining the various deaths and resurrections of Poland is relatively poor, particularly when compared to the leverage offered by the logic of the security dilemma surrounding buffer states. In the 18th century, none of the Prussian, Russian, or Austrian rivals could accept a situation of relative gains or losses. Therefore, they were particularly careful to divide up Poland equally; even when Austria was left out of the second partition, she insisted on compensation in the third. The words of the rulers and advisors of the day confirm the suspicion that the dynamics of rivalry drove the partitions of Poland. Further, they demonstrate an utter indifference to – even an abhorrence of – nationalism. Nationalist uprisings were not to be feared; they were to be crushed.

Similarly, the growing rivalry between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union sealed Poland's fate in 1939. Knowing that they were not strong enough to fight two-front wars, Germany and Russia bought each other off with Poland, in order to temporarily forestall fighting each other. They knew the Poles would fight back, but they also were well-schooled in the practice of repression. The momentum of rivalry, once again, far outpaced the would-be deterrent effects of nationalism in putting an early end to the Polish Second Republic.

The constant theme of nationalism in Polish political life resurfaced in 1956. In this case, nationalism might have appeared to do its job; despite menacing words and even troop movements, the Soviets stood back. But in comparison to Soviet behavior in Hungary in the same year (indeed, the same month), the occupation costs argument does not bear out. Why did the Soviets invade Hungary and not Poland? It was not because the Poles were more nationalistic, but because they were more compliant. The threat of a Polish break from the Soviet bloc was minimal at most, while the possibility that the Soviet Union would lose its Hungarian buffer to the West seemed very real. Once again, the dynamics of rivalry better account for the death – or, as in this case, the survival – of states than do the costs of occupation.

Acknowledging that the preceding quantitative analysis does not do justice to the occupation costs argument, I have examined two centuries of Polish history to explore this argument further. The verdict is clear; occupation costs explain very few of the rises and falls in Polish fortunes. I have also used this chapter to illustrate the process by which rivalry leads to state death. In addition to demonstrating the relationship between the pressures of rivalry and the fate of buffer states, I have explored the notion that the

probability of buffer state death increases as buffers try to free themselves from indirect control. This chapter has provided an opportunity to develop this subsidiary hypothesis, as well as examine empirical evidence that might support it.

The final goal of this chapter was to provide an additional test of the argument that a norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty prevents violent state death after 1945. While it seems clear that Russia, Germany, and Austria were not constrained by this norm prior to 1945, as I would expect, what is not clear is whether the Soviet Union was constrained by the norm in 1956. Available evidence confirms rather than disproves this hypothesis, but available evidence is very slim. Additional study of recent Polish history – in particular, the 1981 crackdown on the Solidarity movement – could yield more convincing evidence in favor of the norms argument. In 1981, repression of Solidarity was carried out exclusively by domestic elements, although with the support of the Soviet Union. It may well be that the USSR's decision to remain on the ostensible sidelines in 1981 was due to a desire to avoid the appearance of impropriety with respect to the territorial sovereignty norm.

In part, the problem of assessing the impact of the territorial sovereignty norm on Soviet behavior speaks to the difficulty of testing normative arguments. For this reason, much of the next chapter is devoted to exploring the role of this norm in determining US behavior toward the Dominican Republic in the early and late 20th century. Nonetheless, the strongest evidence in support of the normative argument emerges from the contrast between pre- and post-war Poland. Before 1945, Poland was constantly hacked away at by her neighbors. By contrast, the period from 1945 to the present represents the longest era of stable borders in Polish history.

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Like Poland, the Dominican Republic has endured a series of occupations, annexations, and interventions throughout its history. It has been called by one scholar an "unsovereign state."¹ After gaining independence from Spain in 1822, the Dominican Republic was immediately annexed and occupied by Haiti for more than two decades. Following the resurrection of the Republic in 1844, Dominican leaders entered a phase of annexationism, seeking protection against the Haitians from virtually all the great powers operating in the Caribbean at the time. Annexationist schemes found a likely partner in Spain, which agreed to reannex its former colony in 1861. The renewal of this prior relationship, however, proved difficult, and thus the Dominican Republic once again regained its independence in 1865. Despite the failure of the Spanish venture, Santo Domingo continued to seek protectorate status through an available great power, this time the United States. US-Dominican negotiations for annexation went so far that in 1870 a treaty was presented for the Senate's ratification; Congressional resistance, however, meant that the proposed annexation would not occur. Forty-five years later, in 1916, the US began a military occupation of the Republic that would last eight years. For decades after the occupation ended, US-Dominican relations seemed fairly stable until, in April 1965, President Lyndon Johnson ordered the intervention of the Dominican Republic to forestall the danger of a communist takeover.

Broadly speaking, there are two puzzles to be solved with respect to these repeated incursions of the Dominican sovereignty. First, why was the Dominican

Republic such a frequent target for intervention? And second, how can we explain variation among these very different events?

As in the case study of Poland, my goal in this chapter is to use Dominican history both to illustrate my own argument and to provide further tests of competing explanations, particularly the occupation costs argument. In part to better control for differences of situation, I focus on the three events involving the United States and the Dominican Republic as primary actors: the near-annexation of 1870, the military occupation of 1916-24, and the limited intervention of 1965. More so than in the previous chapter, my goal here is to illustrate the operation of the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty in changing US behavior over time. Because the norms argument is both historically based and focused on the role of the United States as a normative entrepreneur, the Dominican case provides an excellent opportunity to trace the role of this norm in US foreign policy, from Presidents Grant to Wilson to Johnson.

For each mini-case in this chapter, I will ask four broad questions. First, why was intervention undertaken or considered? My argument suggests that when security dilemmas between rivals surrounding the Dominican Republic are particularly acute, the probability of violent intervention will increase. This general prediction raises an important issue about the geography of the Dominican Republic. Unlike Poland, the Dominican Republic is not obviously positioned between two or more great powers. Indeed, the only great power in the vicinity is the US. It is important to remember, however, that the reach of great powers can be quite long; in both the 19th and 20th centuries, other great powers found bases in nearby colonial possessions or proxy states

¹ Black, *The Dominican Republic : Politics and Development in an Unsovereign State*.

that challenged US hegemony in the Caribbean and Latin America. An added benefit of studying the Dominican Republic is that this case illustrates very well that buffer states come in many different geographies. As in the colonization of Africa and Asia, we see here that great power rivalry is not confined to the immediate backyard of great powers. One suggestion made in Chapter 4 was that the primary quantitative analysis presented in this dissertation undercounts buffer states because the coding of buffer states requires that they be located between two other states engaged in an enduring rivalry. The discussion of the results in the quantitative chapter indicates that if this strict coding is relaxed – such that states that two or more great powers are clearly fighting for control over are included in the analysis – the independent effect of being a buffer state further increases the probability of violent state death. Dominican history illustrates how this expanded notion of buffer states is consistent with reality, and buttresses the case for using this definition of buffer states to analyze state death.

In examining the causes of intervention, then, I will first look for evidence of great power rivalry around the Dominican Republic. My expectation is that there were no such rivalries in 1870, but that the US did face rivals for control over the Dominican Republic in both 1916 and 1965.

The second broad question I will ask in each mini-case is: what, if any, role did international norms promoting territorial sovereignty play in preventing or influencing the nature of the intervention? To restate the argument from Chapter 2, the basic claim made here is that a norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty should prevent violent state death after 1945. This norm, however, is not a rule that simply appeared at the close of World War II; its roots go at least as far back as World War I, when Woodrow Wilson

publicly espoused the doctrines of self-determination and territorial sovereignty. As argued earlier, we should therefore see effects of this norm prior to 1945. Further, since the US is the principal moral entrepreneur supporting the norm, this case provides an important chance to examine the role of this norm in US foreign policy from the mid-19th to the mid-20th centuries.

Given the anticipated changing strength of the territorial sovereignty norm over time, I do not expect that the norm played an important role in the United States' ultimate decision not to annex the Dominican Republic in 1870. In 1916, however, Woodrow Wilson – the original normative entrepreneur – was US President. How, if at all, can Wilson's idealism be squared with an eight-year military occupation of the Dominican Republic? I argue that the 1916 intervention was always intended to be temporary; Wilson never harbored territorial ambitions toward the Dominican Republic. Further, the occupation lasted longer than anyone had originally meant it to last. I also argue that the Dominican occupation illustrates the tension in Wilson's idealism discussed in Chapter 2: while he was opposed to forcible territorial change, Wilson was also very much in favor of the right to self-determination. In this case – as in others in Latin America – Wilson's view was that neighboring states would not be able to exercise their right to self-determination unless they were endowed with a democratic system. Thus, he could justify the occupation in part through his commitment to the self-determination norm that underpinned the territorial sovereignty norm. Finally, in 1965, despite heightened fears of a Communist incursion in the area, Johnson exercised restraint by engaging in a limited intervention of the Dominican Republic. Indeed, absorption or long-term occupation were never seriously discussed as options.

The third broad question to be asked in this chapter is: what role, if any, did Dominican nationalism play in preventing or influencing the nature of US intervention? An essential claim of the occupation costs argument is that the strength of nationalism has changed dramatically over time; thus, occupation costs theorists would expect that nationalism could account for changes in the US's inclination to violate Dominican sovereignty over time. Was there, in fact, a notable (and noted) change in the strength of Dominican nationalism from 1870 to 1965? In what way could this change account for the US's failure to annex the Dominican Republic in 1870, the prolonged occupation starting in 1916, and the brief intervention in 1965? Did concerns about nationalism affect US decisionmaking in 1870, 1916, and 1965?

Finally, I will ask: why did the US withdraw from the Dominican Republic in each case? Was withdrawal due to fading rivalry, fear of consequences of violating the territorial sovereignty norm, or costs imposed by nationalists resisting US intervention? As stated above, my expectation is that, in 1870, the absence of rivals threatening US hegemony in the Caribbean – or at least in the Dominican Republic – caused the failure of the annexation plan. In 1916-24, I expect that withdrawal was due at least in part to the negative consequences – particularly with respect to US relations with other Latin American states – of violating the territorial sovereignty norm. Further, in both 1924 and 1965, my argument suggests that US indirect control over the Dominican Republic should be restored by the time of withdrawal; in other words, a more compliant government should be installed, especially if the threat of a rival remains in the background. Occupation costs theorists would expect to see an important role for nationalism in US withdrawals. One piece of evidence that would support their case

would be the outbreak of nationalist revolts in anticipation of the 1870 annexation, and as a consequence of the 1916 and 1965 interventions. Note, though, that such evidence would only support half of the occupation costs theorists' case; if occupation costs are only exhibited *after* occupation, then these costs are probably not a very useful deterrent to conquest or occupation. It is also important to note that the historical nature of the norms argument means that my argument and the occupation costs argument are compatible in some cases. For example, if, in the absence of an acute rivalry, anticipated occupation costs prevented the US annexation of the Dominican Republic in 1870, my argument would not be challenged. The strongest challenge that the occupation costs argument could mount to my claim would be if the variation in US behavior toward the Dominican Republic was better explained by increasing Dominican nationalism over time than by the presence or absence of rivalry and/or the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I present a brief history of the Dominican Republic from independence to 1870, focusing particularly on the Spanish reannexation of the Dominican Republic in 1861 and the Republic's rebirth in 1865. Next, I turn to the first mini-case: the near-annexation of the Dominican Republic by the US in 1870. I find that the most convincing explanation for US restraint in this case is President Grant's inability to convince the Senate that a rival threatened to take over the Dominican Republic in the US's stead. I then turn to the US military occupation of the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924. This intervention, I argue, was prompted by US fears of German imperialism in the Caribbean at the time. At the same time, the US exhibited restraint by conducting a limited occupation because of Wilson's normative

concerns. The resurrection of the Dominican Republic in 1924 presents the clearest challenge to my argument, as it was due to a combination of the withdrawal of the German threat, the concern for the US's normative position, and the costs imposed by Dominican nationalists on the American occupying forces. While occupation costs may have helped withdrawal along, they were neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause; the US had always intended its stay in the Dominican Republic to be temporary. Fourth, I examine the 1965 intervention. I find that President Lyndon Johnson was caught between the proverbial rock and hard place in the spring of 1965: he greatly feared that the Dominican civil war would lead to a Communist revolution, but he also knew that any military action in the Caribbean would be globally condemned as a violation of Dominican sovereignty. I argue that the 1965 crisis illustrates a fundamental dilemma of post-1945 foreign policy – the need to balance strategic imperatives against international norms. My conclusions follow.

From Colony to Colony: 1821-1869

The colonization of Hispaniola dates back to Christopher Columbus. Declared a Spanish colony by Columbus, the island remained as such until Spain succumbed to French pressure and turned over the western third of the island to France in 1795. The French slave colony quickly experienced revolt and, in 1804, Haiti declared its independence. Haiti attacked its neighboring Spanish colony, but was driven back by the Spanish and British.

In 1821, the Dominican Republic declared its independence from Spain.² Immediately following this declaration, Haitian forces attacked again; without great power support, the briefly independent Dominicans would live under Haitian rule until 1844. While very little is written on the 1844 rebirth of the Dominican Republic, the conventional wisdom appears to be that Dominican freedom fighters imposed sufficiently severe costs on their Haitian occupiers to win back their independence.³

The hallmark of Dominican foreign policy after 1844 was the search for a protector. Constant fear of another Haitian attack led one Dominican leader after another to request annexation to and protection by various great powers. Indeed, even during its transition to independence in 1844, the Dominican Republic immediately sought to annex itself to France.⁴ For the next fifteen years, annexationism continued to dominate the Dominican agenda. France, Britain, the United States, and Spain all were approached at least once.⁵ Interestingly, what seems to have foiled these early plans of annexation was the great powers' fear of each other. For example, when the Dominicans approached France and Spain after being rejected by the US, President Polk quickly sent agents to Santo Domingo to protect US interests.⁶ As Luis Martínez-Fernández writes, “the designs of one foreign nation were neutralized by those of others.”⁷

The value of the Dominican Republic to the great powers – particularly the United States – was clear. In addition to serving as a source for various raw materials,⁸

² Note that, for the purposes of the quantitative analysis conducted here, the Dominican Republic is not considered to have entered the international system until 1850 because it was not recognized by treaty or mission prior to 1850.

³ Cf. Welles, vol. I, pp. 56-60.

⁴ Welles, vol. I, pp. 98, 126; Martínez-Fernandez, p. 574.

⁵ Atkins and Wilson, p. 15

⁶ Atkins and Wilson, p. 16.

⁷ Martínez-Fernandez, pp. 573-4.

⁸ Originally, these included gold and silver; cotton and, importantly, sugarcane were cultivated later.

Hispaniola was strategically located in the chain of islands that led to Florida, and was also en route to the planned canal at the bottom of the Central American isthmus. Any strengthened European presence on the island would therefore threaten US security, the isthmanian passage, and the credibility of the Monroe Doctrine.

Given the import of control over the Dominican Republic to the US, it is not surprising that a series of US presidents countered advances by European powers with strong signals to both the Dominicans and their potential European partners that undue influence in the Republic would not be tolerated. Similarly, European powers resisted advances by the US toward Dominican territory, as when, in 1853, British and French diplomatic and military pressure were brought to bear to prevent the establishment of a US coaling station in the strategically located Samaná Bay.⁹ At the time, the dynamics of rivalry were not acute, but they were certainly in the background.

By 1855, however, Spain started to get particularly nervous about US movement toward its colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico.¹⁰ Frustrated by his past experiences with the US, and frightened of French overtures to Haiti, Dominican President Santana strongly supported the reannexation of the Dominican Republic by Spain.¹¹ In explaining his decision to Queen Isabella II, Santana wrote:

Seventeen years of continuous disquiet have taught us that our political situation would condemn us to pass through the long series of tribulations which our brothers on the South American Continent are experiencing, if indeed we were not first swallowed up by some powerful state which coveted us.

Such a situation destroys the confidence which a strong and just government might otherwise obtain; it destroys all hope of utilizing the natural riches of our soil which would give promise of so much under more favorable circumstances, and obliges him who today is responsible

⁹ Welles, vol. I, p. 150.

¹⁰ Welles, vol. I, p. 163.

¹¹ Welles, vol. I, p. 191; Martínez-Fernandez, p. 575.

for the happiness of the people to seek a brighter future under a condition of affairs which would be more lasting and stable. Our origin, our language, our religion, our customs, our sympathies finally, incline us to seek to find that stability in a more perfect union with her who was our mother than the union which now exists, and surely never will a more favorable opportunity present itself than the opportunity which actual conditions offer us today.¹²

Despite Santana's eagerness, Spain was reticent in retaking its former colony. Spanish wariness had two sources: first, a concern that Spain would be embarrassed if annexation was followed by revolt – the Spaniards wanted assurances that annexation would be welcome; and second, concern about resistance by the United States.¹³

Worries about the interference of the US were, however, tempered by impending civil war in North America. Thus, 1861 was indeed an opportune moment for Spanish annexation of the Dominican Republic because Spain's principal rival for control over the country was otherwise engaged. Interestingly, Secretary of State Seward, aware of Spanish plans, tried to convince President Lincoln to initiate a diversionary war that would unite the nation against a foreign enemy.¹⁴

Worries about a negative Dominican reaction to Spanish annexation were allayed by Santana. It was clear that the President had the means to quell opposition. Further, as Sumner Welles notes, it was not at all clear that opposition would be forthcoming. Fatigued by the war with Haiti, generally uneducated, and poor, the Dominicans seemed an unlikely lot for nationalist revolt.¹⁵ Thus, the combination of a rival with its back turned and anticipated low occupation costs decided the Spanish in favor of annexation.

¹² Quoted in Welles, vol. I, p. 203.

¹³ Martínez-Fernández, p. 582.

¹⁴ Welles, vol. I, p. 218-19.

¹⁵ Welles, vol. I, p. 223.

Almost immediately following annexation, however, it was clear that Santana and the Spanish had miscalculated. Nationalist revolts followed virtually upon the heels of the arriving Spanish. By 1863, the Dominicans had declared a Provisional Government. The Spanish continued to fight against the Dominican guerrillas to hold their newly-acquired territory. But by 1865, the costs of the war and its unpopularity at home led the Spanish to announce their intent to withdraw from the Dominican Republic. The grounds for withdrawal were stated to be an opposition to territorial conquest for its own sake, and an ignorance of Dominican resistance to the idea of annexation prior to 1861. The Spanish declaration reads:

The belief that the Dominican people as a whole or even that an immense majority desired and above all insisted upon their annexation by Spain was an illusion: since the struggle there had become general, it no longer has the character of a measure taken to subject a few discontented rebels, but has acquired rather the character of a war of conquest, completely foreign to the spirit of Spanish policy; and even by increasing our sacrifices in order to obtain a triumph we will place ourselves in the sad situation of acquiescing in a complete military occupation filled with difficulties and not free from the necessity of *dangerous explanations*; and even under the most optimistic belief that one part of the population might be favorably inclined to us after our victory the authorities which might then be established in those dominions would necessarily have to be either little suited to the habits and customs of the natives or very distinct from those which are installed today in our other foreign colonies.¹⁶

The apparent reason for the 1865 resurrection of the Dominican Republic was, indeed, the occupation costs that the Dominicans were able to inflict upon their Spanish occupiers.

¹⁶ Quoted in Welles, vol. I, p. 288-89. Emphasis in original.

The Near-annexation of 1870

In the late 1860s, following the US Civil War, both the United States and the Dominican Republic faced serious international problems. The US needed to reassert its leadership in the Western Hemisphere and to provide some teeth to the Monroe Doctrine. The Dominican Republic, riddled with debt and concerned once again about the possibility of Haitian incursion, needed a protector.

Dominican President Buenaventura Báez, aided by American filibusters General William Cazneau and Colonel Joseph Fabens, concluded that a mutually beneficial solution to this problem would be for the US to annex the Dominican Republic. Báez would receive a handsome payoff, Cazneau and Fabens could further exploit their Dominican investments, and the US could assert its primacy in the Caribbean. President Ulysses S. Grant was favorable to the idea, seeing a legacy of expanding American territory in the offing. Negotiations went so far that a treaty of annexation was sent to the Senate floor. The treaty, however, was soundly defeated. Strong opposition dictated that the United States would not annex the Dominican Republic.

In this section, I examine the decisions involved in the near-annexation of the Dominican Republic by the US. I first ask why the US was interested in annexing the Dominican Republic. Next, I briefly discuss the role of the territorial sovereignty norm and Dominican nationalism in the American calculus. Finally, I discuss why it was that the Senate failed to ratify the treaty of annexation. I conclude by noting that available evidence supports my argument – annexation was not successful because a strong threat

to US control over the Dominican Republic did not exist at the time. In other words, the Dominican Republic was not a buffer state and, therefore, it did not die.

Why did the US Consider Annexation?

In July 1868, Dominican President Báez played on Secretary of State William Seward's fears by suggesting that Spanish influence was building in the Dominican Republic.¹⁷ Seward, already concerned about the US retreat from the region during the Civil War, was committed to preserving and strengthening the Monroe Doctrine.¹⁸ Upon hearing Báez's suggestion for a US annexation of the Dominican Republic, Seward lent his full support to the plan, and was able to convince President Andrew Johnson of its merits, as well. On December 9, 1868, Johnson stated in a message to Congress that:

It can not be long before it will become necessary for this Government to lend some effective aid to the solution of the political and social problems which are continually kept before the world by the two republics of the island of St. Domingo, and which are now disclosing themselves more distinctly than heretofore in the island of Cuba. The subject is recommended to your consideration with all the more earnestness because I am satisfied that the time has arrived when even so direct a proceeding as a proposition for an annexation of the two Republics of the island of St. Domingo would not only receive the consent of the people interested, but would also give satisfaction to all other foreign nations.¹⁹

Despite his position, Johnson's influence was limited due to his recent impeachment and low popularity. The annexation question was therefore deferred to the next administration.

¹⁷ Nelson, p. 54.

¹⁸ Welles, vol. I, p. 315-16.

¹⁹ United States. President., et al., vol. 6, p. 689.

Fortunately for Báez, Cazneau, and Fabens, President Ulysses S. Grant was a strong proponent of expansionism and, therefore, eager to implement the annexation plan. General Orville Babcock was commissioned by Secretary of State Hamilton Fish as follows:

The President, deeming it advisable to employ a special agent to obtain information in regard to the Dominican treaty, has selected you for that purpose... You will endeavor to obtain full and accurate information in regard to the disposition of the Government and people of the Republic toward the United States, the character of the Government, whether it be military or civil, whether it be stable or liable to be overthrown... You will also ascertain what the debt, foreign and domestic, of that Government may be, how long it may have to run, the rate of interest, and where it is held... Generally, any information tending to illustrate the condition and resources of that Republic and the character and influence of those charge with its destinies, will be acceptable.²⁰

Babcock's mission quickly turned into a treaty negotiation that included relief of Dominican debt, Grant's promise to use his influence to convince Congress to accede to the treaty, a payoff to the Dominican government, and a backup clause that provided for the US purchase of Samaná Bay in the event that the annexation treaty was not approved.²¹

It appeared that the major players were all agreed. The Dominican and US Presidents, pushed along by the mercenary Cazneau and Fabens, had put their full weight behind the treaty. Notably, their motives were similar. Báez wanted to be bought off, to rule a US colony in comfort without having to worry about Dominican security. Grant saw the Dominican venture as key to his legacy as an American expansionist. Cazneau and Fabens' motives were perhaps the simplest; if the US annexed the Dominican Republic, the value of their investments on the island would increase by orders of

²⁰ Quoted in Welles, vol. I, p. 371-72.

²¹ Nelson, p. 74.

magnitude. Money and pride were the driving goals of the US and Dominican annexationists.

Did the territorial sovereignty norm affect US decisionmaking?

I argue that the role of the territorial sovereignty norm in constraining US decisionmaking with respect to the proposed annexation was minimal at most. I expect that the norm would not exert influence on US policymakers in this instance for two reasons. First, the timing of the annexation plan is well before the territorial sovereignty norm became an integral part of US foreign policy. The argument advanced here suggests that the territorial sovereignty norm should constrain states from conquering other states after 1945 and, further, that the norm also should exert a more limited effect on international relations after 1920. 1868 clearly predates the norm.

The second reason for the limited effects of the norm refers to the nature of the proposed annexation. Violent conquest of the Dominican Republic was a possibility that was never aired. The norm, as stated most clearly in Wilson's speeches, the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the Charter of the United Nations, prohibits violent territorial conquest. I have argued above that the norm may have implications for non-violent as well as violent state death; these implications stem from the foundations of the territorial sovereignty norm in the right to self-determination. For example, I predicted in Chapter 2 that state dissolutions should increase as the norm gains in strength. I have not, however, made any predictions as to the probability of states voluntarily unifying with other states as a function of the strength of the norm.

Despite the fact that there is little *a priori* reason to expect the territorial sovereignty norm to have influenced US decisionmaking in 1868, limited evidence supporting the norms argument is available. This evidence is found chiefly in the speeches of the principal opponent of annexation, Senator Charles Sumner. In a speech to the Senate on December 21, 1870, Sumner argued that:

The resolution before the Senate commits Congress to a dance of blood. It is a new step in a measure of violence. Already several steps have been taken and Congress is now summoned to another...The object of the resolution, and I will demonstrate it, is to commit Congress to the policy of annexation. I object to this proposition because it is a new stage in a measure of violence, which, so far as it has been maintained has been upheld by violence. I use strong language, but only what the occasion requires. As senator, as patriot, I cannot see my country suffer in its good name without an earnest effort to save it. [Báez] is sustained in power by the Government of the United States that he may betray his country...The Island of San Domingo, situated in tropical waters and occupied by another race, of another color, never can become a permanent possession of the United States. You may seize it by force of arms or by diplomacy where a naval squadron does more than the minister; but the enforced jurisdiction cannot endure...It is theirs by right of possession...their independence is as precious to them as ours to us and it is placed under the safeguard of natural laws which we cannot violate with impunity.²²

Although Sumner's comments betray at least a hint of racism and paternalism toward the citizens of the Dominican Republic, they also exhibit a moral objection to the acquisition of "foreign" territory. While the territorial sovereignty norm appears not to have influenced the decisionmaking of Seward, Johnson, or Grant, it was used by Sumner to marshal opposition to the plan. As expected, then, the territorial sovereignty norm played an extremely limited role in the near-annexation of the Dominican Republic.

²² Sumner, "Naboth's Vineyard." Speech in the Senate on the Proposed Annexation of San Domingo to the United States. Sumner, vol. XIV, pp. 89-131.

Did Dominican nationalism affect US decisionmaking?

To what degree was the ultimate decision not to annex the Dominican Republic due to an anticipation of occupation costs that Dominican nationalists might inflict on American occupiers? I argue that pro-annexationists knew that the Dominicans might create occupation costs for the Americans, but were not deterred by this possibility. Anti-annexationists like Senator Sumner, on the other hand, used the fear of occupation costs – just as they used the moral argument to preserve territorial sovereignty – to help convince the Senate to vote against annexation.

To the degree that history guided those considering annexation, they should have been well aware that the likelihood of Dominican rebellion was high. As stated above, the conventional wisdom is that the efforts of Dominican freedom fighters imposed sufficiently high costs on their Haitian and Spanish occupiers to lead to Dominican resurrections in 1844 and 1865. Available sources do not indicate, however, that President Grant took these previous cases as indications of what might happen in a Dominican Republic under US protection.

Grant did, however, make feeble efforts to reassure himself that the Dominican people were in favor of the annexation plan. When Báez realized that the Dominican Congress would not support the annexation treaty, he decided to put the treaty to a popular vote. Although Grant may not have been aware of the reason for Báez's decision, he supported the notion of Dominican consent to annexation. The fraudulent nature of the vote, however, was clear to high-level US policy makers. Just prior to the

plebiscite, US representative Major Raymond Perry wrote Secretary of State Hamilton Fish:

...a list was opened in the police headquarters for citizens to register their names. Báez and Delmonte have told me several times that if any man opposed annexation they would either shoot him or send him his passports. They have also told that it should be a free vote of the people but such has not been the case. There was much feeling throughout the Island kept in check and the people were not permitted to express any opposition to annexation. I have seen Báez myself shake his fist in the face of some of his nearest friends, amongst whom were officers of the army, in Báez' own house, and tell them he would banish them from the Island if they opposed annexation. This conduct on the part of Báez made many who were in favor of annexation opposed to it and also to him...The prisons are filled with political prisoners.²³

Even if Grant was not apprised of the conditions surrounding the plebiscite, suspicions must have been raised by the outcome of the vote, which was 15,169 in favor of annexation and 11 opposed.²⁴ Thus, the administration's ostensible concern for Dominican consent to annexation reflected a regard for appearances rather than actual worry about the response of the Dominican people to annexation.

Similarly to his stated concern for violating the territorial sovereignty norm, Senator Sumner argued against annexation partly on the grounds that it would face Dominican resistance. Specifically, Sumner pointed to two costs the US would have to bear if it took over the Dominican republic: the Dominican debt and the high likelihood of civil war.²⁵ These points were, however, subsidiary to his main argument against annexation.

Aside from the debt, the actual occupation costs the US would have had to pay had it annexed the Dominican Republic remain unclear. As stated earlier, the

²³ Quoted in Nelson, p. 79.

²⁴ Martínez-Fernandez, p. 596.

²⁵ Nelson, p. 97-98.

Dominicans had certainly resisted previous occupiers. Nonetheless, William Nelson, the main historian of this decision, argues that most Dominicans were completely ignorant of these decisions, and simply followed the instructions of their *caudillos*.²⁶ Furthermore, it is important to consider the anticipated reaction to a violent versus nonviolent takeover of the state. Occupation costs theorists might expect, for example, that a violent conquest or annexation might incite more resistance than therefore impose more costs than a voluntary annexation.²⁷

The role of nationalism in influencing the decision against annexation is nebulous but, apparently, at least slightly positive. Whether the Dominicans would have resisted US annexation is uncertain. The US made mild efforts to gauge the extent of popular support for the plan, but these efforts were half-hearted, at best. Senator Sumner used the threat of nationalism as ammunition to help convince his colleagues to vote against annexation. In sum, then, fear of Dominican nationalism appeared to play a very mild role in the US decision not to annex the Dominican Republic.

Why did the US decide against annexation?

As argued above, neither a concern for violating the territorial sovereignty norm nor a concern for anticipated occupation costs heavily influenced the US's final decision against annexation of the Dominican Republic. The norm was not operational in the international system at the time and, further, statements against violating the norm were

²⁶ Nelson, p. 61.

²⁷ This argument, however, is not consistent with Dominican history. Dominicans are said to have inflicted severe occupation costs on both the Haitians who violently conquered the Republic in 1822, and the Spanish who were invited to re-annex their former colony in 1861.

extremely limited. Similarly, occupation costs would probably not have been very high, and US decisionmakers did not appear to be very worried about these potential costs. I argue, then, that the reason the US decided not to annex the Dominican Republic was because there was no strategic imperative to do so. In 1868-70, during the debate over annexation, there was no clear rival competing for hegemony over the Dominican Republic. It was therefore more sensible for the US to exert indirect control over Santo Domingo than to actually absorb it. This is an example of the dynamics of rivalry working in reverse: precisely because it was not a buffer state, there was no convincing reason to annex the Dominican Republic.

As Luis Martínez-Fernández shows, the Caribbean basin was a hotbed of rivalry for much of the period from 1844 to 1865. These rivalries gave Dominican leaders many options for protectors, and allowed them to play various great powers with interests in the region off of each other. It was the presence of a variety of European rivals in the Caribbean, rather than the self-interest of Dominican leaders, Martínez-Fernández argues, that explains Dominican fickleness in courting various potential protectors. Further, the failure of the US to annex the Dominican Republic in 1868-70 is explained by the absence of rivals in the area:

In 1860-61, when Santana planned and achieved Spanish annexation, the United States was enduring a grave political crisis that created a vacuum in one of the poles of rivalry over the region. European nations took advantage of the situation and moved into the Caribbean region. Shortly after the Civil War, the United States once again assumed indisputable hegemony in the region, this time without the antebellum restraints of sectional compromises. In this context, Báez and the other annexationists of the Second Republic could no longer look to European powers for political support, and except for Spain, who maintained a precarious hold

on Cuba and Puerto Rico, those nations retreated from the Hispanic Caribbean, never to return.²⁸

In arguing against annexation, Senator Sumner also noted this point. Sumner's two first arguments against annexation were, first, that annexing the Dominican Republic would *create* unwanted rivalries with European powers and, second, that (absent annexation) European powers were very unlikely to interfere in Dominican affairs.²⁹ Sumner's colleague, Missouri Senator Carl Schurz, in arguing against annexation, dismissed the notion that European rivals threatened US hegemony in the region:

And finally, the great bugbear of foreign interference is again raised before our eyes. We are told that if we do not take San Domingo, some foreign power will do so and in annoying proximity enjoy all the sweets we reject. Why, sir, is there a sensible man willing to believe it? I am ready to assert here, on my responsibility as a Senator, my confident belief that there is no European Power that will ever dare again to set its foot upon a square inch of American soil in the northern hemisphere against our pleasure.³⁰

Rivalry in the region was not only absent, but was also recognized as such by the major opponents to annexation.

A final reason for the Senate's rejection of annexation was the nature of the reasons motivating the pro-annexationists. Mercenaries like Cazneau and Fabens, by fabricating information to support their own financial interests, reflected poorly on the scheme. Grant's expansionist tendencies also were frowned upon. In the Senate's eyes, then, the reasons to vote for annexation were hard to find; but the reasons to vote against annexation were hard to miss.

²⁸ Martínez-Fernandez, pp. 596-597.

²⁹ Pierce, vol. 4, p. 441.

³⁰ *Congressional Globe*, 41st Congress, 3rd Session, January 11, 1870, Annex, p. 32.

Given the lack of a strong strategic impetus for the annexation of the Dominican Republic – even a voluntary annexation, as was planned – Congress did not approve the plan. In the absence of a strategic imperative to annex the Dominican Republic – indeed, given the strategic, normative, and occupation costs associated with doing so – there was no overriding reason for the US to take over the Republic.

Military Occupation: 1916-1924

In the forty-five years between its annexationist misadventure with the United States and the lengthy occupation implemented by the US, the Dominican Republic continued to suffer from both poor geography and poor governance. By the time Teddy Roosevelt gained the US Presidency in 1901, the situation had become acute. The Monroe Doctrine alone was no longer sufficient to preserve the US sphere of influence; European creditors were insistently knocking at the doors of Caribbean debtors. To forestall European intervention in the region in general and the Dominican Republic in particular, Roosevelt enunciated the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine his annual message to Congress in 1904:

It has for some time been obvious that those who profit by the Monroe Doctrine must accept certain responsibilities along with the rights which it confers; and that the same statement applies to those who uphold the Doctrine. It cannot be too often and too emphatically asserted that the United States has not the slightest desire for territorial aggrandizement at the expense of any of its southern neighbours and will not treat the Monroe Doctrine as an excuse for such aggrandizement on its part. We do not propose to take any part of Santo Domingo or exercise any other control over the Island save what is necessary to its financial rehabilitation in connection with the collection of revenue, part of which will be turned over to the Government to meet the necessary expenses of running it and part of which will be distributed pro rata among the creditors of the

Republic on a basis of absolute equity. The justification for the United States taking this burden and incurring this responsibility is to be found in the fact that it is incompatible with international equity for the United States to refuse to allow other Powers to take the only means at their disposal of satisfying the claims of their creditors and yet to refuse, itself, to take any other steps.

An aggrieved nation can, without interfering with the Monroe Doctrine, take what action it sees fit in the adjustment of its disputes with American States, provided that action does not take the shape of interference with their form of government or of the despoilment of their territory under any disguise. But, short of this, when the question is one of a money claim, the only way which remains, finally, to collect it is a blockade or bombardment, or the seizure of the custom houses, and this means, as had been said above, what is in fact a possession, even though only a temporary possession, of territory. The United States then becomes a party in interests, because under the Monroe Doctrine it cannot see any European Power seize and permanently occupy the territory of one of these Republics; and yet such seizure of territory, disguised or undisguised, may eventually afford the only way in which the Power in question can collect any debts, unless there is interference on the part of the United States...The conditions in the Dominican Republic not only constitute a menace to our relations with other foreign nations, but they also concern the prosperity of the people of the Island, as well as the security of American interests.³¹

In stating this new policy, Roosevelt authorized the creation of a US customs receivership in the Dominican Republic to manage that country's finances. One could certainly argue that this level of interference constitutes a formal loss of control over foreign policy making to another state – in other words, it is plausible to suggest that the Dominican receivership signaled the exit of the Dominican Republic from the international system. If the definition were to be applied in this way, the example of the customs receivership would fit my argument in that the Roosevelt Corollary and its attendant policies were clearly a reaction to the threat of European intervention in the region; nearby rivals forced Roosevelt to act. Despite the fact that this case would fit my argument, I do not include the establishment of the US customs receivership in the Dominican Republic as an

instance of state death because the Republic continued to exercise an independent foreign policy in many other respects, negotiating deals and security loans and contracts with a number of European powers, often without US consent.

In 1916, however, the US did formally strip the Dominican Republic of its foreign policy making powers by implementing a large-scale – and long-term – military occupation. The 1916 intervention raises a number of questions. The first, of course, is: why did the intervention occur? The ostensible reason for intervention was to restabilize the Dominican government – was the given reason the true one, or were other factors at work? Further, this case presents a potential problem for my argument in that the intervention occurred during Woodrow Wilson's presidency. How, if at all, can Wilson's commitment to self-determination and opposition to territorial aggression be reconciled with the eight-year military occupation of the Dominican Republic? Another issue to be examined is the role of nationalism – did the US anticipate or pay occupation costs during the intervention and, if so, were these costs so high that they account for the US withdrawal from the Dominican Republic in 1924? Below, I argue that strong fears of a German threat led to the US intervention in 1916. I also suggest that Wilson's rhetoric and behavior are reconcilable in this case; the US never sought territory in the Dominican Republic and, although Wilson may have been inappropriately paternalistic, he believed that the US intervention would ultimately put the Dominicans in a position to make good choices about government. Finally, I argue that, more than in any other case examined in this thesis, the occupation costs argument is supported by the 1916-1924

³¹ Quoted in Welles, vol. II, p. 621-23.

intervention in that high occupation costs did have an important positive effect on the US decision to withdraw from the Dominican Republic.

Why did the US intervene in 1916?

Despite the given reason of purported Dominican violation of the US-Dominican treaty of 1907, I argue that the principal cause for US intervention was the German threat in the Caribbean. Recent German actions from Venezuela to Mexico challenged US hegemony in the region and, in fact, Germany was alone among the European powers in refusing to accept the basic principles behind the Monroe Doctrine. At the time, Germany was seen a major threat to US interests in the Caribbean. This perception created a rivalry between the US and Germany that would be played out in both Latin America and Europe; the states in between suddenly became buffers between these two rising great powers.

The general consensus among historians of the 1916 occupation is that fear of Germany drove the US decision to intervene in the Dominican Republic. William Calder writes, "The most important immediate cause of the US occupation of the Dominican Republic, aside from the logic of its ever increasing involvement in Dominican affairs, was strategic: the desire of the United States to protect the approaches to its southern coast and the Panama Canal against unfriendly powers, especially Germany."³² In a contemporary account, Carl Kelsey wrote, "Prominent Americans and Dominicans have told me that they believe that Washington knew of certain plans of Germany to use the

³² Calder, p. xii.

island if opportunity offered and, inasmuch as we were not then at war, thought it better to forestall such a possibility.”³³

What precisely were the grounds behind the American fear of the German threat? First, Germany – like the US – was a rising power. The Kaiser’s policy of *Weltpolitik* was threatening to all states, as was his commitment to his navy; in the early 1900s, it was clear that naval superiority favored the Germans over the Americans. Germany had missed out on the first wave of colonization, but Latin America seemed to provide an opportunity for a second wave. Second, as Nancy Mitchell shows, increased trade between Germany and the United States by the end of the 19th century led to as much conflict as cooperation. The US-German relationship, which had previously been friendly, was now characterized by tariff wars and mutual suspicion.³⁴ Third, Germany did not accept the Monroe Doctrine. The Kaiser’s marginalia on a memo after the German gunboat *Panther* downed a Haitian ship in 1903 reads: “South America is our aim, old boy!” Fourth, and more specifically, in 1902, Germany participated in a blockade of Venezuela in response to Venezuelan default on a number of European debts. In retrospect, Teddy Roosevelt described the incident as follows: “Germany intended to seize some Venezuelan harbor and turn it into a strongly fortified place of arms...with a view to some measure of control over the future Isthmaian Canal, and over South American affairs generally.”³⁵ Fifth, as Friedrich Katz has argued, Germany was actively increasing its influence in Mexico. Katz suggests that this activity culminated with the Zimmermann Telegram, sent in January 1917, which proposed that Mexico help

³³ Kelsey then adds: “If this were the main reason it is difficult to understand why President Wilson waited until December, 1920, before proposing to withdraw the troops.” Kelsey, p. 178.

³⁴ Mitchell, p. 18.

³⁵ Quoted in Mitchell, p. 98.

Germany by miring the US in a regional war to prevent US involvement in World War I.³⁶

Thus, the US had ample reason to fear German invasion in the region. The Caribbean, in particular, was pregnable because of its poorly managed states – such as the Dominican Republic and Haiti – that were vulnerable to the demands of outside creditors. Indeed, the German navy had war plans to invade both the Caribbean and the United States. Suspecting this possibility, the General Board of the US navy drew up responses, the most detailed of which was the Hi-Sd (Haiti-Santo Domingo) Plan.³⁷ The expectation was that, if Germany was going to attack, it was most likely that Hispaniola would be the target.

Although there is no direct evidence linking an imminent German attack to the US intervention of the Dominican Republic in 1916, the incident was practically a textbook case for German action. In a number of cases in recent years, German gunboats steamed into the ports of countries that were about to default on loans to Germany. Germany was also involved in the Mexican Revolution, taking advantage of the turmoil of domestic politics to increase its influence in Mexico, despite US protests. Similarly, the Dominican economy was in dire straits. To preserve its influence in the country and prevent the interference of European powers, the US insisted on increased decisionmaking power in the Republic. The newly-elected President Jimenez refused, knowing that accession to such demands would amount to political suicide. This combination of domestic and financial instability had created clear targets for German

³⁶ Katz.

³⁷ Mitchell, pp. 46, 54-55, 56.

intervention in the past. To forestall such intervention, the US preempted it, landing an early contingent of 150 Marines in the Dominican Republic on May 5, 1916.³⁸

Did the territorial sovereignty norm affect US decisionmaking?

The territorial sovereignty norm influenced US decisionmaking with respect to the 1916 intervention in one critical way: the intervention was always intended to be temporary, and the US was explicit in denying territorial ambitions in Hispaniola. Nonetheless, the nature and duration of the occupation seem to belie Woodrow Wilson's principles of territorial integrity and self-determination. How – if at all – can we reconcile Wilson's principles with his actions?

Wilson's pre-World War I policy had been characterized by a commitment to improving US-Latin American relations. In an address on October 27, 1913, he argued:

The dignity, the courage, the self-possession, the self-respect of the Latin American States, their achievements in the face of all these adverse circumstances, deserve nothing but the admiration and applause of the world. They have had harder bargains driven with them in the matter of loans than any other peoples in the world. Interest has been exacted of them that was not exacted of anybody else, because the risk was said to be greater; and then securities were taken that destroyed the risk – an admirable arrangement for those who were forcing the terms! I rejoice in nothing so much as the prospect that they will now be emancipated from these conditions, and we ought to be the first to take part in assisting in that emancipation... We must prove ourselves their friends and champions, upon terms of equality and honor.³⁹

³⁸ Fuller and Cosmas, p. 7. Note that, under similar circumstances, and for similar reasons, the US had invaded Haiti the previous year.

³⁹ "An Address on Latin American Policy in Mobile, Alabama." Wilson, et al., vol. 28, pp. 448-52. This speech was delivered at the Fifth Annual Convention of the Southern Commercial Congress, where one of the major issues under discussion was the economic benefits of the Panama Canal to Latin America. Representatives from Costa Rica, Bolivia, Peru, and Panama were among Wilson's audience.

Later in the same speech, he stated: "the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest."⁴⁰

The commitment to a policy against conquest was, in fact, a theme of the Dominican occupation. When constitutional government faced a breakdown in the Republic, the US Government stated that, "The Government of the United States desires nothing for itself from the Dominican Republic and no concessions or advantages for its citizens which are not accorded citizens of other countries. It desires only to prove its sincere and disinterested friendship for the republic and its people and to fulfill its responsibilities as the friend to whom in such crises as the present all the world looks to guide Santo Domingo out of its difficulties."⁴¹ Similarly, upon actually occupying the Republic, Rear Admiral W.B. Caperton declared to the Dominican people that:

It is not the intention of the United States Government to acquire by conquest any territory in the Dominican Republic nor to attack its sovereignty, but our troops will remain here until all revolutionary movements have been stamped out and until such reforms as are deemed necessary to insure the future welfare of the country have been initiated and are in effective operation.⁴²

Indeed, Wilson himself acceded to the occupation only because he saw it as his only option. Responding to the suggestion that the US occupy the Dominican Republic, he wrote to his Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, "It is with the deepest reluctance that I approve and authorize the course here proposed, but I am convinced that it is the least of the evils in sight in this very perplexing situation."⁴³

Even if the avowedly (and actual) temporary and non-acquisitive nature of the occupation does not stand in direct opposition to Wilson's stated principles, it is hardly

⁴⁰ Quoted in Welles, vol. II, p. 716. Also see Gilderhus, p. 18.

⁴¹ Quoted in Welles, vol. II, p. 736.

⁴² Quoted in Welles, vol. II, p. 777.

directly in line with those principles. The US occupation of the Dominican Republic did not constitute a territorial conquest, but neither did it reflect a respect for the Dominican right to territorial sovereignty. If the argument in this dissertation is correct – that a norm protecting states’ territorial sovereignty prevents violent state death after 1945 – how can it be that the primary entrepreneur for this norm, Woodrow Wilson, himself failed to follow the norm strictly?

Sumner Welles conjectures that Wilson assumed that observers understood his motives. Because he had disavowed territorial conquest, he expected that the Dominicans and Latin Americans both accepted that disavowal and expected that his intentions in occupying the Dominican Republic were good.⁴⁴ In addition, Wilson’s commitment to the right of self-determination played a particularly odd role in his decisionmaking with respect to Latin America. As argued in Chapter 2, the self-determination principle caused Wilson problems because it could conflict with the territorial sovereignty norm. But because he saw war as the greatest evil, and because he saw territorial aggression as the principal cause of war, the ultimate shape of the territorial sovereignty norm was a bright-line rule against conquest. Nonetheless, Wilson continued to attempt to promote the right to self-determination when possible. In his relations with Latin American states, Wilson’s perception of these rights took on a paternalistic role. Latin Americans certainly possessed the right of self-determination, but Wilson himself stated that “I am going to teach the South American republics to elect good men.”⁴⁵ To teach them such lessons, intervention was justified, as in the Mexican case. In this case, in Wilson’s eyes, the right had to be temporarily abrogated in order to

⁴³ Quoted in Welles, vol. II, p. 792.

⁴⁴ Welles, vol. II, p. 738.

be exercised. And even though the promotion of Wilson's brand of Latin American self-determination required the military occupation of certain states, the territorial sovereignty norm was preserved because of the US's renunciation of the right of conquest.

In examining the role of norms in the US decision to occupy the Dominican Republic in 1916, it is interesting to compare 1916 to 1870. How might events have turned out differently if Grant, rather than Wilson, had been president? As argued above, Grant's scheme to annex the Dominican Republic failed for lack of rivals in the region. By contrast, Wilson intervened because of rivals – or one particular rival – in the region. It is probably fair to speculate that, given the credible excuse of a strategic imperative, Grant would have annexed the Dominican Republic in 1916. At the same time, in the absence of a European threat forcing him to use military force, Wilson probably would not even have considered annexing the Dominican Republic in 1870. Wilson's restraint in 1916 is further exemplified by the lack of a policy of occupation for the Dominican Republic;⁴⁵ had the US planned to acquire the territory, it is likely that policies of political assimilation and resource extraction would have been implemented in the years from 1916 to 1924. None were. Thus, the territorial sovereignty norm did play an important role in the US occupation of the Dominican Republic. Although, on the surface, this case appears to challenge my argument, Wilson made a reluctant decision to temporarily violate Dominican sovereignty in the face of a strategic imperative. His principles severely constrained the nature of the intervention, both by depriving the occupation forces of an occupation plan and by encouraging them to teach the Dominicans how best to exercise their right to self-determination.

⁴⁵ Ninkovich, p. 52.

⁴⁶ Calder, p. 23.

Did Dominican nationalism affect US decisionmaking?

The general occupation costs argument would make several predictions with respect to the Dominican Republic in 1916. The first prediction would be that the US would be more likely to take over the Republic in 1870 than in 1916, as Dominican nationalism would be more developed in the later period. The second prediction would be that, if the US anticipated nationalist resistance from the Dominicans prior to 1916, they would not have occupied the Republic. And the third general prediction of the argument would be that, in the face of resistance during the occupation, the US should withdraw its forces.

The first prediction is clearly not supported by the evidence; the US failed to annex the Dominican Republic in 1870, but occupied it for eight years beginning in 1916. The second and third predictions, however, are supported by available evidence. Thus, of all the mini-cases presented in this and the previous chapter, the 1916 US occupation of the Dominican Republic best supports the occupation costs argument.

Both just prior to and just after the US intervention, Dominican resistance was practically nonexistent.⁴⁷ Although the US Marines experienced light casualties in the first days of the occupation, the resistance they met was very dispersed and weak.⁴⁸ For occupation costs theorists, then, the lack of anticipated resistance makes the US decision to intervene a sensible one.

⁴⁷ Calder, p. 10.

⁴⁸ Fuller and Cosmas.

By 1917, however, the situation had changed dramatically. Particularly in the eastern part of the country, large bands of organized nationalists denied the Marines entry into various rural areas. Poorly-armed Dominican guerrillas met and consistently defeated US Marines who, by all accounts, should have outmatched them. Further, as Calder suggests, these guerrillas were politically aware at some basic level, resenting the insecurity that came with the Marines.⁴⁹

The initial reaction to Dominican resistance was to send more Marines to the eastern part of the Republic. The US military called the guerrillas “bandits,” thereby labeling them as something other than nationalists.⁵⁰ Fighting continued throughout 1917 and 1918. By 1919, the conflict was so intense that three times the original number of Marines was stationed in the east.⁵¹ Thus, the first response to nationalist revolt was to fight back, not to withdraw. In addition to sending more troops, the US military double-crossed nationalist leaders seeking to negotiate, herded many rural Dominicans into internment camps, air-bombed the east, and not infrequently abused civilians. This type of behavior only elevated the level of fighting.

By 1920, plans for withdrawal began to surface. Thus, it appeared that nationalist resistance had been successful. At that point, the Marines had given up on controlling the east, seeking only to contain the fighting. And indeed, violent opposition to the occupation ended by May 1922, when it was clear that the US intent was to withdraw soon.⁵²

⁴⁹ Calder, p. 120-21.

⁵⁰ Fuller and Cosmas.

⁵¹ Calder, p. 133.

⁵² Calder, pp. 179-180.

The threat of renewed resistance affected the plans for withdrawal in a way that neither side wanted. The US preference, for reasons discussed below, was to withdraw as quickly and cleanly as possible. This was also the Dominican preference. But the original US terms (stated in 1921) included provisions for continued US control over various parts of the Dominican economy and government. The Dominicans rejected this plan, and four years of negotiation ensued. For every plan suggested by the US, the Dominicans appeared willing to wait for something better. At times the US response was violent, threatening to extend the occupation until the Dominicans acceded to US demands. Ultimately, though, the US decision was to withdraw from the Republic, rather than to continue fighting.

Why did the US withdraw in 1924?

Three reasons drove the US withdrawal from the Dominican Republic, two of which are consistent with the argument made in this dissertation. First, the original reason for the intervention no longer existed. The rivalry with Germany was, at least temporarily, over. The strategic imperative for occupation was gone. Second, the occupation was damaging the US's relationship with other Latin American states. Adverse reputational consequences of violating Dominican sovereignty – and, in many eyes, the territorial sovereignty norm – clearly played into US decisionmaking at this point. And finally, as noted above, the costs imposed by Dominican resistance far exceeded the “benefits” of occupation.

The change in the situation with Germany explains part, but by no means all, of the decision to withdraw from the Dominican Republic. By 1918, World War I had ended and Germany was soundly defeated. Thus, the dynamics of rivalry would predict US withdrawal from the Dominican Republic during or after 1918, but cannot explain the extension of the occupation for another six years. Indeed, none of the available theories would have predicted such a long occupation. The best explanation for the length of the intervention appears to be that negotiations over withdrawal were unexpectedly drawn out from 1920 to 1924.

In addition to constraining the nature of the intervention, the territorial sovereignty norm influenced the decision to withdraw from the Dominican Republic. As argued in Chapter 2, one of the mechanisms by which great powers in particular are encouraged to adhere to norms is reputational. The Soviet Union, for example, refrained from outright conquest after World War II in part because such behavior would damage its relationships with other states it sought to recruit to its ideological cause. Similarly, the US suffered from violating Dominican territorial sovereignty in the eyes of other Latin American states. By 1919, as Secretary Lansing was reconsidering the Dominican situation due to the end of World War I, voices of protest of the occupation from Latin America were getting louder.⁵³ In 1920, a series of events underlined the general protest. The Colombian Congress passed a resolution in favor of ending the occupation, the Brazilian and Uruguayan ambassadors to the US told Lansing they hoped the occupation would soon end, and most of the Latin American press launched a campaign against the occupation.⁵⁴ The US intervention made other Latin American states nervous for a good

⁵³ Welles, vol. II, p. 823.

⁵⁴ Welles, vol. II, p. 829.

reason; if the US could find a legitimate excuse to occupy the Dominican Republic for so long, might another Latin American state be next?⁵⁵ The negative repercussions of the occupation were felt domestically as well. In the 1920 presidential election, Warren Harding frequently challenged Wilson on his Latin American policy in general and the Dominican occupation in particular.⁵⁶ The impact of violating even the periphery of the territorial sovereignty norm was keenly felt by the Wilson administration.

A final cause for the US withdrawal from the Dominican Republic was that the costs outweighed the benefits. Indeed, in the absence of a German threat, it was not clear that there was any benefit to occupying the Dominican Republic at all. Although several US businesses had interests in the Republic, those interests could still be protected if the US was not engaged in a military occupation. In addition to the costs generated by Dominican guerrillas fighting US marines, the US faced the “opprobrium costs” of violating Dominican sovereignty. In this instance, then, inflicting occupation costs was an effective strategy in resurrecting the Dominican state.

The absence of rivalry, the presence of the territorial sovereignty norm, and the imposition of occupation costs all influenced the US decision to withdraw from the Dominican Republic. One puzzle concerning the intervention, however, remains: why did it last so long? The reasons for the extended duration of the Dominican occupation are related to the reasons for the occupation (and withdrawal) itself. Because the US did not intend to annex the Dominican Republic in 1916, there were no plans beyond occupying the island to protect it from Germany. Soon after the occupation, the US

⁵⁵ Mark Gilderhus makes this broad argument with respect to US policy toward Latin America in the early 20th century.

⁵⁶ Welles, vol. II, 836.

became involved in World War I. High-level attention was directed across the Atlantic, not the Caribbean.

In the absence of direction from Washington, the Navy began to implement a number of programs to improve Dominican government and society. These included public works, education, sanitation, and military projects. Inertia seems to have carried the day until about 1920. Once opposition to the occupation was voiced – both internally and externally – the US government made the easy decision to withdraw. The conditions of withdrawal were, however, more difficult to determine. From 1920 to 1924, the US negotiated with the Dominicans, going through at least three major plans for withdrawal until one was accepted. Interestingly, during the process of negotiation, it was the US – facing domestic and international pressure, as well as the threat of renewed violence – and not the Dominicans, that made major concessions. Thus, both US inertia (at first) and intransigence (later) account for the duration of the Dominican occupation.

The 1965 Intervention: Forestalling a “Second Cuba”

One of the great ironies of the well-intentioned military reforms of the 1916 US occupation of the Dominican Republic was the emergence of Rafael Trujillo as the Republic’s new dictator. The US occupation of 1916-1924 had seen the reform of the Dominican constabulary and the training of Trujillo and his cohort. Trujillo quickly rose through the ranks, gaining control of the constabulary and then of the government.

For three decades, the US supported the Trujillo regime because it adhered to Washington's Caribbean policy.⁵⁷ Thus, the Dominican Republic was a compliant neighbor for much of the post-occupation period. Then, in 1961, Trujillo was assassinated. Following a series of attempted coups and provisional governments, elections in 1962 brought Juan Bosch to the Dominican presidency. Bosch was initially supported by US President Kennedy as the type of pro-democracy reformer needed to make the Alliance for Progress succeed.⁵⁸ Bosch's presidency, however, was short-lived. In September 1963, the Bosch government was overthrown in a military coup. The US initially refused to recognize the military government, but eventually acceded. Not quite two years later, in April 1965, the military government that had replaced Bosch was itself ousted by pro-Bosch military officers. This April, 1965 coup represents the start of what has frequently been called the "Dominican crisis."

In many respects, the US response to the crisis appeared – and was – muddled. President Johnson's justification for the early stages of a US intervention differed from his reasoning for the latter stages of the intervention. Information was sketchy and often biased. And although a significant amount of attention was paid to the crisis – such that Johnson essentially became his own desk officer for the Dominican Republic – the Administration was constantly distracted by its two policy priorities: the Great Society and Vietnam.⁵⁹

Nonetheless, several features of the intervention emerged distinctly. First, the US clearly considered the Dominican Republic a buffer state in the Cold War. The principal motivation for the US intervention was the fear of the Dominican Republic becoming a

⁵⁷ Atkins and Wilson, pp. 66-7, 80.

⁵⁸ Felten, "Path to Dissent", pp. 1009-1010.

“second Cuba.” Second, the Johnson administration was significantly constrained by the normative environment of the time. Options like annexation or long-term occupation were never considered, while concern for both domestic public opinion and the opinion of Latin American neighbors was often front-and-center in high-level meetings. And third, both Dominican nationalism and occupation costs were low. Low levels of Dominican nationalism in 1965 are not predicted by the occupation costs argument; the failure of the US to conquer the Dominican Republic under these conditions is also not predicted by occupation costs theorists.

Why did the US intervene in the Dominican Republic in 1965?

Johnson’s foreign policy was governed by a need to prevent the spread of Communism on a global – and certainly regional – basis. Although the Dominican Republic was in the US’s traditional “backyard,” very little attention was paid to it during Trujillo’s regime, principally because there appeared to be no threat of Communist incursion. With the “loss” of Cuba, however, and Castro’s stated intentions toward the island of Hispaniola, the US foreign policy establishment slowly began to fear the possibility of a Communist takeover in the Dominican Republic.⁶⁰ It was precisely this fear, which to US policymakers was embodied in the pro-Bosch coup, that led to the US intervention of the Dominican Republic in 1965.

As Abraham Lowenthal argues, the historical US interest in the Dominican Republic was not economic or even military, but “preemptive.” Lowenthal notes that,

⁵⁹ Felten, “Yankee, Go Home and Take Me with You”, p. 99.

⁶⁰ Lowenthal, p. 25.

since the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, the US's primary goal with respect to the Caribbean in general and the Dominican Republic in particular has been to prevent other powers from gaining a foothold in the region. The same was true in 1965.⁶¹

Indeed, even prior to the 1965 crisis, fears of a "second Cuba" in the Dominican Republic were growing. According to Lowenthal, John F. Kennedy's self-imposed indicators of success in his first year as president were preventing the Dominican Republic and the Congo from turning to communism.⁶² This concern was reflected both in Washington, after Kennedy's death, and in the US Embassy in Santo Domingo.

During the last week of April 1965, when the crisis erupted, worries about a Communist takeover surfaced immediately. In particular, reports from the US Embassy fed these concerns. *New York Times* reporter Tad Szulc observed that, within 24 hours of the April coup, embassy officials were convinced that Bosch's return to the Dominican Republic would mean the loss of the Republic to communism.⁶³ US Chargé d'Affaires William Connett, Jr. quickly informed Washington that "We believe there is a serious threat of a communist takeover in this country and that very little time remains in which to act."⁶⁴ On April 28, US Ambassador to the Dominican Republic W. Tapley "Tap" Bennett, Jr. cabled the State Department: "I regret that we may have to impose a military solution to a political problem...While leftist propaganda will fuzz this up as a fight between the military and the people, the issue is really between those who want a Castro-type solution and those who oppose it."⁶⁵ Later that same day, Bennett made the

⁶¹ Lowenthal, p. 20.

⁶² Lowenthal, p. 26.

⁶³ Szulc, p. 19.

⁶⁴ April 26, 1965. Quoted in Brands, pp. 51-52. At the time of the coup, Ambassador Bennett was visiting family in Georgia. Chargé d'Affaires Connett was the next-in-command at the embassy.

⁶⁵ Quoted in Szulc, p. 44. NB: Szulc had special access to US diplomatic cables during the crisis.

following recommendation to Washington: "I recommend that serious thought be given to armed intervention to restore order beyond a mere protection of lives. If the present loyalist efforts fail, the power will go to groups whose aims are identical with those of the Communist Party. We might have to intervene to prevent another Cuba."⁶⁶

Embassy concerns found a receptive audience in the White House and State Department. Immediately following the coup, President Johnson expressed his commitment to prevent "another Cuba in this Hemisphere," although he did not take action to this end for several days.⁶⁷ A State Department telegram to the Santo Domingo Embassy read: "We are very concerned with your reports of pro-Communist and anti-United States statements. Please keep us informed."⁶⁸ Newly sworn-in CIA Director William Raborn briefed Congressional leaders on the crisis he called a "Moscow-financed, Havana-directed plot to take over the Dominican Republic."⁶⁹

With the conviction that the Dominican Republic was in jeopardy of being lost to communism, US troops were landed in Hispaniola on April 28, ostensibly to protect the lives of American citizens and other foreign nationals. It was made clear to President Johnson, however, that this minimal initial contingent could not prevent the pro-Bosch rebels from winning what had by then become a civil war. According to former US Ambassador to the Dominican Republic John Martin, Johnson stated that he did "not intend to sit here with my hands tied and let the Communists take that island. What can we do in Vietnam if we can't clean up the Dominican Republic? I know what the editorials will say, but it would be a hell of a lot worse if we sit here and don't do

⁶⁶ Quoted in Szulc, p. 54.

⁶⁷ Lowenthal, p. 86.

⁶⁸ Quoted in Szulc, p. 21.

⁶⁹ Quoted in Lowenthal, p. 105.

anything and the Communists take that country.”⁷⁰ Similarly, Secretary of State Dean Rusk listed the US’s primary objectives in the Dominican Republic as “restoration of law and order, prevention of a possible Communist takeover, and protection of American lives.”⁷¹

Additional evidence that fear of a Communist takeover motivated the US intervention can be found in the text of Johnson’s speeches justifying the action. Initially, on April 28, Johnson couched the intervention as motivated entirely by a desire to protect American lives.⁷² Two days later, however, he suggested that “there are signs that people trained outside the Dominican Republic are seeking to gain control.”⁷³ And by May 2, Johnson reported that:

[T]he revolutionary movement took a tragic turn. Communist leaders, many of them trained in Cuba, seeing a chance to increase disorder, to gain a foothold, joined the revolution. They took increasing control. And what began as a popular democratic revolution, committed to democracy and social justice, very shortly moved and was taken over and really seized and placed into the hands of a band of Communist conspirators... The American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere.⁷⁴

Interestingly, one of the more controversial aspects of the intervention questions the validity of the claim that the Dominican Republic could become “another Cuba.” Both Theodore Draper and Tad Szulc, for example, argue that the communist threat was

⁷⁰ Quoted in Lowenthal, p. 116.

⁷¹ Quoted in Brands, p. 54

⁷² “Statement by the President Upon Ordering Troops Into the Dominican Republic.” April 28, 1965. Johnson, 1965 Book I, p. 461. Indeed, the Administration initially felt that this was the only justification that would be palatable to the American public. This conviction was so strong that the Embassy had to hint strongly to Dominicans requesting aid that their request must be framed in terms of protecting American lives, rather than protecting the Dominican Republic from communism.

⁷³ “Statement by the President on the Situation in the Dominican Republic.” April 30, 1965. Johnson, 1965 Book I, pp. 465-66.

⁷⁴ “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Situation in the Dominican Republic.” May 2, 1965. Johnson, 1965 Book I, pp. 469-74.

overblown. Draper contends that the evidence of a communist role in the coup was slim, at best – although communists supported the coup, their support was rejected by the rebels.⁷⁵ Similarly, Szulc interviewed a number of rebels during the crisis who repeatedly asked him to convey the message that they were not communists.⁷⁶ Szulc goes even farther, arguing that the US portrayal of the pro-Bosch forces as communist probably drove them farther to the left than they were originally.⁷⁷

Strong doubts continue to overlay the US decision to intervene in the Dominican Republic to forestall a communist revolution. Various analysts have argued that there was no communist element in the coup, that there was only a very small and weak element, or that intervention to prevent a communist revolution was unjustified. It is likely that a small group of communists participated in the rebel movement, but it is also likely that the strength of the communist “threat” to the Dominican Republic – and hence, the United States – was blown well out of proportion. An anxious embassy staff, an overzealous State Department,⁷⁸ and an administration generally preoccupied with international communism may have created a propitious frame for exaggeration. The salient point here, though, is that all these parties believed in a communist threat in the Dominican Republic in April 1965 and that, for this reason, they chose to intervene to prevent the Dominican buffer from becoming a “second Cuba.”

⁷⁵ Draper, p. 34. In fact, the theme of Draper’s book is that the Dominican coup did not represent a communist threat to US interests.

⁷⁶ Szulc, p. 82.

⁷⁷ Szulc, pp. 91-92.

⁷⁸ Undersecretary of State Thomas Mann, along with the embassy in Santo Domingo, is frequently characterized as a zealot in the literature on the 1965 intervention. This general perception appears to be supported by Mann’s own words. In an interview with CBS, Mann justified the intervention as preventing the Dominican Republic from falling to the Sino-Soviet bloc, which had conspired to take over the Republic. Quoted in Szulc, p. 291.

Did the territorial sovereignty norm affect US decisionmaking?

The history of US-Dominican relations is telling in its illustration of a trend. In 1870, the US seriously considered annexing the Dominican Republic; in 1916, an eight-year occupation commenced; in 1965, the US reluctantly intervened for a relatively short period of time. What accounts for this change in US behavior toward the Dominican Republic?

I argue that US behavior was increasingly conditioned by a need to respect the territorial sovereignty norm, particularly in the late 20th century. As shown above, limited evidence of the impact of this norm can be found in the 1870 and particularly the 1916 cases. By 1965, however, awareness of territorial sovereignty norm was central to the Johnson administration's decisionmaking with respect to the Dominican Republic. The territorial sovereignty norm played a key role in shaping the 1965 intervention in three ways: first, from the beginning days of the crisis, Washington was very concerned about both Latin American and US domestic reaction to the intervention; second, throughout the crisis, almost no mention was made of the 1870 or 1916 incidents – the options of annexation or prolonged occupation seem to have exited the US behavioral repertoire; and finally, the US was both reluctant to intervene in and eager to exit the Dominican Republic for reasons of reputation.

Immediately following the US intervention, Latin American leaders began to object to the US action. For instance, Venezuelan President Raúl Leoni sent Johnson a

telegram condemning the move.⁷⁹ Lowenthal argues that Johnson had two main goals – “to prevent a Communist takeover of the Dominican Republic and to avoid having the United States caught alone in Santo Domingo, isolated from hemispheric opinion.”⁸⁰ World opinion was also an issue; by May 1, UN Secretary-General U Thant had agreed, at the Soviet Union’s request, to hold a Security Council meeting to discuss the US intervention.

What is striking about the reaction to the US intervention of the Dominican Republic is that it consisted of protest of an intervention was always explicitly limited. Latin Americans, Soviets, and US citizens were not protesting one state’s violent conquest of another, but a much more discrete incursion of Dominican sovereignty. International opinions about acceptable behavior had clearly changed significantly since the 19th – and certainly 18th – centuries, when much more extreme challenges to sovereignty were common, if not expected. And in addition to the world reacting differently to US action than before, the US reacted differently to world opinion.

On the morning of April 30, President Johnson told Secretary of State Rusk to “find out what we have to do to make it look good. We’ll get a cloak of international approval if we can get it before the baby dies.”⁸¹ The administration had already opened channels to the Organization of American States (OAS) with the intent of transforming

⁷⁹ Lowenthal, p. 116. Leoni later published an anti-intervention article in the July 1965 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. He wrote: “Such actions as the one in the Dominican Republic tend to revive the era of unilateral intervention, which one supposed had been left far behind by the evolution of international life. They place in serious jeopardy the principles and essential norms that constitute the legal basis of the OAS...Venezuela, I repeat, will not countenance unilateral intervention. We favor multilateral or collective action when necessary to guarantee or reestablish the democratic basis of member states, or to oppose subversive activities from abroad that threaten the security and independence of any American state. Such was the case when the Soviet Union established missiles on Cuban territory, clearly threatening the peace and security of the hemisphere. And today we adhere to the same attitude regarding the situation in the Dominican Republic. Leoni, p. 642.

⁸⁰ Lowenthal, p. 116. Also see Felten, “Yankee, Go Home and Take Me with You”, p. 103.

the originally unilateral US intervention into a hemispheric action. OAS leaders quickly became involved in brokering various cease-fires, negotiating new governments, and installing Latin American troops alongside US Marines. By May 6, it was agreed that soldiers from Venezuela, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Paraguay would participate in the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) to be stationed in the Dominican Republic. The US intent here was not difficult to discern. "We are going to have to use the OAS as a cloak for whatever we're going to do," Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy told President Johnson on April 28.⁸²

The US spent considerable diplomatic capital in ensuring the participation of the OAS in the Dominican intervention. The need to preserve the illusion that the region acted as one during the crisis also constrained US military actions, for example by forcing the Marines on the ground to behave neutrally toward both sides in the civil war.⁸³ It is not clear why the US would expend this kind of effort if not to project the impression that they were behaving as they ought; that the US had violated Dominican sovereignty to some degree was clear, but by behaving according to certain scripts, the violation could be mitigated. One such script was the transformation of a unilateral intervention into a multilateral action. The pressure of world and regional opinion, which supported the territorial sovereignty norm, constrained US behavior by shaping the nature of the 1965 intervention.

The territorial sovereignty norm also influenced US decisionmaking in that behaviors that were actively considered in the past were either not discussed or discussed only unwillingly in 1965. Available sources do not reveal any references to the

⁸¹ Felten, "Yankee, Go Home and Take Me with You", p. 103.

⁸² Felten, "Yankee, Go Home and Take Me with You", p. 104.

annexationism of 1870, and only brief and derogatory references to the 1916 occupation can be found. For example, Undersecretary of State George Ball recalled that “There was nothing to do but react quickly. Though none of us wanted to repeat history by stationing troops in the Dominican Republic, as America had done from 1916 to 1924, we had no option.”⁸⁴ US envoy and former Ambassador Martin noted that “a full-scale US military occupation” was a major danger to be avoided in the Dominican Republic.⁸⁵ The only other reference to the 1916 occupation I have located was in a May 6, 1965 *New York Times* editorial, which stated that, “in its development if not in its origin, the Marine intervention in the Dominican Republic was reminiscent of 1916...Ours is the most powerful nation on earth, but there are things that even the United States cannot do in this period of history. The sooner this country extricates itself from the Dominican Republic – if at all possible with the help of the OAS – the better.”⁸⁶ Thus, 1965 appears to have been barely reminiscent of 1916, and 1916 was hardly looked upon with pride. Instead, the prolonged occupation that characterized the 1916 intervention was viewed as a policy to be avoided.

The territorial sovereignty norm also conditioned US behavior by creating a reluctance to intervene and an eagerness to withdraw from the Dominican Republic. Two days after the coup, US Chargé d’Affaires Connett expressed reservations about intervening. Connett argued that intervention could have “serious implications” for the US global and regional role: “We would be cast in the role of an interventionist power opposing a popular revolution of democratic elements overthrowing an unpopular

⁸³ Lowenthal, p. 127.

⁸⁴ Brands, p. 53.

⁸⁵ Lowenthal, p. 119.

⁸⁶ “The Illusion of Omnipotence.” Editorial, *The New York Times*.

constitutional regime.”⁸⁷ Similarly, Ambassador Bennett, despite his hyperbole about the Communist threat, resisted escalation of the intervention.⁸⁸

Once the intervention had begun, developing an exit strategy became a priority. Indeed, the administration evaluated proposals for new Dominican governments in part based on the nature of the exit strategy for the US, and preferred the plan proposed by former Dominican President Joaquín Balaguer precisely because it provided such a strategy.⁸⁹ Balaguer’s proposal, which included an imminent president election, itself led to an interesting incident with respect to the US exit strategy. Both Balaguer and Bosch – the two leading candidates for the Dominican presidency – requested that the IAPF remain in the Dominican Republic after the election, to help ensure control over the military. Their proposal was unambiguously rejected.⁹⁰ Had the US harbored territorial ambitions toward the Dominican Republic, agreeing to this request would have provided a perfect opportunity to advance those goals.

Concern about international reaction to the intervention, distaste for the prolonged occupations of the past, and a genuine desire to exit the Dominican Republic all shaped the US 1965 action in consequential ways. These behaviors are consistent with a situation in which the US felt constrained by an international norm protecting states’ territorial sovereignty. Indeed, it would have been much more efficient for the US to intervene unilaterally, and to stay as long as needed to ensure that the Dominican Republic would remain within the American sphere of influence. Ultimately, though, both these options were foreclosed by the normative environment of the post-World War

⁸⁷ Quoted in Brands, p. 51.

⁸⁸ Lowenthal, p. 106.

⁸⁹ Felten, "Yankee, Go Home and Take Me with You", p. 118.

⁹⁰ Felten, "Yankee, Go Home and Take Me with You", p. 125.

II world. Even the much more limited option of a quick intervention was undertaken reluctantly, and only because the threat of a Communist takeover appeared imminent. Johnson's dilemma is representative of the fate of buffer states after 1945; international norms proscribe incursions of sovereignty, but strategic imperatives demand action against rivals. The only option was a compromise: the US simply could not engage in a prolonged occupation, but neither could it stand by and see the Dominican Republic become a "second Cuba." Limited intervention was the best solution, albeit a least of all evils. Johnson himself characterized the difficulty of balancing the territorial sovereignty norm against the need to protect a buffer state best. On May 2, 1965, in a conversation with congressional leaders, he remarked, "If I send in Marines, I can't live in the Hemisphere. If I don't, I can't live at home."⁹¹

Did Dominican nationalism affect US decisionmaking?

Unlike the 1916 occupation, the 1965 intervention of the Dominican Republic does not provide confirming evidence for the occupation costs argument. Three questions must be asked in evaluating the argument in this case. First, could the US have anticipated Dominican nationalism prior to the intervention? Second, did Dominican nationalism influence the decision to intervene or the nature of the intervention? And third, were the costs of the intervention low or high for the US? *Ex post*, the occupation costs argument would suggest that the change in US behavior between 1870 and 1965 means that increased Dominican nationalism in the later years prevented US conquest or

⁹¹ Quoted in Dallek, *Flawed Giant*, pp. 265-66.

long-term occupation of the Republic in 1965. In other words, the costs of occupation should have become prohibitively high.

Available evidence contradicts this analysis. Although some scholars have suggested that Dominican nationalism – or, at least, commitment to democracy – was in greater evidence in 1965 than in 1916, these sentiments were not expressed clearly prior to the intervention. Thus, nationalism could not have served as a deterrent to US action. Further, the history of US decisionmaking regarding the 1965 intervention is as silent on the issue of nationalism as it is on the option of conquest. But while the norms argument is supported by the lack of discussion of conquest as an option, the occupation costs argument is challenged by US decisionmakers' failure to express concern about Dominican nationalism. The norms argument suggests that conquest may have exited the US's behavioral repertoire; the occupation costs argument contends that nationalism should be at the forefront of US decisionmaking. Finally, the costs of the intervention for the US were in fact quite low. Ignoring for the moment the historical trend of increasing nationalism predicted by the occupation costs argument, the US's calculus in 1965 should have led to conquest or long-term occupation of the Dominican Republic, given the low costs of intervention.

Only two, weak pieces of evidence support the claim that Dominicans in 1965 were more nationalistic than in 1916. First, in Theodore Draper's estimation, the 1965 coup gave the Dominicans a cause to fight for and believe in. According to Draper, "the Dominican people will probably look back at the 1965 revolt with pride and even exaltation. They did not have much to be proud or exalted about in over a hundred years. For one of the few times in their entire history they fought for something worth believing

in.”⁹² Second, and similarly, Draper points to a February 1965 advertisement in a major Dominican newspaper, signed by 2,000 Dominican professionals and intellectuals, deploring the lack of democracy in the country.⁹³ The willingness of middle-class, professional citizens to take such a political risk under a military government, argues Draper, illustrates a commitment to democracy and to country. A third piece of evidence that might demonstrate nationalism, although not a change from 1916, is popular involvement in the 1965 revolt. It is true that the pro-Bosch rebels included more civilians than the “loyalists” of the military juntas, but both groups were dominated by different sectors of the pre-coup military. The Dominican crisis, prior to intervention, was a civil war. It was not a fight for a separate homeland, or for freedom from foreign influence, but for political power and political change. Under these conditions, it is difficult at best to discern the level of nationalism felt by the Dominican protagonists; one could as easily argue that none or all were nationalists.

Regardless of whether the Dominicans actually were strong nationalists, none of the accounts of the crisis reveal a concern about Dominican resistance in contemplating and planning the intervention. Given that all these accounts are based on interviews with US decisionmakers, on-the-spot reporting, and/or exhaustive examination of primary documents, the absence of a discussion of Dominican nationalism is telling. US policymakers were far more concerned about the reaction of their Latin American neighbors to the intervention than they were about the reaction of the Dominicans themselves. Indeed, the US was so confident that it could tip the scales in favor of the

⁹² Draper, p. 2.

⁹³ Draper, pp. 2526.

loyalists, that the primary questions driving the intervention were “when” and “how,” not “whether” it would work.⁹⁴

The US confidence in its ability to exercise its will in the Dominican Republic was justified. Not only did the Johnson administration ultimately achieve its goal of a Dominican Republic that remained in the American sphere of influence, but it did so at a very low cost. According to Peter Felten, 27 US soldiers died, and the added costs of the intervention (over what the US would have normally given the Dominican Republic in assistance) was \$225 million, far short of what was and would be spent in Vietnam.⁹⁵ Once again, had the US wished to take over the Dominican Republic, the logic of the occupation costs argument suggests that it should have done so in 1965, given the low costs of intervention and occupation.

Thus, the occupation costs argument fails on three counts with respect to the 1965 intervention of the Dominican Republic. One of the main lines of argument of this theory is that nationalism should increase over time; it is not at all clear that Dominican nationalism did increase from 1916 to 1965. Further, if worries about the resistance of nationalist populations governed US decisionmaking, we should see evidence of such concern in interviews, memos, or news articles; virtually none is available. And finally, another line of argument germane to the occupation costs theory is that, when occupation costs are low, states should be more likely to conquer other states. In the case of the Dominican Republic in 1965, occupation costs were low, but the US sought to withdraw from the Republic as soon as its goals there were accomplished.

⁹⁴ Lowenthal, p. 84.

⁹⁵ Felten, “Yankee, Go Home and Take Me with You”, p. 126.

Why did the US withdraw in 1966?

On June 28, 1966, the withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Forces from the Dominican Republic began. By this time, US troop numbers had already declined from a high of 21,000 to approximately 6,000 soldiers. As noted above, the two leading candidates for the Dominican presidency requested that the IAPF troops remain, but were refused by both the US and the OAS. Given that they were invited to stay, why did they choose to leave?

The theories explored in this chapter offer a number of explanations for the US/OAS decision to withdraw. Specifically, my argument suggests two causes for withdrawal: the first is that the threat of the Dominican Republic leaving the US sphere of influence had ebbed, making (temporary) direct control of the buffer state unnecessary; the second is that the US had always sought a brief action in order to prevent an international backlash against violating the territorial sovereignty norm.

The occupation costs argument suggests another line of reasoning. Withdrawal should be a function of nationalism. Even if the Dominicans were not sufficiently nationalistic to deter intervention, the intervention itself should have inspired nationalist revolt that increased pressure on the US such that the intervention became too costly to continue.

As with the general occupation costs argument, only very limited evidence supports the claim that strong Dominican nationalist sentiment followed the US intervention. Tad Szulc, who was in Santo Domingo for the first five weeks of the intervention, reported in the *New York Times* that "Two weeks after the first American

troop landings in Santo Domingo, the United States is facing a surge of anti-American sentiment here. Virtually no such hostility existed here before the landings.”⁹⁶ Anti-American sentiment, such as it was, did not appear to hinder US troops in executing the intervention. Peter Felten also observes a nationalist reaction to the intervention, but with a twist; he noted Dominican graffiti in April 1966 as reading: “go home yankee y llevame contigo” [and take me with you].⁹⁷ These observations, however, seem to represent the most extreme elements of Dominican nationalist sentiment against the intervention. This is not to argue that the Dominicans welcomed the intervention, but rather that they did not, by any means, provide sufficient resistance to induce the US to withdraw its troops.

Instead, US troops were withdrawn from the Dominican Republic because they had accomplished their goal, and because the intervention was always intended to be temporary. With Balaguer’s election to the Dominican presidency in 1966, the US once again felt it had a reliable ally. And, as argued above, the US wanted to withdraw from the Dominican Republic as soon as possible in order to avoid the negative international response that would be evoked by a long-term occupation.

Conclusion

This chapter probes arguments suggested by the dynamics of rivalry, the territorial sovereignty norm, and occupation costs theories by examining a century of US-Dominican relations. Perhaps surprisingly, the dynamics of rivalry help explain a

⁹⁶ “Crisis in Santo Domingo: Anti-U.S. Feeling Surges.” *The New York Times*.

⁹⁷ Felten, “Yankee, Go Home and Take Me with You”, p. 98.

number of incidents in US-Dominican relations. The power of this argument is unexpected here because the Dominican Republic is not geographically located between the US and any of its historical rivals. As has been shown in this chapter, however, rivalry is not bounded by geography. A number of contenders for control over Dominican sovereignty have sailed into the US's "backyard" since the Republic's independence in 1822. Spain actually succeeded in reannexing the Dominican Republic in 1861, and the threat of German and Communist (i.e., Cuban and Soviet) incursions in 1916 and 1965, respectively, led to strong US action to preserve its indirect control over the Republic. Conversely, despite the annexationist aims of President Grant in 1870, he could not convince Congress to support the US absorption of the Dominican Republic precisely because he lacked a credible rival that could take over the island.

In contrast to the dynamics of rivalry argument, both the norms and occupation costs arguments are fundamentally historical; generally speaking, they predict different outcomes at different times. Superficially, the norms argument weakly wins out over the occupation costs argument when examining the broad sweep of history. The US considered annexation in 1870, but not in 1916. The US executed an eight-year occupation in 1916, but actively sought to avoid a similar outcome in 1965. In very general terms, the occupation costs argument would have predicted annexation in 1870, occupation in 1916, and intervention in 1965. In this light, the occupation costs argument only fails on one count, and one could also argue that the norms argument would make a similar prediction. My view, however, is that the territorial sovereignty norm acts as a constraint on states – just as rivals inspire conquest and intervention, the norm shapes these actions. Thus, in the absence of a positive (i.e., strategic) reason to take over the

Dominican Republic in 1870, I am not surprised that the US considered, but ultimately decided against, annexation.

A closer examination of the individual events described in this chapter reveals additional support for the norms argument, but only limited support for the occupation costs argument. As expected, US policymakers expressed concern for adherence to the territorial sovereignty norm. Wilson justified violating the norm by convincing himself that he was doing the Dominicans a good turn through reformation of their government and society; Johnson, in his own words, “cloaked” the intervention by turning it into a multilateral action supported by those most likely to condemn it. Neither president, however, expressed concern about Dominican nationalism in anticipation of intervention. Thus, the primary prediction of the occupation costs argument – that expected occupation costs will be likely to prevent conquest or intervention in the twentieth century and beyond – is not borne out by the Dominican case. Where the occupation costs argument does seem to offer some analytical, although erratic, leverage is in understanding state resurrection. In response to both the Spanish reannexation of 1861 and the US occupation of 1916, nationalist resistance to foreign occupation imposed significant costs on the occupiers. By all accounts, these costs were at least somewhat influential in the Spanish and US decisions to withdraw from the Dominican Republic. But similar costs were not anticipated or imposed in 1870 or 1965. Why was this so? One conjecture is that nationalist revolt in response to occupation needs time to grow; because the proposed 1870 annexation never occurred, and because the 1965 intervention was relatively brief, there was not sufficient time for a revolt to develop. If this conjecture is correct, however, it seriously undermines the explanatory power of the occupation costs argument

in the post-1945 world. To the degree that the occupation costs argument is most helpful in predicting state resurrection, it cannot explain much in an era characterized by limited interventions as opposed to prolonged conquests and occupations.

CONCLUSION

States die when other states have strong incentives to take them over. States survive in the absence of a strategic imperative toward conquest or, if such an imperative exists, states survive when would-be conquerors face international norms that constrain their behavior. This dissertation has contributed to the knowledge of international relations first by answering the question posed in the introduction: under what conditions do states die, or exit the international system? In addressing this issue, my analysis has challenged longstanding conventional wisdom that had never before been tested, as well as provided needed definitions for important terms in the field.

I conclude by first summarizing the arguments and evidence presented in the previous chapters. I then assess the theoretical implications of my analysis. Next, I turn to policy implications derived from my argument – in particular, I consider the role of the territorial sovereignty norm in future international relations, as well as how today's buffer states can maximize the probability of state, regime, and leader survival. Finally, I present a number of important issues related to but not addressed in this dissertation, and suggest avenues for future research on state sovereignty and death.

Review of Previous Chapters

In Chapter 2, I argued, contrary to most international relations theory, that understanding state death and survival required examining the incentive structures facing states that might take over states, rather than focusing on the features or behaviors

exhibited by states that might themselves get taken over. In particular, I suggested that states engaged in enduring rivalries are involved in security dilemmas around the states that lie between them – buffer states. This prediction is surprising in that great powers are generally thought to have an interest in preserving the buffers that distance them from each other. When states become rivals, however, this equilibrium quickly erodes. Each rival fears the possibility that its opponent will take over a buffer state at its expense; thus, the survival of buffer states is a fragile condition, easily upset by the behavior of rivals or of buffers themselves. Because states engaged in rivalries only fear that their competitors will take over buffers associated with the rivalry, non-buffer states are much less likely to die than buffer states. And because the survival of buffer states is so fragile, small moves made by encroaching rivals or even by buffers themselves can appear sufficiently threatening to rivals to lead them to partition nearby buffers. Buffer states, then, are likely to die precisely because surrounding states face a strategic imperative to take them over.

Just as strategy can drive state behavior, so can international norms constrain it. I argue that an international norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty prevents violent state death after 1945. With its roots in Wilsonian idealism and American anti-war sentiment, this norm entered the international system after World War I but only received strong great power sponsorship following the second world war. For fear of punishment if they violate the norm, would-be conquerors today revise their territorial ambitions, and manage their rivalries by intervening in, rather than conquering, buffer states.

Chapter 3 provided definitions needed to test the ideas laid out in my argument, as well as to test competing hypotheses. The two main terms that needed both definition

and coding rules were “state,” or “member of the interstate system,” and “state death,” or “exit from the interstate system.” I challenged and built on the major data set in international security studies – the Correlates of War – in identifying members of the interstate system. By drawing on original archival research, as well as international legal theory, I revised and expanded the Correlates of War list of members of the interstate system. Using this expanded list of states will allow scholars to apply their analyses to a broader number and range of cases, as well as to examine the role of international legitimacy – a variable never before coded for quantitative analysis – in world politics.

I also discussed the definition of state death. After considering a number of different definitions, I chose to define state death as the formal loss of control over foreign policy making power to another state. This definition both captured the essence of what was interesting about state death for IR scholars and also came with a workable, built-in coding scheme. Nonetheless, there are cases at the edges of both statehood and state death; instead of avoiding discussion of these cases, I tried to justify my decisions for coding them as I did.

The many definitions and coding decisions presented in Chapter 3 were applied in the quantitative analysis that comprised Chapter 4. Both to challenge my own argument, as well as to give other hypotheses as fair a test as possible, I ran a number of analyses on principal and corollary hypotheses of my own and competing theories. As expected, I found a strong and positive statistical relationship between buffer state status and the probability of violent state death; the data analysis also revealed an equally strong, but negative, relationship between states surviving to 1945 and the probability of violent state death. Surprisingly, however, there appeared to be no relationship between a major

neorealist variable – power – and the probability of violent state death. Similarly, the relationship between variables associated with the occupation costs argument and both state death and state resurrection was weak at best. Thus, the consistent message from the data not only confirmed the hypotheses generated by my argument, but disconfirmed the claims made by others.

Additional analyses of both my and competing arguments were presented in the case study chapters. In Chapter 5, an examination of 250 years of Polish history illustrated the curse of buffer state status very clearly. The behavior of surrounding rivals, and even of the Poles themselves, also showed how small policy moves can induce fears of loss of control over a buffer state that ultimately lead to state death. The pattern of Polish state death was, however, interrupted after World War II. In 1956, instead of planning to conquer a wayward Poland, the Soviet Union only considered intervening in its troubled satellite. This dramatic change in behavior – from partition to annexation to contemplation of limited intervention – is consistent with the argument that a norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty prevents violent state death after 1945. Although this norm overrides the strategic imperative rivals face to conquer their buffer states, the need to retain control over buffers remains and takes the form of limited military interventions following World War II.

In addition to illustrating the process by which my argument works, the Polish case also served as an additional challenge to two competing hypotheses. The neorealist selection argument suggests that, if states in threatening situations follow realist principles in their foreign policy, they will be more likely to survive. The Poles consistently attempted to balance against power and threat, but none of these moves

could save Poland from its own geography. Polish history also provides what should be an easy test for the occupation costs argument. The logic of this argument is that states with more nationalistic populations will be more likely to survive, as conquerors will recognize that these states will be particularly costly to govern. Polish nationalism was apparent to Russia, Austria, and Prussia in the 18th century, to Nazi Germany and the USSR just before World War II, and to the Soviets in 1956. In none of these cases, however, did the costs of occupation generated by a nationalistic Polish population deter aggression against Poland. Instead of being warned off by the threat of nationalism, Poland's conquerors met their goals through the repression of nationalist sentiment and rebellion. At most, one might argue that there was a limited role for nationalism in the resurrections of Poland in 1919 and 1945.

Similar findings emerged in the case study of the Dominican Republic. One of the more surprising elements of this case is that the Dominican Republic, despite being part of an island, actually functioned as a buffer state for much of its history. Caught between the Germans and Americans during World War I, and between the USSR/Cuba and the US during the Cold War, the maintenance of indirect control over the Republic has often been a critical issue in US foreign policy history. Fear of a loss of control over the Dominican Republic led to the eight-year military occupation of 1916 and the limited intervention of 1965. At the same time, in the absence of a strategic imperative to take over the Republic in 1870, the US Senate rejected a treaty to annex the Dominican Republic.

The Dominican case also illustrates the workings of the territorial sovereignty norm. President Grant was one of the strongest proponents of annexation in 1870, but

Wilson and Johnson never even considered absorbing Dominican territory during their presidencies. Woodrow Wilson was sensitive to stepping on the fringes of the territorial sovereignty norm by occupying the Dominican Republic, and Johnson expended a good deal of effort to manage the domestic and regional perceptions of the US intervention in 1965.

The evidence, then, supports the theory. Buffer states are more likely to die than non-buffer states, and states after 1945 are very unlikely to die. In the postwar world, however, one form of death substitutes for another as buffer states are increasingly vulnerable to external interventions that replace their regimes and leaders.

Theoretical Implications

A number of theoretical implications emerge from this analysis. In particular, these implications speak to the failure of the conventional wisdom on state death embedded in IR theory. Further, this analysis also builds on existing schools of thought in international relations scholarship by promoting the role of geography as well as a more nuanced view of norms in international politics.

One of the great, heretofore-untested assertions of international relations theory is the neorealist selection argument. To restate, this argument suggests that, if states fail to behave as if they were rational, they will be selected out of the international system. Rational behavior, in this case, means following realist prescripts in foreign policy making.

The preceding analysis belies this claim. There is no apparent relationship between “rational” (or realist) state behavior and state survival or death. Contrary to this neorealist claim, states are not selected out of the international system. Selection implies a system whereby certain traits or behaviors of organisms (or organizations, as in this case) are better suited to the environment and therefore more likely to reproduce. Conversely, those that fail to exhibit these features or behaviors will be selected out of the system. My analysis shows that state death is unrelated to state attributes or behaviors. Hyper-rational behavior – or at least, the type of behavior suggested by neorealism – is unlikely to save buffer states from dying a violent death. And irrational behavior is unlikely to lead to the death of non-buffer states when surrounding powers have no positive incentives to take them over. A major theoretical implication of this dissertation, then, is that, contrary to neorealist expectations, selection does not occur in the international system.

Another claim that is often made but rarely tested is that states that can generate high occupation costs for would-be conquerors are more likely to survive than states that are unable to generate these costs. Most often, the occupation costs referred to here are related to nationalism. This general argument works in two ways. First, on a very basic level, if would-be conquerors anticipate high occupation costs in a potential conquest, they should refrain from taking over that state. Second, there is an historical component to this argument; as nationalism has grown globally over the past two centuries, general rates of conquest should decrease as all states are increasingly able to generate occupation costs for potential conquerors.

The first version of this argument is unsupported by the evidence examined in this dissertation. The quantitative indicators suggested by proponents of the occupation costs argument bear no relationship to the probability of state death or survival. Further, as shown most clearly in the Polish case, conquerors may be more likely to be spurred on by the threat of nationalism than to be deterred by these costs. Poland's partitioners were disgusted by Polish nationalism in part because it threatened their ability to indirectly control the Polish buffer. Repeatedly, they made reference to eradicating all Polish nationalism. And, consistently, they responded to nationalist uprisings – both before and after partition – with repression instead of retreat. Instead of helping to save Poland, Polish nationalism appears to have contributed to her undoing.

The historical claim suggested by the occupation costs argument is more difficult to assess, particularly when placed alongside the hypothesis that a territorial sovereignty norm prevents violent state death after 1945. If, however, consideration of occupation costs constituted the primary calculation of would-be conquerors, it is not clear why the US failed to take over the Dominican Republic in 1870, when these costs should have been low, but engaged in a long-term occupation in 1916. Further, the historical component of this argument suggests a gradual decline in conquest, when the change in behavior is in fact very sharp at 1945.

This is not to say that nationalism has not increased over the past two centuries, or that nationalists cannot inflict costs on conquerors. My suspicion is that conquerors are either unable to assess or unwilling to be deterred by these costs in their decisions to take over other states. One possibility is that conquerors simply cannot tell which states will generate prohibitively high costs if absorbed. More than any other corollary of the

occupation costs argument, this hypothesis is at least mildly supported by the evidence. Particularly in the Dominican case, it appears that the infliction of high costs on conquerors may be correlated with state resurrection.

Both the neorealist selection argument and the occupation costs argument look to features or behaviors of states to predict state survival and death. I have argued, in contrast, that it is essential to examine the incentive structures facing states that might take over other states to understand state death. In locating specific incentive structures in the dynamics of rivalry and the prohibitive power of norms, I draw additional theoretical implications from my argument.

One such implication is that geography plays a critical role in international relations. Buffer states are defined by their location; were they located elsewhere, they might very well be less likely to die. Thus, I argue that IR scholars should consider more seriously the role of geography as an independent variable in international relations.

This analysis also bears on constructivist arguments in international relations. As a relatively new school of thought in IR, constructivist scholarship has focused on laying the theoretical groundwork for the general argument that international relations are socially constructed. In addition to focusing on the major effect of one social construction in international relations – the territorial sovereignty norm – this analysis also points to corollary effects of the norm. Given the difficulty of illustrating normative arguments, it is important to derive additional predictions from these arguments that distinguish them from other claims. Furthermore, unlike most constructivist analyses, my argument examines a norm that is not necessarily deeply internalized by actors in the international system. The consequences of shallow internalization of norms are

important to consider. In this case, would-be conquerors seek alternative means to attain goals previously sought through territorial expansion, and sometimes even directly test the strength of the norm.

Policy Implications

At first glance, it might appear that the topic of violent state death is not relevant for today's policymakers because conquest has virtually ceased to occur. Before deciding to ignore this topic, however, it is important for decisionmakers to ask two questions. First, why has violent state death ceased to occur? And second, are there policy-relevant consequences that emerge from this change in state behavior?

I argue that the norm protecting states' territorial sovereignty prevents violent state death after 1945. I also argue that this norm is rooted in Wilsonian idealism, and promoted through American hegemony. Given the limited internalization of this norm in current international relations, what would happen if the US declined as hegemon?

One possible answer to this question is that momentum, or path-dependence, would serve the survival of the norm in the absence of a hegemon. But what if another hegemon – for example, China – replaced the US as global superpower? In this case, we might expect Chinese notions of sovereignty to supplant the American commitment to the territorial sovereignty norm. Given China's history of creating tributary relations with states, and of committing to a policy of recreating the Chinese homeland,¹ the rule against territorial conquest could change significantly with the fall of one great power and the

¹ See the website of the Chinese foreign ministry: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/c413.html>.

rise of another. Although buffer states today appear to be protected from conquest, the source of this protection may not be a permanent part of the international system.

Even if the territorial sovereignty norm continued to constrain state behavior as it does today, my analysis of past violent state deaths contains implications for present policy. The finding that buffer states are more frequent targets of conquest and intervention than non-buffers, for example, indicates that certain states are more likely to be invaded today than others. The argument that, among buffer states, those that appear likely to move from one rival's control to another's are most likely to die also suggests policy implications for buffer states themselves. Buffer states should be particularly aware of external views regarding proposed domestic and foreign policy changes, as extreme reforms may well produce an unwanted intervention.

Buffer states must therefore be especially cautious in their decisionmaking. More specifically, it is the leaders and regimes of buffer states that will feel the most extreme consequences of intervention; the public at large is likely to be much less affected by the limited actions taken to control buffer states today. Thus, while their leaders should be very careful in making policy changes, publics should distance themselves from their leaders and regimes. In other words, citizens in buffer states would be well-advised not to identify the state too closely with its current regime or leader. They can, at least for the moment, rest easy in the notion that the state will survive; but they also should not necessarily expect the regime or leader to govern for long.

Future Research

This dissertation contributes to IR scholarship in challenging the conventional wisdom about state death, and also derives important policy implications about the likelihood and nature of violent state death in present and future international relations. The primary contribution here, though, is in providing an answer to the question: under what conditions do states die?

But this question raises further questions and issues. For example, my current analysis is restricted to the dichotomous dependent variable of violent state death, which is defined in terms of foreign policy control. As discussed in Chapter 3, however, foreign policy control is not a dichotomous variable. How would this analysis change if control over foreign policy were considered over a continuum? Are buffer states more likely to suffer all types of incursions of sovereignty, or are the rivals surrounding buffer states only concerned about some kinds of control over their buffers but not others? How would a continuum of foreign policy control even be constructed? Violent state death, as defined here, is an extreme loss of foreign policy control, but how could we compare other infringements of sovereignty?

A second set of questions raised by this analysis refers specifically to the normative argument made here. It is inherently difficult to test normative arguments because norms are invisible features of international relations. I have tried to meet this problem in part by deriving and then testing corollary hypotheses of the norms argument as well as alternative explanations for the post-1945 trend away from violent state death.

More scholarship, however, is needed on the general problem of testing for the role of specific norms in international politics.

A final, obvious, question not answered in this dissertation is: under what conditions do states die – non-violently? I chose to focus on violent state death here for three reasons. First, most state deaths are violent. Second, current international relations theories are best-suited to predict violent state death. And third, there appeared to be no *a priori* reason to expect that the causes of violent and non-violent state death would be the same or even similar.

Having concluded this portion of an analysis of state death, however, I suspect that my argument may in fact bear on non-violent state death. In examining variation in buffer state death, for instance, I find that many buffer states die non-violently. Two prime examples of this phenomenon are the German city-states of Bavaria and Württemberg, which voluntarily joined the Prussian confederation. The fate of Bavaria and Württemberg contrasts sharply with that of Hanover and Saxony, which fought and lost wars against the advancing Prussians. Faced with their imminent end, the German city-states had at least one choice to make: they could stand and fight – and probably lose, or they could negotiate themselves out of existence. The second choice might appear to be the obvious one, but it contains an inherent conundrum in that the would-be conquering state would have to convince the buffer that it would keep its promises to it. Understanding the choices made and bargains struck by buffer states under these conditions would enhance our ability to account for the variation in outcomes of state death.

There also may be applications of the norms argument to non-violent state death. As suggested in Chapter 2, the origins of the territorial sovereignty norm in the right to self-determination might lead to an increase in voluntary state unifications or dissolutions along national lines as the norm increases in strength. Chapter 4 contains a very brief test of this claim, but more research is needed to assess the role of the territorial sovereignty norm in all aspects of state behavior, as well as in changing patterns of (violent and non-violent) state death.

Conclusion

This dissertation has addressed a seminal, but previously unexplored question in international relations: under what conditions do states die, or exit the international system? As opposed to most arguments that look to features or behaviors of states themselves to predict state death and survival, I have argued that we must look to the conquerors instead of the conquered if we are to comprehend the phenomenon of state death. My argument upsets basic notions in international relations theory about selection in the international system, and the impact of norms in constraining great power behavior. The argument also generates important policy implications regarding the future stability of the international system and the current viability of various regimes and leaders. Most important, the answer to the question posed at the beginning of this dissertation is clear, at least with respect to violent state death. Buffer states are born to lose, and states after 1945 are – at least for now – doomed to survive.

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